The most important weather forecast in history
In memory of my father Hans who, in 1944, took part in the liberation of Europe with the Royal Engineers in the Italian Campaign. –Benny Peiser
1) The Weather Forecast That Saved D-Day
Christopher Klein
Years of detailed planning went into the D-Day invasion on June 6, 1944, but success hinged on one element that no military commander could control—the weather. In the days leading up to the invasion, Allied meteorologists delivered the most important weather forecast in history. If they got it wrong the Allies might have lost tens of thousands of men and World War II might have been lost forever.
In contrast to the bright morning about to dawn over Portsmouth, England, on June 4, 1944, gloom settled over the Allied commanders gathered inside Southwick House at 4:15 a.m. Years of preparation had been invested in the invasion of Normandy, but now, just hours before the launch of D-Day operations, came the voice of Group Captain James Stagg urging a last-minute delay. As Operation Overlord’s chief meteorological officer, the lanky Brit was hardly a battlefield commander, but the ultimate fate of D-Day now rested in his decision-making.
The disappointed commanders knew that the list of potential invasion dates were only a precious few because of the need for a full moon to illuminate obstacles and landing places for gliders and for a low tide at dawn to expose the elaborate underwater defenses installed by the Germans. June 5, chosen by Allied Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower to be D-Day, was the first date in a narrow three-day window with the necessary astronomical conditions. The massive Normandy landings, however, also required optimal weather conditions. High winds and rough seas could capsize landing craft and sabotage the amphibious assault; wet weather could bog down the army and thick cloud cover could obscure the necessary air support.
The critical, but unenviable task of predicting the English Channel’s notoriously fickle weather fell to a team of forecasters from the Royal Navy, British Meteorological Office and U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Force, and as D-Day approached, storm clouds brewed inside the meteorological office. Observations from Newfoundland taken on May 29 reported changing conditions that might arrive by the proposed invasion date. Based on their knowledge of English Channel weather and observations, the British forecasters predicted the stormy weather would indeed arrive on June 5. The American meteorologists, relying on a differing forecasting method based on historic weather maps, instead believed that a wedge of high pressure would deflect the advancing storm front and provide clear, sunny skies over the English Channel.
Stagg, the only meteorologist allowed direct contact with Eisenhower, had to make the final call. Although the sky was clear and wind negligible in the early hours of June 4, Stagg believed foul weather was only hours away. He sided with his fellow British colleagues and recommended a postponement. Knowing that the weather held the potential to be an even fiercer foe than the Nazis, a reluctant Eisenhower agreed in the early hours of June 4 to delay D-Day by 24 hours.
On the other side of the English Channel, German forecasters also predicted the stormy conditions that indeed rolled in as Stagg and his fellow Brits had feared. The Luftwaffe’s chief meteorologist, however, went further in reporting that rough seas and gale-force winds were unlikely to weaken until mid-June. Armed with that forecast, Nazi commanders thought it impossible that an Allied invasion was imminent, and many left their coastal defenses to participate in nearby war games. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel even returned home to personally present a pair of Parisian shoes to his wife as a birthday present.
German Luftwaffe meteorologists, however, relied on less sophisticated data and models than their Allied counterparts, says John Ross, author of “The Forecast for D-Day: And the Weatherman behind Ike’s Greatest Gamble.” “The Allies had a much more robust network of weather stations in Canada, Greenland and Iceland; of weather ships and weather flights over the North Atlantic and observations by secret agreement from weather stations in the neutral Republic of Ireland,” he says. Those weather stations, in particular one at a post office at Blacksod Point in the far west of Ireland, proved crucial in detecting the arrival of a lull in the storms that Stagg and his colleagues believed would allow for an invasion on June 6. As rain and high winds lashed Portsmouth on the night of June 4, Stagg informed Eisenhower of the forecast for a temporary break. With the next available date for an invasion nearly two weeks away, the Allies risked losing the element of surprise if they waited. In spite of the pelting rain and howling winds outside, Eisenhower placed his faith in his forecasters and gave the go-ahead for D-Day.
The weather during the initial hours of D-Day was still not ideal. Thick clouds resulted in Allied bombs and paratroopers landing miles off target. Rough seas caused landing craft to capsize and mortar shells to land off the mark. By noon, however, the weather had cleared and Stagg’s forecast had been validated. The Germans had been caught by surprise, and the tide of World War II began to turn.
Weeks later, Stagg sent Eisenhower a memo noting that had D-Day been pushed to later in June, the Allies would have encountered the worst weather in the English Channel in two decades. “I thank the Gods of War we went when we did,” Eisenhower scribbled on the report.
He could also have been thankful for Stagg overruling the advice of the American meteorologists who wanted to go on June 5 as planned, which Ross says would have been a disaster. “The weather over Normandy contained too much cloud cover for Ike’s greatest strategic asset, the Allied air forces, to effectively protect the landings from German armor, artillery and infantry reserves. Winds were too strong for the deployment of paratroopers to secure bridges and crossroads inland from the beaches thus preventing German reinforcement of coastal positions. Waves were too high for landing craft to put soldiers and supplies ashore. The key element of surprise—location and time—would have been lost, and the conquest of western Europe could well have taken another year.”
2) D-Day: The Sceptical Meteorologists Who Surprised The Nazis By Saying ‘Yes’ To June 6
Simon Pearson
The outcome of D-Day was decided not on the beaches of Normandy, but by weather systems in the mid-Atlantic and the ability of rival teams of meteorologists to interpret the forces of nature. The Americans were confident in long-range five-day forecasts. The British were sceptical, believing they could forecast only two days ahead at best. The teams clashed repeatedly.
The outcome of D-Day was decided not on the beaches of Normandy, but by weather systems in the mid-Atlantic and the ability of rival teams of meteorologists to interpret the forces of nature.
As unfavourable conditions developed during that early summer 70 years ago, three teams of meteorologists produced reports for the Allied commander, General Dwight D Eisenhower, who laid down the conditions necessary for invasion — and his preferred date: June 5. Across the Channel, a single team of Germans watched the weather.
One of the men who took part in this great drama was Lawrence Hogben, a New Zealand naval officer, who, as a Rhodes Scholar, studied mathematics at New College, Oxford and trained as a meteorologist with the Royal Navy. Today, he lives in a care home in southern France, the country he helped to liberate and, even at the age of 98, retains vivid memories of events in June 1944.
Hogben had already distinguished himself as a naval officer before he was asked to work with Geoffrey Wolfe, a Cambridge-educated engineer, in the Admiralty team forecasting the D-Day weather.
As an instructor lieutenant, responsible for training, intelligence and meteorology on HMS Sheffield, he had witnessed several major naval actions: the sinking of the German battleship Bismark in May 1941; the Battle of the Barents Sea — when Sheffield engaged the German pocket battleships Admiral Hipper and Lutzow in the Arctic in December 1942; and Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa a year later.
Decorated for bravery and promoted instructor lieutenant-commander, he had also developed his skills as a weatherman. “OnSheffield, I was making forecasts every day from the data coming in and from the state of the sea,” he says.
Hogben and Wolfe were one of two British teams. The second, put forward by the Met Office, consisted of Charles Douglas, the chief forecaster who was known for his photographic memory of meteorological events, and Sverre Pettersen, a Norwegian. The third team was American, with Irving Krick and Benny Holzman, two well-known weathermen from the California Institute of Technology. Each day, the three teams reported their findings to Group Captain James Stagg, a Scot who had been superintendent of the Kew Gardens observatory in 1939. He briefed Eisenhower.
For operational reasons, the American commander needed a full moon, a low tide, little cloud cover and light winds so that troops in landing craft could get ashore quickly, the gliders and parachutists could operate efficiently, and the Allied fighters and bombers could find their targets.
The forecast was not good. Indeed, climatic data suggested the odds against the forecasters finding the right conditions was 13-1 in June 1944. The Americans were confident in long-range five-day forecasts. The British were sceptical, believing they could forecast only two days ahead at best. The teams clashed repeatedly.
According to William Bryant Logan, author of Air: The Restless Shaper, they succeeded, “not because of the brilliant work of any solitary forecaster, but because a group of forecasters imitated the weather. They jostled, yelled, scribbled, and cast malevolent looks at one another. They fought it out and voted. And in the end, they were just right enough.”
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I find it strange that, in all that has been written on this site about D-day, no mention has been made of General Frederick Morgan who chose the sites and drew up the plans for Operation Overlord, Admiral Ramsay who was in overall command of the more than 5,000 ships that took part in the invasion, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory who was in overall command of the Allied air forces or General Montgomery who was in overall command of the of the Allied ground forces.
Incidentally, shortly after the war, I attended a lecture by Montgomery who complained that he had pleaded with Eisenhower that, once the bridgehead had broken out, rather than attack on a broad front Ike should allocate all the fuel and equipment to him (Monty) so that he could spearhead an attack into Northern Germany. When Ike refused he (Monty) had suggested hat Ike allocate all the fuel and equipment to Patton so that he could to spearhead an attack into the Rhineland but again Ike refused and insisted on spreading the fuel and equipment evenly between the three commanders. IN Monty’s view this added months to the war. But hindsight always plays a part.
Solomon Green,
Thank you for showing that Eisenhower did not like America’s best fighting general. Patton was a superior general in every way but rank.
Eisenhower was intensely jealous of Patton’s ability. So Eisenhower had Patton murdered.
Patrick says:
June 9, 2014 at 12:43 am
“phlogiston says:
June 9, 2014 at 12:08 am
The soviet tank crews themselves spoke of how their T34 shells, when fired at distance, bounced off the panzers “like candles”.
I can believe that for the Panzer IV Tigers, but nothing else the Germans had.
Yes I believe it was the Panzer IV Tigers about which this was said at Prokhorovka.
dbstealey says:
June 9, 2014 at 6:02 am
Gen. Eisenhower may well have been intensely jealous of Gen Patton, but Patton was murdered for other reasons:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/3869117/General-George-S.-Patton-was-assassinated-to-silence-his-criticism-of-allied-war-leaders-claims-new-book.html
Patton wrote his wife on July 21, 1945:
(my bold)
~
Despite accounts in the popular press glamorizing blitzkrieg and the “Nazi war machine,” the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 with forces entirely inadequate for the task before them, and then compounded their mistake by dividing these meager, relatively light forces into three widely separated Army Groups with divergent objectives, none of which was ever realized.
In my opinion, the only chance for German success in operations Barbarossa & Typhoon was a direct, drive on Moscow with all available forces in the first weeks and months of the war. In addition to being the major rail junction of the Soviet Union (booty: rolling stock), Moscow was the administrative center of the entire USSR, and also the seat of Bolshevik power.
The Wehrmacht’s attack on the well-prepared Red Army tank traps in the Kursk salient (Citadel) has to rank as one of the worst military decisions of all time, after Barbarossa itself.
A little Hollywood what-if:
Imagine Hitler, sword in hand, addressing the assembled multitudes at Nuremberg, raising the sword high, and issuing this simple, direct order to his generals and soldiers:
Anything less wasn’t going to work, and it didn’t.
Steve P,
I agree with everything you wrote. But I’ve read other accounts that said Eisenhower was envious of Patton. Several times when Eisenhower was in the area, Patton would be driving by his 3rd Army soldiers, who burst out in spontaneous cheers when they saw him. That didn’t happen with Eisenhower, who was more of an administrator than a fighting general.
Eisenhower also dissed Patton when Patton got his 4th star. The promotion was sent to him. No ceremony. Really, Eisenhower was very petty and jealous.
The Russians and Americans colluded to murder Patton. Eisenhower was a key player in that plot. He got the killer and assigned him the job. Today, the world is paying a terrible price for Eisenhower’s treachery.
If you haven’t yet read it, I recommend War As I Knew It, Patton’s autobiography. Used copies are about a dollar. It is excellent; I’ve read it several times. A general like Patton comes along only once a century or less.
evanmjones says:
June 9, 2014 at 5:00 am
T-34/85 was good, but still mechanically unreliable. Whenever possible, they carried spare transmissions with them. Sherman was vulnerable (“Ronsons”) & armed with less powerful main armament (even Firefly with high velocity 76.2mm 17-pounder, except with advanced armor-piercing ammo), but also the most mechanically reliable tank of the war. As noted, it had a radio, too. Soviet Shermans “liberated” Vienna. The 10,000 Shermans we sent the USSR made the difference, since that’s about how many tanks the Red Army had left at the end of the war.
Steve P says:
June 9, 2014 at 8:33 am
A single thrust toward Moscow would have left vulnerable flanks exposed both north & south. However what might have worked would have been driving toward Moscow, then turning south. Instead, Guderian was diverted south in August ’41 instead of maintaining the drive east after taking Smolensk. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were captured in the subsequent Ukrainian encirclement, but at the cost of not taking Moscow.
In August, the Siberian Red Army formations which saved Moscow were still in the Far East. He might have been slowed by autumnal rains & mud, but Guderian felt an armored surge toward Moscow could capture the communications & transport center of the USSR & possibly net Stalin as a prisoner, or lead to the dictator’s death. Stalin was prepared to flee, however.
In any case, the marching & horse-drawn German infantry could not have kept up. For them to do so would have required stripping Western Europe of automobiles, which would have broken down in the East, but not before speeding the Wehrmacht advance to a pace faster than Napoleon’s or Charles XII’s.
dbstealey says:
June 9, 2014 at 8:52 am
That about sums it up.
milodonharlani says:
June 9, 2014 at 9:37 am
Agreed, but with Army Groups North & South acting as flank guards for Army Group Center – rather than being 100s of miles away – as well as providing vital mobile reserves, there is at least the theoretical possibility that Moscow might have been captured before the rasputitsa, and that is the only possible way I can see that the Germans might have prevailed on the Eastern Front
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moscow
Even as it was, the tattered, battered Wehrmacht had arrived in the suburbs of Moscow by late November 1941, but by then it was already too late, and Zhukov’s devastating counterattack was imminent.
Steve P says:
June 9, 2014 at 10:22 am
The flanks would necessarily have been vulnerable if limited to infantry, with all armor concentrated against the center.
IMO the way for Germany to occupy & hold all of the USSR west of Moscow would have been for Hitler to have asked for Japan to attack Siberia rather than the USA, which he didn’t feel necessary. But even then, the USSR might not have surrendered, but hunkered down in the Urals & western Siberia, supplied by the US via Iran, with the South Pacific & Indian Ocean free of the IJN.
Also, treating Soviet PoWs better & not oppressing the Ukraine & Belorussia would have helped in a protracted war. German supply situation may have dictated criminal treatment of surrender Red Army troops however, even if insane racial doctrine had not called for it.
Trivia question: In what WWII battle did the Allies lose the most tanks?
What a lot of you clowns don’t seem to realise is that if Germany had won The Battle of Britain there never would have been a Western front needing to be defended.
Gamecock on June 9, 2014 at 12:21 pm
Trivia question: In what WWII battle did the Allies lose the most tanks?
One of the Normandy battles I would guess.
I thought RAH would get it, as he said, “Never forget that in the end the outcomes of large wars are always dependent upon logistics.”
The Allies lost thousands of tanks in the Battle of the Atlantic.
RAH says:
June 8, 2014 at 7:59 am
The P-38 was the only US fighter aircraft that was in front line service before the war and still in front line US service at the end of the war. This is why in the end It P-38s had shot down more enemy aircraft than any other US aircraft.
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Gamecock says:
Not even close. The F6F was the big killer.
“U.S. Navy and Marine F6F pilots flew 66,530 combat sorties and claimed 5,163 kills”
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According to the original count your right with the F6F having 5,168 kills in the Pacific and the P-51 Mustang with 4,950 kills in the European Theater of Operations and the P-38 having 3,785 total. Some revised counts now have the P-51 on top for all theaters combined. All numbers are air to air victories.
So your right and I was wrong.
“Gamecock says:
June 10, 2014 at 3:11 am
The Allies lost thousands of tanks in the Battle of the Atlantic.”
And many of the “floating Shermans” are still at the bottom of the English channel.
dbstealey says:
June 9, 2014 at 8:52 am
Steve P,
I agree with everything you wrote. But I’ve read other accounts that said Eisenhower was envious of Patton. Several times when Eisenhower was in the area, Patton would be driving by his 3rd Army soldiers, who burst out in spontaneous cheers when they saw him. That didn’t happen with Eisenhower, who was more of an administrator than a fighting general.
Eisenhower also dissed Patton when Patton got his 4th star. The promotion was sent to him. No ceremony. Really, Eisenhower was very petty and jealous.
The Russians and Americans colluded to murder Patton. Eisenhower was a key player in that plot. He got the killer and assigned him the job. Today, the world is paying a terrible price for Eisenhower’s treachery.
If you haven’t yet read it, I recommend War As I Knew It, Patton’s autobiography. Used copies are about a dollar. It is excellent; I’ve read it several times. A general like Patton comes along only once a century or less.
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There was no reason to kill Patton and I believe that conspiracy theory to be bunk.
1. Patton at the time of his death did not command a single combat troop. At the time of his death he was in command of the 15th Army which consisted of nothing more than a staff charged with compiling information and reports for the US Army’s official history of WW II in Europe. He was in no position to have any substantial effect on what was going on in the world or even in Europe.
2. Before his death Patton had already stated his intention to retire and had inquired about it officially. He was old even for an Army Commander and his war was over.
3. Patton had repeatedly denied any interest in politics though he would comment on it.
As for Ike and Patton? Why would Ike be jealous of Patton? Ike was his superior and had political ambitions while Patton only wanted to command troops in combat. Ike was Patton’s superior from the first time Patton went into combat in WW II in Africa. As Patton was working on putting the US portion of Torch together he was privately warned by his friend Ike to tone down his criticism of the Navy or risk Marshal relieving him.
Patton and Ike’s conflicts throughout the war had everything to do with strategy, tactics, and supply and had nothing of a personal nature about them. Ike and Patton had been friends long before WW II when they lived near each other at Ft. Myer and spent a great deal of time together. Ike certainly showed a lot of forbearance for Patton’s bombastic outbursts during the war. Certainly Ike understood Patton’s talents and were part of the reason for keeping him but at the same time I can’t think of another Army commander that Ike took so much guff from or caused Ike so many problems as Patton did. Can you or anyone else?
It was Ike relieving Patton of command of the 3rd Army that ended that decades long friendship and again it was not personal but merely Ike making a political decision. It should be noted that Ike approved of Patton’s 4th star in April before he relieved him in Sept of 1945. Ike could have easily gotten rid of Patton after the slapping incidents in Sicily or even for the Knutsford affair but he didn’t. He gave him command of an excellent Army designed for a role suited perfectly for Patton’s talents and desires over the objections of Omar Bradly that would be Patton’s direct commander. But by the time of the occupation many of Patton’s friends in high places he had in the Roosevelt administration, and in particular Sec. War Henry L. Stimson, that had helped provide political cover before had moved on after Truman took over. Besides Patton’s talents were simply no longer needed.
I think I have read every Patton biography that has been published in the English language. There is much to admire. But Patton was not above abusing his position and power for personal reasons. The prime example being the raid on the prison camp at Hammelburg by the understrength Task Force Baum. The prison camp wasn’t even in the 3rd Army’s area of responsibility! And the only reason why Patton put that raid together and kept it hush hush without it even allowing to be shown on the map in the 3rd Army’s war room was to try and rescue his son in law. It was a disaster for everyone but the enemy. THAT is the biggest black mark in Patton’s entire career in my opinion.
As for the Falaise Gap? It was Bradly that refused to ask Monty to move the line so that Patton could meet the Canadian further north and not Ike.
And when it comes to the Battle of the Bulge? In terms of conservation of force it was the US losses in the poorly conceived meat grinder battle of the Hurtgen Forrest far more than what the Germans saved from France that helped the Germans carry off the Watch On the Rhine as well as they did initially.
RAH,
See here.
evanmjones says:
June 9, 2014 at 5:09 am
I
And numbers. (And, yes, its mechanical reliability is often undervalued.) But it was always and remained essentially an infantry support vehicle. It was just as good as any other tanks when firing mere HE. But as a tank killer, it didn’t really make it.
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And they could thank Lesly McNair for that. He was the main force behind the concept of tanks like the Sherman as infantry support while claiming that Tank Destroyers such as the M-10 should be the main weapon to defend against enemy tanks.
dbstealey says:
June 10, 2014 at 7:18 am
RAH,
See here.
Not a reasonable explanation in all of that of why Patton, a man who was on his way out and did not command a single combat troop was such a threat. No matter what Patton said or did he would not nor could change a thing. From the moment Truman took the reigns of power his over riding political consideration was ending the war. The American people wanted their boys home and that was IT! What other person of note having any power to effect events wanted to take on Stalin?
Gamecock says:
June 10, 2014 at 3:11 am
I thought RAH would get it, as he said, “Never forget that in the end the outcomes of large wars are always dependent upon logistics.”
The Allies lost thousands of tanks in the Battle of the Atlantic.
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I got it but choose not to answer until others had taken their shots.
Now here is one from me. What was the single deadliest and most destructive air raid of WW II?
Another WW II trivia question. Who came up with the code name “Overlord” for the Normandy invasion?
RACookPE1978 says:
June 8, 2014 at 7:02 am
Yes. The LST, jeep, C-47, radio, radars and many other inventions were all part of the far larger technology and industry “safe” back from enemy attacks. Even the long-lasting English bombing campaign by Germany was less-effective (hit far fewer areas) than the “controversial” wide-spread American and British area bombing. But, bombing the Ruhr 9explosives, power, artificial gasoline, armor and armaments) did its part. Just wish the bombers were more accurate though.
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Concerning the use of the heavy bombers for the Normandy invasion. On the day of the invasion they were pretty much a bust. Because of the fear of hitting the fleet it was decided that the preparatory bombardment of the coast would be conducted with the bombers flying in perpendicular to the coast instead of parallel to it. The same cloud bank that caused the paratroop carrying transports so much trouble masked the targets of the coastal defenses from the higher flying heavies and so, releasing on the conservative side, most of the heavies bombs fell behind the coastal defenses. The Brits didn’t do much better. Missing their target the Brit heavies actually bombed the DZ the Canadians were about to land on causing their job to be dispersed.
The real value of the heavies in the preparation for D-day Normandy came in the weeks before the invasion as part of the Transportation Plan.
RAH says:
June 10, 2014 at 8:20 am
RACookPE1978 says:
June 8, 2014 at 7:02 am
Yes. The LST, jeep, C-47, radio, radars and many other inventions were all part of the far larger technology and industry “safe” back from enemy attacks. Even the long-lasting English bombing campaign by Germany was less-effective (hit far fewer areas) than the “controversial” wide-spread American and British area bombing. But, bombing the Ruhr 9explosives, power, artificial gasoline, armor and armaments) did its part. Just wish the bombers were more accurate though.
On the subject of bombing accuracy – Germany during WW2 actually developed radio controlled flying bombs and used them in the Mediterranean to sink a couple of British ships. This technology was lost in the destruction of the Wemracht and it was to be three decades – the end of the Vietnam war – until it was re-invented.
RAH asks, “Now here is one from me. What was the single deadliest and most destructive air raid of WW II?”
Firebombing of Tokyo, 9-10, March, 1945. Killed more than the atomic bombs.
Gamecock says:
June 10, 2014 at 11:28 am
RAH asks, “Now here is one from me. What was the single deadliest and most destructive air raid of WW II?”
Firebombing of Tokyo, 9-10, March, 1945. Killed more than the atomic bombs.
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Correct. Also burned out 16 square miles and about 1/4th of buildings/dwellings of Tokyo which at that time was the 3rd largest city in the world. Japans official estimate of those killed was 83,783 killed and 50,000 wounded but there is reason to believe that the death toll was actually somewhat higher and probably exceeded 100,000. Nearly one million Tokyo residents were left homeless. By any measure the destruction and death toll from this single firebomb raid exceeded that wrought by either atomic bomb, and thus it is the most destructive and deadly single air raid in history. And from that time until the end of the war Japan suffered the worst bombing blitz in history. Perhaps all those that today claim the atomic bombs should not have been used should reconsider?
More along the regular subject of this website the one big reason why LeMay came in and started low level bombing by the B-29s was because high level bombing had not been successful primarily due to the poor weather information. The jet streams and weather generally came out of Manchuria and Russia. Unlike in in Europe the Allies simply did not have the data or the ability to get it to do nearly as good a job of forecasting in the north Pacfic. Witness the American fleet being blind sided by a massive typhoon during the war. Winds and weather don’t just effect the flight of aircraft they effect the fall of bombs and even the fall of the shells from long range guns.
LeMay got away with it without prohibitive losses because Japans AA defenses, especially at night, just weren’t even close to what the Germans were capable of. Basically LeMay was sent to take over the bombing campaign against Japan because the US had much more invested in the development and production of the B-29 than it did in the atomic bombs. The whole concept of long range strategic bombing was being questioned because of the failure of the B-29s and Hap Arnold understood that unless the B-29s were successful odds were the Army Air Corp would be a much smaller outfit than it and later the USAF (Formed 1948) would have otherwise been in the post WW II Armed Forces. The success of both the B-29 and the bombs thus led to SAC.