The most important weather forecast in history
In memory of my father Hans who, in 1944, took part in the liberation of Europe with the Royal Engineers in the Italian Campaign. –Benny Peiser
1) The Weather Forecast That Saved D-Day
Christopher Klein
Years of detailed planning went into the D-Day invasion on June 6, 1944, but success hinged on one element that no military commander could control—the weather. In the days leading up to the invasion, Allied meteorologists delivered the most important weather forecast in history. If they got it wrong the Allies might have lost tens of thousands of men and World War II might have been lost forever.
In contrast to the bright morning about to dawn over Portsmouth, England, on June 4, 1944, gloom settled over the Allied commanders gathered inside Southwick House at 4:15 a.m. Years of preparation had been invested in the invasion of Normandy, but now, just hours before the launch of D-Day operations, came the voice of Group Captain James Stagg urging a last-minute delay. As Operation Overlord’s chief meteorological officer, the lanky Brit was hardly a battlefield commander, but the ultimate fate of D-Day now rested in his decision-making.
The disappointed commanders knew that the list of potential invasion dates were only a precious few because of the need for a full moon to illuminate obstacles and landing places for gliders and for a low tide at dawn to expose the elaborate underwater defenses installed by the Germans. June 5, chosen by Allied Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower to be D-Day, was the first date in a narrow three-day window with the necessary astronomical conditions. The massive Normandy landings, however, also required optimal weather conditions. High winds and rough seas could capsize landing craft and sabotage the amphibious assault; wet weather could bog down the army and thick cloud cover could obscure the necessary air support.
The critical, but unenviable task of predicting the English Channel’s notoriously fickle weather fell to a team of forecasters from the Royal Navy, British Meteorological Office and U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Force, and as D-Day approached, storm clouds brewed inside the meteorological office. Observations from Newfoundland taken on May 29 reported changing conditions that might arrive by the proposed invasion date. Based on their knowledge of English Channel weather and observations, the British forecasters predicted the stormy weather would indeed arrive on June 5. The American meteorologists, relying on a differing forecasting method based on historic weather maps, instead believed that a wedge of high pressure would deflect the advancing storm front and provide clear, sunny skies over the English Channel.
Stagg, the only meteorologist allowed direct contact with Eisenhower, had to make the final call. Although the sky was clear and wind negligible in the early hours of June 4, Stagg believed foul weather was only hours away. He sided with his fellow British colleagues and recommended a postponement. Knowing that the weather held the potential to be an even fiercer foe than the Nazis, a reluctant Eisenhower agreed in the early hours of June 4 to delay D-Day by 24 hours.
On the other side of the English Channel, German forecasters also predicted the stormy conditions that indeed rolled in as Stagg and his fellow Brits had feared. The Luftwaffe’s chief meteorologist, however, went further in reporting that rough seas and gale-force winds were unlikely to weaken until mid-June. Armed with that forecast, Nazi commanders thought it impossible that an Allied invasion was imminent, and many left their coastal defenses to participate in nearby war games. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel even returned home to personally present a pair of Parisian shoes to his wife as a birthday present.
German Luftwaffe meteorologists, however, relied on less sophisticated data and models than their Allied counterparts, says John Ross, author of “The Forecast for D-Day: And the Weatherman behind Ike’s Greatest Gamble.” “The Allies had a much more robust network of weather stations in Canada, Greenland and Iceland; of weather ships and weather flights over the North Atlantic and observations by secret agreement from weather stations in the neutral Republic of Ireland,” he says. Those weather stations, in particular one at a post office at Blacksod Point in the far west of Ireland, proved crucial in detecting the arrival of a lull in the storms that Stagg and his colleagues believed would allow for an invasion on June 6. As rain and high winds lashed Portsmouth on the night of June 4, Stagg informed Eisenhower of the forecast for a temporary break. With the next available date for an invasion nearly two weeks away, the Allies risked losing the element of surprise if they waited. In spite of the pelting rain and howling winds outside, Eisenhower placed his faith in his forecasters and gave the go-ahead for D-Day.
The weather during the initial hours of D-Day was still not ideal. Thick clouds resulted in Allied bombs and paratroopers landing miles off target. Rough seas caused landing craft to capsize and mortar shells to land off the mark. By noon, however, the weather had cleared and Stagg’s forecast had been validated. The Germans had been caught by surprise, and the tide of World War II began to turn.
Weeks later, Stagg sent Eisenhower a memo noting that had D-Day been pushed to later in June, the Allies would have encountered the worst weather in the English Channel in two decades. “I thank the Gods of War we went when we did,” Eisenhower scribbled on the report.
He could also have been thankful for Stagg overruling the advice of the American meteorologists who wanted to go on June 5 as planned, which Ross says would have been a disaster. “The weather over Normandy contained too much cloud cover for Ike’s greatest strategic asset, the Allied air forces, to effectively protect the landings from German armor, artillery and infantry reserves. Winds were too strong for the deployment of paratroopers to secure bridges and crossroads inland from the beaches thus preventing German reinforcement of coastal positions. Waves were too high for landing craft to put soldiers and supplies ashore. The key element of surprise—location and time—would have been lost, and the conquest of western Europe could well have taken another year.”
2) D-Day: The Sceptical Meteorologists Who Surprised The Nazis By Saying ‘Yes’ To June 6
Simon Pearson
The outcome of D-Day was decided not on the beaches of Normandy, but by weather systems in the mid-Atlantic and the ability of rival teams of meteorologists to interpret the forces of nature. The Americans were confident in long-range five-day forecasts. The British were sceptical, believing they could forecast only two days ahead at best. The teams clashed repeatedly.
The outcome of D-Day was decided not on the beaches of Normandy, but by weather systems in the mid-Atlantic and the ability of rival teams of meteorologists to interpret the forces of nature.
As unfavourable conditions developed during that early summer 70 years ago, three teams of meteorologists produced reports for the Allied commander, General Dwight D Eisenhower, who laid down the conditions necessary for invasion — and his preferred date: June 5. Across the Channel, a single team of Germans watched the weather.
One of the men who took part in this great drama was Lawrence Hogben, a New Zealand naval officer, who, as a Rhodes Scholar, studied mathematics at New College, Oxford and trained as a meteorologist with the Royal Navy. Today, he lives in a care home in southern France, the country he helped to liberate and, even at the age of 98, retains vivid memories of events in June 1944.
Hogben had already distinguished himself as a naval officer before he was asked to work with Geoffrey Wolfe, a Cambridge-educated engineer, in the Admiralty team forecasting the D-Day weather.
As an instructor lieutenant, responsible for training, intelligence and meteorology on HMS Sheffield, he had witnessed several major naval actions: the sinking of the German battleship Bismark in May 1941; the Battle of the Barents Sea — when Sheffield engaged the German pocket battleships Admiral Hipper and Lutzow in the Arctic in December 1942; and Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa a year later.
Decorated for bravery and promoted instructor lieutenant-commander, he had also developed his skills as a weatherman. “OnSheffield, I was making forecasts every day from the data coming in and from the state of the sea,” he says.
Hogben and Wolfe were one of two British teams. The second, put forward by the Met Office, consisted of Charles Douglas, the chief forecaster who was known for his photographic memory of meteorological events, and Sverre Pettersen, a Norwegian. The third team was American, with Irving Krick and Benny Holzman, two well-known weathermen from the California Institute of Technology. Each day, the three teams reported their findings to Group Captain James Stagg, a Scot who had been superintendent of the Kew Gardens observatory in 1939. He briefed Eisenhower.
For operational reasons, the American commander needed a full moon, a low tide, little cloud cover and light winds so that troops in landing craft could get ashore quickly, the gliders and parachutists could operate efficiently, and the Allied fighters and bombers could find their targets.
The forecast was not good. Indeed, climatic data suggested the odds against the forecasters finding the right conditions was 13-1 in June 1944. The Americans were confident in long-range five-day forecasts. The British were sceptical, believing they could forecast only two days ahead at best. The teams clashed repeatedly.
According to William Bryant Logan, author of Air: The Restless Shaper, they succeeded, “not because of the brilliant work of any solitary forecaster, but because a group of forecasters imitated the weather. They jostled, yelled, scribbled, and cast malevolent looks at one another. They fought it out and voted. And in the end, they were just right enough.”
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Patrick
I mentioned Slapton sands was above;
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2014/06/06/the-weather-forecast-that-saved-d-day/#comment-1655829
My point was that the Germans still had the capability to strike right at the heart of our military efforts. Any delay through waiting for better weather a few weeks later would certainly have resulted in the Germans becoming aware of the huge forces that had been assembled and its purpose. With such a massing of Allied troops and equipment in highly vulnerable location it would have been like shooting fish in a barrel had the attack not taken place when it did.
tonyb
“tonybclimatereason says:
June 7, 2014 at 11:58 pm”
Could not agree more. I am not in favour of Wiki links for an account of war events, they usually leave out some facts. I know this from accounts from mates who fought in the Falklands war.
It was very fortunate that the Germans didn’t, seem to at least, “twig” with what was going on. It seems, from the accounts I have read, that a small group of E-boats left their base in France on a “patrol” of the English channel and “stumbled” across the activities in and arround Lyme Bay. But yes, I agree, the forecast wasn’t that good, the previous few days were horrendous weather wise in the channel, and the Allies had very little room to give the “Go” order. I don’t recall the name of the forecaster, but I’d imagine they would have been chomping at the bit all day and night before that morning.
Whether D-Day weather forecaster had any serious competence to make reliable prediction prior the landing in the Normandy should be evaluated by the severe summer storm that swept the English Channel only two weeks later, which the forecaster did not expected, reckon, or are able to explain! Details: http://climate-ocean.com/2013/7_4.html
Soon after landing troops on the shores in Normandy since 06 June 1944, an unexpected storm lashed across the English Channel on 19 June 1944 lasting three days. From Britain to France the operation and supply area for the invasion was severely affected. 800 ships and floating units were beached or lost, more than the German army managed to take out during the entire campaign. It was claimed that this was the most severe storm in June for 40 years.
If the Met Office is so proud on its service with regard to D-Day weather forecast, it should be ashamed that the most severe storm for 40 years in the English Channel, from June 19-21, is still not fully assessed, investigated, and thoroughly explained.
milodonharlani says:
June 6, 2014 at 10:23 am
RACookPE1978 says:
June 6, 2014 at 9:37 am
It turned out that the Americans were able to land supplies & equipment directly across the beaches after the Mulberry harbors were destroyed in the storms.
Only one Mulberry was destroyed. The Mulberry harbour was a British invention that was developed at Churchill’s request because the failure of the Dieppe Raid by predominantly Canadian forces in 1942 showed just how difficult the D-Day landings would have been if they had taken place near any of the French ports, all of which were heavily defended. Two were built; one to supply the two British and the Canadian beach, and the other to supply the two American beaches.
The British/Canadian Mulberry survived the storms (I think I read somewhere that the British engineers constructing it used more anchors that the American engineer did) and for a while heavy equipment for the US troops had to be landed on the British Mulberry.
DD More says:
June 6, 2014 at 9:22 am
What is nice is they got to use some of the German data too.
The End of German Presence in Greenland
During 1943 and 1944, there were reports that German forces were constructing a base on the island. These came to nothing, thanks to action by U.S. forces; similarly, a weather station on the northeast coast was bombed by U.S. Air Force planes based in Iceland.
You did not mention the role played by people in Greenland in discovering the German meteorological station on Greenland. After the German invasion of Denmark in 1940 the Danish governor of Greenland realised that it would be easy for the Germans to land anywhere along the vast and virtually unpopulated coast of east Greenland without detection. Therefore a dog sledge patrol manned by a small group Danish, Greenlandic and Norwegian volunteers was established and during their patrol of the east Greenland coast they discovered that the Germans had established a weather station. If it were not for that discovery the Germans might have had more reliable weather forecasts.
The story of the discovery and destruction of the German weather station in Greenland has been told in the book by David Howarth.
The Sledge Patrol: A WWII Epic of Escape, Survival, and Victory
http://www.amazon.com/The-Sledge-Patrol-Survival-Victory/dp/1599213222/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1402222167&sr=8-1&keywords=sledge+patrol
Early on in the Cold War the Danes set up the Sirius Patrol of eastern Greenland using dogs as in the WWII patrol. The Sirius Patrol continues to this day.
Greenland by dog sledge: The Sirius Patrol in numbers
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15940985
DD More says:
June 6, 2014 at 9:22 am
What is nice is they got to use some of the German data too.
The End of German Presence in Greenland
During 1943 and 1944, there were reports that German forces were constructing a base on the island. These came to nothing, thanks to action by U.S. forces; similarly, a weather station on the northeast coast was bombed by U.S. Air Force planes based in Iceland.
You did not mention the role played by people in Greenland in discovering the German meteorological station on Greenland. After the German invasion of Denmark in 1940 the Danish governor of Greenland realised that it would be easy for the Germans to land anywhere along the vast and virtually unpopulated coast of east Greenland without detection. Therefore a dog sledge patrol manned by a small group Danish, Greenlandic and Norwegian volunteers was established and during their patrol of the east Greenland coast they discovered that the Germans had established a weather station. If it were not for that discovery the Germans might have had more reliable weather forecasts.
The story of the discovery and destruction of the German weather station in Greenland has been told in the book by David Howarth.
The Sledge Patrol: A WWII Epic of Escape, Survival, and Victory
Early on in the Cold War the Danes set up the Sirius Patrol of eastern Greenland using dogs as in the WWII patrol. The Sirius Patrol continues to this day.
Greenland by dog sledge: The Sirius Patrol in numbers
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15940985
@milodonharlani June 7, 2014 at 2:39 pm
“German defensive specialist Heinrici figured that he could handle ten to one odds, but 11 to one became problematical.”
That was basically the point I was making. Both the German and Soviet commanders knew that Soviet forcers needed overwhelming odds (typically better thab 5:1) in order to be confident of winning.
As a detail, I am not sure how often, if ever, German forces actually overcame 10:1 odds, but it is possible in smaller conflicts.
@Gamecock June 7, 2014 at 11:31 am
“It has been said that Churchill intended to fight to the last American (!)”
There is probably some truth in that, at least to the extent that Churchill was very, very careful. The US started WWII with more resources (at least potentially) than Britain and by the time the US took an active part Britain had already expended a huge amount of men and materiel.
As I said above Britain lost about the same number of troops (killed, wounded & captured) in the Battle of France as the US committed on D-Day itself. Add in all the other calls on British manpower from then onwards (the Far East, the Middle East, North Africa & the Med, at sea & in the air, on the home front) and you can see that Churchill’s ‘cupboard’ was rather bare.
Mods, the bold was supposed to end after ‘lost’. Can you fix that please?
“RACookPE1978 says:
June 6, 2014 at 9:37 am
It turned out that the Americans were able to land supplies & equipment directly across the beaches after the Mulberry harbors were destroyed in the storms.”
Concerning the Mulberry’s. The British one was severely damaged in the storm and parts from the American one were salvaged to repair it.
As for getting supplies across the beach? The Landing Ship Tank (LST) was the largest of the vessels that could land and was critical in this task. Without the LSTs the invasion may well have failed. Ike one credited the M-1 Garand and Jeep as two of the most essential weapons the allies had. I think the LST should have been on that short list. Most of the LSTs were built inland in the US and transited the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to the Gulf. The largest builder of LSTs was in Evansville, IN.
The other project that was critical for the early success despite the loss of one Mulberry and the damaging of the other was Operation Pluto. That underwater pipe line delivered 1 million gallons a fuel across the channel thus freeing up 1,000s of tons of shipping and landing craft for ferrying other supplies.
Yes. The LST, jeep, C-47, radio, radars and many other inventions were all part of the far larger technology and industry “safe” back from enemy attacks. Even the long-lasting English bombing campaign by Germany was less-effective (hit far fewer areas) than the “controversial” wide-spread American and British area bombing. But, bombing the Ruhr 9explosives, power, artificial gasoline, armor and armaments) did its part. Just wish the bombers were more accurate though.
My dad drove LST’s a bit later after the war (not in Normandy) and my grandfather escorted LST’s and merchants against the battleships outside Leyte. in the Pacific.
It was only General Patton who had proper fighting spirit, but he was kept out of battle for too long.
Patton was used as a decoy to keep the Germans in Calais. He probably was worth it. An once the required resources were built up and Monty had tied down the Germans on the direct route to Paris, Patton was assigned the mobile elements and did his thing.
The crime was not giving him all the supplies needed for mobility and keeping him moving. But that was later.
Do YOU have any authenticated statement by any named one of “Most of our Jewish nuclear physicists”, to support your assertion.?
I have read it in histories of Los Alamos. Likely true.
“PS: In those instances in which US fighters accidentally attacked Russian a/c or ground forces or were attacked by the Red Air Force in 1945, the Soviets lost. Badly. The best known incidents involved P-38s over Romania. You’d think that Yaks would have an advantage in a dogfight with twin-engined, high altitude interceptor/escort fighters, but they lost, anyway, despite superior numbers.”
The P-38 was absolutely deadly at lower altitudes. In fact during the North Africa campaign that is where they operated more often than not because of the crappy turbos and duct system they had in the earlier models. Despite the slow roll rate the P-38 made up for that with excellent wing loading and the ability to use variable power in the engines to turn more quickly than one would think. And in those days they still hadn’t solved the compressibility problem and fighting at lower altitudes eliminated that. The Luftwaffe actually tried to avoid tangling with them in N. Africa.
The P-38 was the only US fighter aircraft that was in front line service before the war and still in front line US service at the end of the war. This is why in the end It P-38s had shot down more enemy aircraft than any other US aircraft.
Though after 1943 the P-38 had only a limited role in the European theater with the Merlin powered P-51 taking over the high altitude escort role. In the Pacific the Japanese simply had no answer for the big two engine fighter. It chewed through Japanese aircraft and pilots at a frightening rate in the SW Pacific. Having two engines was a great boon in the Pacific theater where operations spanned vast areas of open water.
“The tide in the European theatre had turned in 1942, when the Germans were defeated at El Alamein and (more importantly) Stalingrad.”
The tide of the war in the European theater could not turn for good on either front until the Battle of the Atlantic was won and that did not really happen until May of 1943 as signified by Black May. Never forget that in the end the outcomes of large wars are always dependent upon logistics.
That being said, I look at the turning point on the ground in both theaters are coming in August of 1943. Husky proved the Allied ability to amphibiously invade well defended enemy land that was within range of the best the Luftwaffe could offer having bases supplied internally. More troops were put ashore the first day of Husky than in Overlord. At the same time Husky was going on the Russians were winning at Kursk. From that time on Hitler was on the defensive on both fronts.
–Heavy HTML formatting; apologies for any glitches–
TimC says:
June 6, 2014 at 12:29 pm
Note (in my bold) the use of the capitalized term “United Nations” even though this body was not officially promulgated until 24 October 1945, after the conclusion of the war.
arthur4563 says:
June 6, 2014 at 9:18 am
Yes, good comments.
Germany was doomed from the moment Hitler launched Barbarossa, which attack was undertaken either to pre-empt an impending attack by the Red Army (see: Victor Suvorov), or as victim of clever provocations by Stalin meant to convince Hitler that an attack was imminent. FDR (paraphrasing): the enemy must be seen to have struck the first blow…
The only possible route to success for Barbarossa was a direct attack on Moscow by all available forces of the Wehrmacht,with good flanki protection, of course, but with no costly, time/force-consuming secondary attacks on Leningrad, nor to the south of the Pripet Marches.
If this had been done, and Moscow had fallen before the rasputitsa, there is an outside chance Barbarossa may have had a least limited success in taking control of the Bolshevik capital. Whether or not Moscow could have been held is another matter, but the commies were all too ready to flee before the Germans, as the Big Skidaddle of the following October illustrates.
But it should be remembered that, at the time of Barbarossa, the Germans had neither heavy tanks, nor long-range bombers. Nor did they have even winter gear/coats for their soldiers.
milodonharlani says:
At WP, Ike was known as that “terrible Swedish Jew”
milodonharlani also says:
June 6, 2014 at 2:33 pm
No, the T-34/85 was vastly superior to the Sherman, aka “Ronson” (burned like a cigarette lighter), and even the earlier T-34s – armed with the excellent 76mm gun and just entering service in the early days of Barbarossa – made mincemeat of the Wehrmacht’s PzKpfw IIs, IIIs, IVs, as accounts of German generals at the time show.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-34
The T-34 featured a suspension designed by the American engineer Walter Christie.
evanmjones says:
June 6, 2014 at 6:08 pm
The worm in the apple? This referes to the quote by Churchill, referring to the 10% of Germans who opposed Hitler, and who were doing all in their power to ensure that Hitler was deposed, even if that meant traitorous actions underming the German fighting forces.
(my bold)
~
And speaking of treachery, let us also not forget an infamous day in American military history:
June 8, 1967
Remember the Liberty!
–sp (Cold War AF analyst on duty 6/8/1967)
Most of those familiar with WW II history berate the M4 as compared to the T-34 and PzKpfw 5 (Panther). And in a head to head battle tank on tank they are correct. The M4 was typical product of US industry mass production. It’s greatest assets were range, speed, and reliability. No tank of it’s class or higher beat the M4 in these characteristics. In fact it was so reliable that it was American made M4s and not the T-34s that Russians relied on to make the long march south through the mountains to gain the Slovakian countries.
But I do not damn the allies or the US for not introducing the M-26 Pershing sooner as they could have. What people fail to do is look at the whole history. Far too many concentrate exclusively on the fun stuff of weapons and tactics and virtually ignore what seems to the much more mundane history of the logistics battles. But logistics explains why the Sherman remained the front line tank for the allies until the end of the war with only a few of the Pershings making it into battle.
The fact is that the Sherman and any heavy weapon or equipment made in the US bound for a theater of war, unlike the Russian and German tanks, had to transit an ocean to get to where they were needed. Every tank, every spare part, and most of the ammunition and guns got to the theater via ship across an ocean. Then those same tanks were used for amphibious landings against contested beachheads. None of the other tanks used in WW II in ANY theater can claim such a distinction with a exception of the relatively few and poor Japanese tanks. None of the opposing countries could even do such a thing on significant scale without ports.
And there is part of the key. The allies in Europe lacked ports that could deal with large amounts of such heavy equipment such as tanks. This is why the invasion taking in place in Normandy was considered by most of the German high command to be a diversion for a couple weeks after the invasion. They considered it folly for the main thrust of the campaign to launched from an area were the port facilities were so limited (initially non existent).
Well as history shows the allies did it. But the cost later was enormous. The initial breakout was delayed more because of the excellent defensive nature of the bocage country’s hedgerows and the Germans extensive training and preparations for just such a battle not because of logistics.
But then came the breakout and the logistics headaches really began until the lack of fuel and supplies stopped the allied Armies fantastic advances. Who would have introduced the relatively large, heavy, gas thirsty Pershings in that situation?
Fact is that until the allies took the ports in the Neatherlands at Antwerp they would be at a significant logistical disadvantage. And it was not until those logistical difficulties were worked about by taking the ports in the Neatherlands that the Pershing was deployed.
So while I will not argue against the fact that the T-34 and Panther were more battle-worthy tanks than the M-4 in head to head situations; I will argue until blue in the face against the notion that the Pershing was not introduced sooner because of some disregard for allied casualties or because of some scandalous screw up.
RAH says:
June 8, 2014 at 7:59 am
The P-38 was the only US fighter aircraft that was in front line service before the war and still in front line US service at the end of the war. This is why in the end It P-38s had shot down more enemy aircraft than any other US aircraft.
==========================
Not even close. The F6F was the big killer.
“U.S. Navy and Marine F6F pilots flew 66,530 combat sorties and claimed 5,163 kills”
RAH says:
June 8, 2014 at 12:24 pm
…
Fact is that until the allies took the ports in the Neatherlands at Antwerp they would be at a significant logistical disadvantage. And it was not until those logistical difficulties were worked about by taking the ports in the Neatherlands that the Pershing was deployed.
“Neatherlands”? Freudian slip?
Steve P says:
June 8, 2014 at 10:15 am
…
milodonharlani also says:
June 6, 2014 at 2:33 pm
T-34 was overall better than but not vastly superior to Sherman.
No, the T-34/85 was vastly superior to the Sherman, aka “Ronson” (burned like a cigarette lighter), and even the earlier T-34s – armed with the excellent 76mm gun and just entering service in the early days of Barbarossa – made mincemeat of the Wehrmacht’s PzKpfw IIs, IIIs, IVs, as accounts of German generals at the time show.
If the gun of the T34 was so good, then why at Prokhorovka did the T34s have to drive straight at the German panthers and engage them in the famous point-blank melee in order for their guns to be effective against the German tanks? The soviet tank crews themselves spoke of how their T34 shells, when fired at distance, bounced off the panzers “like candles”.
milodonharlani says:
June 6, 2014 at 9:29 am
…
Besides holding so many German forces in the West, D-Day also improved the odds for convoys carrying to Russia the supplies, war materiel & vehicles without which the Red Army could not have driven the invaders out of the USSR. In particular, Bagration benefited from American trucks, so many of which were sent East that the western Allies suffered from a shortage of them in their drive across France. Khrushchev rightly observed that the advance from Stalingrad to Berlin would have been impossible without them, & other Allied aid.
evanmjones says:
June 6, 2014 at 8:44 pm
He says the Russians were extremely unfriendly and after delivery of their goods they were not allowed to stay in the city but encouraged to leave as soon as possible.
They were lucky. The Russians made not of few of them disappear. Murmansk was a hellish trip, and it was within air interdiction of Norway (shades of convoy PQ17, which ended the effort). Not to mention Tirpitz and Scharnhorst. In the end, the bulk of lend lease did not make it through until July 1943 when the Tehran route was opened. In a few months, a large portion of Soviet infantry became motorized.
On the subject of motorization – yes the Soviet army was motorized largely thanks to the American trucks delivered via Persia.
Its also worth remembering that the German Barbarossa rode into Russia largely in French trucks. During the Blitzkrieg in France it is a paradoxical fact that the German army was significantly less motorized than the French and British – unlike either still making large scale use of horse carriages for guns etc. This remained the case throughout the war (note how many horses were killed in the allied bombing of the Germans in the Falaise pocket). As described in Anthony Beevor’s excellent history of WW2, the colossal French capitulation handed the wemracht an almost pristine French military inventory, including thousands of trucks. These formed the majority of the transport for Barbarossa, a foretaste of Franco-German EU partnership.
“phlogiston says:
June 9, 2014 at 12:08 am
The soviet tank crews themselves spoke of how their T34 shells, when fired at distance, bounced off the panzers “like candles”.
I can believe that for the Panzer IV Tigers, but nothing else the Germans had.
Its also worth remembering that the German Barbarossa rode into Russia largely in French trucks.
And horses, as you mentioned. (400,000 trucks, 600,000 horses, at least according to the older scholarship.)
T-34 was overall better than but not vastly superior to Sherman.
Depends on the model. A T43/85, which was standard towards the end, could pick off a Sherman easily.
Fact is that until the allies took the ports in the Neatherlands at Antwerp they would be at a significant logistical disadvantage.
Monty rolled into Antwerp intact in September. And then stopped. Maddeningly. Without clearing the Schelde estuary. By the time he got around to that, the Germans had hugely reinforced, and it took until November before Antwerp could be used.
If the gun of the T34 was so good, then why at Prokhorovka did the T34s have to drive straight at the German panthers and engage them in the famous point-blank melee in order for their guns to be effective against the German tanks?
Those were mostly Mark 76s. The 85s were much better. But the Germans never really made the best use of their heavy tanks. And at short range even a T34/76 can easily hole a Panther or Porsche Tiger.
The M4 was typical product of US industry mass production. It’s greatest assets were range, speed, and reliability. No tank of it’s class or higher beat the M4 in these characteristics.
And numbers. (And, yes, its mechanical reliability is often undervalued.) But it was always and remained essentially an infantry support vehicle. It was just as good as any other tanks when firing mere HE. But as a tank killer, it didn’t really make it.