The most important weather forecast in history
In memory of my father Hans who, in 1944, took part in the liberation of Europe with the Royal Engineers in the Italian Campaign. –Benny Peiser
1) The Weather Forecast That Saved D-Day
Christopher Klein
Years of detailed planning went into the D-Day invasion on June 6, 1944, but success hinged on one element that no military commander could control—the weather. In the days leading up to the invasion, Allied meteorologists delivered the most important weather forecast in history. If they got it wrong the Allies might have lost tens of thousands of men and World War II might have been lost forever.
In contrast to the bright morning about to dawn over Portsmouth, England, on June 4, 1944, gloom settled over the Allied commanders gathered inside Southwick House at 4:15 a.m. Years of preparation had been invested in the invasion of Normandy, but now, just hours before the launch of D-Day operations, came the voice of Group Captain James Stagg urging a last-minute delay. As Operation Overlord’s chief meteorological officer, the lanky Brit was hardly a battlefield commander, but the ultimate fate of D-Day now rested in his decision-making.
The disappointed commanders knew that the list of potential invasion dates were only a precious few because of the need for a full moon to illuminate obstacles and landing places for gliders and for a low tide at dawn to expose the elaborate underwater defenses installed by the Germans. June 5, chosen by Allied Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower to be D-Day, was the first date in a narrow three-day window with the necessary astronomical conditions. The massive Normandy landings, however, also required optimal weather conditions. High winds and rough seas could capsize landing craft and sabotage the amphibious assault; wet weather could bog down the army and thick cloud cover could obscure the necessary air support.
The critical, but unenviable task of predicting the English Channel’s notoriously fickle weather fell to a team of forecasters from the Royal Navy, British Meteorological Office and U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Force, and as D-Day approached, storm clouds brewed inside the meteorological office. Observations from Newfoundland taken on May 29 reported changing conditions that might arrive by the proposed invasion date. Based on their knowledge of English Channel weather and observations, the British forecasters predicted the stormy weather would indeed arrive on June 5. The American meteorologists, relying on a differing forecasting method based on historic weather maps, instead believed that a wedge of high pressure would deflect the advancing storm front and provide clear, sunny skies over the English Channel.
Stagg, the only meteorologist allowed direct contact with Eisenhower, had to make the final call. Although the sky was clear and wind negligible in the early hours of June 4, Stagg believed foul weather was only hours away. He sided with his fellow British colleagues and recommended a postponement. Knowing that the weather held the potential to be an even fiercer foe than the Nazis, a reluctant Eisenhower agreed in the early hours of June 4 to delay D-Day by 24 hours.
On the other side of the English Channel, German forecasters also predicted the stormy conditions that indeed rolled in as Stagg and his fellow Brits had feared. The Luftwaffe’s chief meteorologist, however, went further in reporting that rough seas and gale-force winds were unlikely to weaken until mid-June. Armed with that forecast, Nazi commanders thought it impossible that an Allied invasion was imminent, and many left their coastal defenses to participate in nearby war games. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel even returned home to personally present a pair of Parisian shoes to his wife as a birthday present.
German Luftwaffe meteorologists, however, relied on less sophisticated data and models than their Allied counterparts, says John Ross, author of “The Forecast for D-Day: And the Weatherman behind Ike’s Greatest Gamble.” “The Allies had a much more robust network of weather stations in Canada, Greenland and Iceland; of weather ships and weather flights over the North Atlantic and observations by secret agreement from weather stations in the neutral Republic of Ireland,” he says. Those weather stations, in particular one at a post office at Blacksod Point in the far west of Ireland, proved crucial in detecting the arrival of a lull in the storms that Stagg and his colleagues believed would allow for an invasion on June 6. As rain and high winds lashed Portsmouth on the night of June 4, Stagg informed Eisenhower of the forecast for a temporary break. With the next available date for an invasion nearly two weeks away, the Allies risked losing the element of surprise if they waited. In spite of the pelting rain and howling winds outside, Eisenhower placed his faith in his forecasters and gave the go-ahead for D-Day.
The weather during the initial hours of D-Day was still not ideal. Thick clouds resulted in Allied bombs and paratroopers landing miles off target. Rough seas caused landing craft to capsize and mortar shells to land off the mark. By noon, however, the weather had cleared and Stagg’s forecast had been validated. The Germans had been caught by surprise, and the tide of World War II began to turn.
Weeks later, Stagg sent Eisenhower a memo noting that had D-Day been pushed to later in June, the Allies would have encountered the worst weather in the English Channel in two decades. “I thank the Gods of War we went when we did,” Eisenhower scribbled on the report.
He could also have been thankful for Stagg overruling the advice of the American meteorologists who wanted to go on June 5 as planned, which Ross says would have been a disaster. “The weather over Normandy contained too much cloud cover for Ike’s greatest strategic asset, the Allied air forces, to effectively protect the landings from German armor, artillery and infantry reserves. Winds were too strong for the deployment of paratroopers to secure bridges and crossroads inland from the beaches thus preventing German reinforcement of coastal positions. Waves were too high for landing craft to put soldiers and supplies ashore. The key element of surprise—location and time—would have been lost, and the conquest of western Europe could well have taken another year.”
2) D-Day: The Sceptical Meteorologists Who Surprised The Nazis By Saying ‘Yes’ To June 6
Simon Pearson
The outcome of D-Day was decided not on the beaches of Normandy, but by weather systems in the mid-Atlantic and the ability of rival teams of meteorologists to interpret the forces of nature. The Americans were confident in long-range five-day forecasts. The British were sceptical, believing they could forecast only two days ahead at best. The teams clashed repeatedly.
The outcome of D-Day was decided not on the beaches of Normandy, but by weather systems in the mid-Atlantic and the ability of rival teams of meteorologists to interpret the forces of nature.
As unfavourable conditions developed during that early summer 70 years ago, three teams of meteorologists produced reports for the Allied commander, General Dwight D Eisenhower, who laid down the conditions necessary for invasion — and his preferred date: June 5. Across the Channel, a single team of Germans watched the weather.
One of the men who took part in this great drama was Lawrence Hogben, a New Zealand naval officer, who, as a Rhodes Scholar, studied mathematics at New College, Oxford and trained as a meteorologist with the Royal Navy. Today, he lives in a care home in southern France, the country he helped to liberate and, even at the age of 98, retains vivid memories of events in June 1944.
Hogben had already distinguished himself as a naval officer before he was asked to work with Geoffrey Wolfe, a Cambridge-educated engineer, in the Admiralty team forecasting the D-Day weather.
As an instructor lieutenant, responsible for training, intelligence and meteorology on HMS Sheffield, he had witnessed several major naval actions: the sinking of the German battleship Bismark in May 1941; the Battle of the Barents Sea — when Sheffield engaged the German pocket battleships Admiral Hipper and Lutzow in the Arctic in December 1942; and Operation Torch, the invasion of French North Africa a year later.
Decorated for bravery and promoted instructor lieutenant-commander, he had also developed his skills as a weatherman. “OnSheffield, I was making forecasts every day from the data coming in and from the state of the sea,” he says.
Hogben and Wolfe were one of two British teams. The second, put forward by the Met Office, consisted of Charles Douglas, the chief forecaster who was known for his photographic memory of meteorological events, and Sverre Pettersen, a Norwegian. The third team was American, with Irving Krick and Benny Holzman, two well-known weathermen from the California Institute of Technology. Each day, the three teams reported their findings to Group Captain James Stagg, a Scot who had been superintendent of the Kew Gardens observatory in 1939. He briefed Eisenhower.
For operational reasons, the American commander needed a full moon, a low tide, little cloud cover and light winds so that troops in landing craft could get ashore quickly, the gliders and parachutists could operate efficiently, and the Allied fighters and bombers could find their targets.
The forecast was not good. Indeed, climatic data suggested the odds against the forecasters finding the right conditions was 13-1 in June 1944. The Americans were confident in long-range five-day forecasts. The British were sceptical, believing they could forecast only two days ahead at best. The teams clashed repeatedly.
According to William Bryant Logan, author of Air: The Restless Shaper, they succeeded, “not because of the brilliant work of any solitary forecaster, but because a group of forecasters imitated the weather. They jostled, yelled, scribbled, and cast malevolent looks at one another. They fought it out and voted. And in the end, they were just right enough.”
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RAH says:
June 10, 2014 at 1:55 pm (replying to)
Gamecock says:
June 10, 2014 at 11:28 am
Weather reports mattered in the Pacific even more than in the Atlantic theater: there were four hurricanes/typhoons that blew through allied fleets, not just one.
Even further back – as a cause for the ability for the B-29’s to fly low, is the Japanese very, very un-even and poor command-and-control administration and funding and manning for their homeland defenses. Poorly set up, poorly manned, and competition (not even apporaches to coorperation!) between Navy and Army air forces, anti-air cannon, anti-air radar systems, and local army and navy bases protection. Much less city-and area-wide anti-air coordination. That they had almost no effective long-range radar places to put radars on the coast lines did not help, but there was no system to use what little warning was available to the various local AA and aircraft commands in the various services and districts.
Further back up the logistics string, the basic strategy of Roosevelt before the war was to cut off Japan’s gasoline, oil, and steel production by embargo by the US oil fields, the Malaysian oil fields, and the Iranian/Iraq oil fields. With the Russia oil fields out because of the 1903 Russo-Japanese war and the Japan invasion of Russian Manchuria in the late 1930’s, the Baka and Crimean oil fields were already isolated. (What???? Did you think today’s headlines about energy-oil-geopolitical-conflicts are any different now than in the 1930’s ????) .
So Japan’s oil was cut off before the war (hence their first-months’ strategy of isolating the US fleet (Manila, Hawaii, Guam, Wake actions) and the simultaneous attacks south towards Malaysia.
During the war, US subs (after fixing their torpedoes, torpedo guidance, torpedo fuzes, and submarine commanders) cut oil imports by mining and convoy attacks. So what little air raid warning did happen was given to air bases with not enough planes loaded with no fuel, carrying pilots with almost no training, and little bullets or no maintenance on what few planes could fly. Against those limits, the B-29’s could fly low enough that the engine fires and QA problems could be worked out.
To illustrate: More than 25,000 B-29 crewmembers landed at Iwo Jima between the invasion start and the end of war just in emergency landings alone: Some were combat damage, but most were engine flameouts, engine oil fires, engine/propeller and structural damage, and wing damage. The first B-29 landed at Iwo before the shooting stopped.
RAH says:
June 10, 2014 at 8:04 am
Another WW II trivia question. Who came up with the code name “Overlord” for the Normandy invasion?
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No takers on this one apparently so. The short answer is Winston Churchill. The story:
From the begining when the US entered the war US Chief of Staff George Marshall had pushed for an invasion of France crossing the English Channel. As far as Marshall was concerned the invasion should take place in 1942. The British demurred. They rightfully pointed out that the allies would not have the men and materials to push such an invasion in 1942 or possibly even in 1943 but pointed out the US must enter the war in somewhere. And so in 1942 and 1943 we saw the invasions of N. Africa, Sicily, and finally Italy.
Finally Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff had to agree to prepare for a cross channel invasion because President Roosevelt insisted on it and because Stalin was making noises about making a seperate peace unless his allies agreed to engage Hiter’s forces in the heart of Europe.
So early in 1943 while Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, and all of the big name players were still busy down in the Mediterainian a HQ was set up in London to begin planning for the cross channel invasion of France.
The Americans always recognized the talent of the British for staff work and so this inital staff for making a plan of invasion was made up mostley of Brits and commanded by an Englishman. So under the able command of General Sir Fredrick Morgan the first draft of a plan for invasion into Normandy was created.
Once the first draft was completed Morgan needed to present it to Churchill before it could then be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and others for approval and expected revisions. For this to happen the operational the plan needed an official code name.
Now, code words and names were not just made up by those that needed them. Such names and codes were created and given out by the “Inter Services Security Bureau” (ISSB). Such names had to be picked carefully for various reasons and of course duplication was forbidden within a give theater.
Morgan sent one of his deputies to get a code name and the deputy came back from the ISSB with “Mothball” as the code name of the operation.
Morgan used the code name for his presentation to Churchill knowing very well that the Prime Minister would find the name unacceptable for the greatest endevor in the history of invasions.
When he got back from his meeting with Churchill his staff asked what happened when the Prime Minister heard the code word. Morgan explained: “Just what I knew was going to happen. Winston went right through the roof”. Churchill said “If they can’t come up with a better code name for our landing than that, I’ll damned well pick the code name myself.” Morgan reported that Churchill “glowered for a moment, pointed his cigar up towards the ceiling then reared back and barked OVERLORD! We shall call it OVERLORD.
clipe says:
June 9, 2014 at 5:15 pm
Not true.
If Britain had been occupied by Germany, the US still could have landed in North Africa & invaded Italy & southern France. Even if Rommel had been able to drive across Egypt & into SW Asia, Germany, Italy & Vichy France could not have kept us out of North Africa.
Roy says:
June 8, 2014 at 2:43 am
You are correct that I should have said only the US Mulberry was destroyed. As my comment shows, only the US had to bring in equipment over the beach, as the Canadian-British Mulberry survived.
phlogiston says:
June 10, 2014 at 11:05 am
On the subject of bombing accuracy – Germany during WW2 actually developed radio controlled flying bombs and used them in the Mediterranean to sink a couple of British ships. This technology was lost in the destruction of the Wemracht and it was to be three decades – the end of the Vietnam war – until it was re-invented.
Yes they were radio controlled glide bombs, one of my relatives was killed on the first ship to be sunk by a guided missile, the HMS Egret, it was in the Bay of Biscay though not the Med.
RAH says:
June 10, 2014 at 7:21 am
evanmjones says:
June 9, 2014 at 5:09 am
Not just McNair, but Patton. The AUSA designed its armor based upon early WWII experience. The tank destroyer idea made sense in 1940, but not in 1944. Sherman with the low velocity 75mm main armament was primarily an infantry support tank, but Firefly with HV 76.2mm gun was a tank-killer. Russian designers understood in the late ’30s that a tank should have a gun capable of defeating its own & comparable tanks’ armor. They also saw the advantage of the American Christie suspension, which the AUSA didn’t.
We could have given the 90mm tank destroyer a covered turret to field a Pershing-like tank sooner in the war, but at the cost of numbers produced. That was Patton’s call & he blew it.
Phil. says:
June 10, 2014 at 7:32 pm
First use of Fritz X guided anti-ship glide bomb was in the Med, ie July ’43 in a Sicilian harbor. HMS Egret was hit by Hs 293 radio-controlled glide bombs in August.
Other guided air-to-surface conventional weapons were studied between the US AZON of WWII & Vietnam-era Bullpup (1960s), but development was retarded by concentration on nukes.
RACookPE1978 says:
June 10, 2014 at 2:45 pm
The slaughter of Marines on Iwo wasn’t justified by B-29 crews saved. Most could have made it back to the Marianas or ditched at sea to be picked up by subs or destroyers. P-51 escort fighter flights from Iwo became less important after Le May’s switch to low level attacks, once he realized the Japanese lack of AAA.
FDR refused to use poison gas on Iwo, even though there were no civilians. Doing so would have saved the lives of around 7000 young American men. He may have worried about Japanese retaliation against our landings on Okinawa & the Home Islands, but as it turns out, such concern was ill-founded. Okinawa was in April ’45, but the attack on Kyushu in the fall would have benefited from the discovery of German nerve agents.
True, but what was going to be used in 1936-39 (the design period for a tank that had to be built in 1941-42-43 from parts and foundries built in factories and equipment built in factories built in 1939-1940?
The very early German designs were not exactly a “secret” in 1938-39, but we didn’t have them in the US to shoot at to figure out our actual designs (Grant, Lee, etc) were terrible. And outside of the early Panzer “armies” of very light tanks and armored personnel carriers, much of the Germans were significantly horse-drawn, with train & horse supplies and marching. “Good” panzers were late and mid-war items by the time they got to the front. Supplies in Europe in 1944 were shipped in 1943 from factories built 1942 using machines and parts built in factories built in 1941 and 42 using designs made in 1940 with ideas from 1938-39-40.
I don’t think ANYBODY expected that number of casualties on Iwo.
milodonharlani says:
June 10, 2014 at 7:32 pm
With 20/20 hindsight, the best stopgap, field expedient solution for 1943-44, after experience showed Sherman’s problems, would have been to produce a European & Asian variant. The Pacific version could have been the normal 75mm infantry support tank, while the ETO might have been a combo of the Russian Lend-Lease diesel with the Firefly’s 17 pounder gun. Plus more armor, possibly requiring an extra set of bogie wheels.
That way production could have been maintained at close to the same levels, while fielding a more battle worthy AFV in the NW ETO, if not Italy as well.
RACookPE1978 says:
June 10, 2014 at 7:57 pm
M4 Sherman tank was designed in 1940 & M36 tank destroyer with 90mm gun in 1942.
RACookPE1978 says:
June 10, 2014 at 7:58 pm
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/iwojima_med.htm
“Medical planning for the Iwo Jima campaign began in October 1944. In preparation for the operation, Medical Department representatives of the Navy, Marine Corps, and amphibious units that were to participate, held numerous conferences to discuss the tactical and logistic problems. The nature of the terrain on Iwo Jima was such that there could be no tactical surprise; the Marines had to land on the southeastern beaches, and make a frontal assault. Under the circumstances, heavy casualties were anticipated. For purposes of computing anticipated casualties, it was assumed that the period of active combat, from the beachhead landings to seizure of the objective, would be 14 days; that 5 percent of the entire attacking force would become casualties on the first and second days, 3 percent on the third and fourth days, and 1.5 percent on each of the remaining 10 days.”
In fact, fighting lasted five weeks. Actual fatalities, not casualties, were close to 10%. An escort carrier was sunk & there were also loses among US Army Air Forces personnel.
RACookPE1978 says:
June 10, 2014 at 2:45 pm
…..”To illustrate: More than 25,000 B-29 crewmembers landed at Iwo Jima between the invasion start and the end of war just in emergency landings alone: Some were combat damage, but most were engine flameouts, engine oil fires, engine/propeller and structural damage, and wing damage. The first B-29 landed at Iwo before the shooting stopped.”
Two points here: First off Iwo’s value was not just as an emergency landing field for the B-29s and others. The US crammed as many fighters, in particular P-51 Ds, on the island as they could to provide long range fighter escort for the B-29s. At the targets the fighters didn’t just protect the bombers from air attack they flew down onto the deck suppressing AA fire and attacking targets of opportunity. And that also had a significant effect in cutting the losses of the B-29s and crew members. Further the taking of Iwo denied the Japanese the early warning they could have otherwise provided for raids bound for the home Islands. There is no doubt in my mind that Iwo was worth it and the numbers you provided for emergency landings tell only the most noted part of the tale.
The B-29 with it’s Wright Cyclone R-3350 engines was the most complicated machine ever truly mass produced up to that time. It was the first large aircraft mass produced with pressurized compartments. Over 6,600 revisions were made to the aircraft and it’s power plants from prototype to the end of the war. So of course it had a lot of teething problems. Overheating of the engines and multiple problems with the electrical systems seemed to be the most prevalent.
Even the small specialized 509th Composite Group that carried the A-bombs having the very best equipment and maintenance and priority for support had problems. Sweeney and crew flying Bockscar had to nearly abort due to multiple electrical problems in the aircraft and one having directly to do with the fusing of the bomb on their way to drop Fat Man. Then of course the Primary target of Kokura was clouded over again demonstrating the lack of reliable forecasting so Nagasaki was finally hit after multiple passes. Dangerously low on fuel Sweeney opted for landing at Okinawa.
milodonharlani says:
June 10, 2014 at 7:49 pm
The slaughter of Marines on Iwo wasn’t justified by B-29 crews saved. Most could have made it back to the Marianas or ditched at sea to be picked up by subs or destroyers. P-51 escort fighter flights from Iwo became less important after Le May’s switch to low level attacks, once he realized the Japanese lack of AAA.
FDR refused to use poison gas on Iwo, even though there were no civilians. Doing so would have saved the lives of around 7000 young American men. He may have worried about Japanese retaliation against our landings on Okinawa & the Home Islands, but as it turns out, such concern was ill-founded. Okinawa was in April ’45, but the attack on Kyushu in the fall would have benefited from the discovery of German nerve agents.
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Totally disagree here.
For the invasion of Iwo Jima it was proposed in the Lethbridge Report to the allied high command that Iwo Jima be “drenched” with a Mustard gas like blister agent. Admiral Chester Nimitz along with most of the allied high command approved of this proposal thinking that the Japanese capabilities in chemical warfare were limited, but President Roosevelt vetoed the idea stating his fear of the use of such weapons against allied troops if and when an invasion of the home islands of Japan became necessary. However it was with these same fears in mind of the potentially tremendous casualties on both sides that LeMay was given approval for his fire bombing scheme.
I believe FDR was right! The Japanese had some significant chemical warfare capability themselves and had already demonstrated some of that capability in China. They would have gone to any extent to stop the invasion of the home islands without regard for the lives of their own citizens.
The problem really comes down to this. In the event that Downfall had been carried out the topography of the targets prohibited surprise and quick exploitation. There were very few beaches suitable for large scale amphibious operations and very limited LOCs to use in passing through the mountainous terrain. In short, the Japanese did not have that many beaches to defend and would know it was coming and in every case the allies attacking forces would be concentrated and perfect targets for chemical attack given the proper weather conditions.
Secondly, many daylight bombing raids from medium altitudes were carried out by the B-29s even after the low level night fire bomb missions. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAKhU8iQrZw
In fact in the vast majority of raids had far more B-29 sorties carrying HE than the limited number of M-31 cluster bombs loaded with Henry Kaisers “Goop” which were available or other incendiaries. That “Goop” was an asphalt product filled with fine magnesium dust particles that was a by product from the production of Magnesium. It was the most effective incendiary weapon and the one used for the most destructive low level night raids. Many other B-29s carried out missions in day and night mining the coastal LOCs to try and stop even coastal shipping.
And as I mentioned elsewhere the fighter escorts from Iwo Jima went down on the deck to suppress AAA and attack targets of opportunity. Iwo, as terrible as it was, was worth every life US life it cost. Great slide show showing Iwo and her fighter groups late in the war: http://picasaweb.google.com/7thfighter/IwoJima?authkey=Gv1sRgCIW06db_6oth&feat=email#slideshow/5299163150448181842
BTW concerning Patton. I was an SF soldier with 8 1/2 years team time. All of that team time was served in 10th Special Forces Group. The 10th SFG(A) is the oldest of the Groups originating from a Special Forces Company made up primarily of displaced persons (DPs) from countries and then later a Battalion formed at Flint Kaserne in the ancient story book Bavarian town of Bad Tolz on the Isar river nestled in the foot hills of the Alps. Bad Tolz came into being as a stop on the Roman salt road and was and is known for it’s mineral water baths.
During WW II Bad Tolz had 8 military hospitals in it. The only other military installation of note in the town was the Junkershule where SS Officers, mostly mostly non Germans were trained. Both the Hospital and the SS facility was serviced by slave labor dispersed from a couple of the satellite camps that were part of the system run from concentration camp at Dachau.
The large quadrangle and the rest of the facility was miraculously spared from bombing by the weather. Eight times missions were run to bomb it and every time they were weathered out. And so the facility survived the war and as with every SS facility they wanted to use became a permanent possession of the allies as per the status of forces agreement. It was named Flint Kasserne for Patton’s good friend Colonel Harry Albert “Paddy” Flint who was KIA being mortally wounded along the Saint-Lô-Périers road in Normandy. Many a storied US Army unit were HQed or billeted there at one time or another during the occupation and subsequent cold war, including the Big Red One.
The Kaserne served as Patton’s first HQ of occupation in Bavaria and his office complete with what was supposedly Rommel’s desk was maintained as a Museum there. It was a fantastic post and a wonderful facility and I served their for three years 1986-89.
When I first arrived there was still an former German soldier that had been given the job of running the mess at the kaserne by Patton. He retired while I was there. He had been wounded in N. Africa and sent to Tolz for treatment. Too disabled to serve in combat again he was given the job of running the mess at one of the hospitals. Patton, being practical about such things, gave him a job working in the mess hall at the Kasserne.
As far as I’m concerned Bad Tolz was the greatest post in Germany during the cold war and I saw about all of them at one time or another. Every step in the Kassern and around the town was pervaded with history. On my walk to my team room I stepped in or over the hob nail boot prints from the workers that poured the concrete. In the walls were the inset gun racks to hold the standard 8 mm Mausers. In the theater I sat in the same seat that Himmler sat in during the opening of the facility. We swam in the same pool they used. I sat on the same concrete bleachers they had as I watched my son play his home football games. We did our PT in the same gym and on the same ground that they had done their in or on. In the field across the road that served as our drop zone they had trained. The ranges were essentially the same they used. Our rigger shed had been their motor pool. The bar and restaurant we used were the same that they had used.
The facility was turned back over to the Germans who promptly tore all of the queadrangle but the front gate with it’s flanking turrets down and adapted it for other less martial purposes.
milodonharlani says:
Not just McNair, but Patton. The AUSA designed its armor based upon early WWII experience. The tank destroyer idea made sense in 1940, but not in 1944. Sherman with the low velocity 75mm main armament was primarily an infantry support tank, but Firefly with HV 76.2mm gun was a tank-killer. Russian designers understood in the late ’30s that a tank should have a gun capable of defeating its own & comparable tanks’ armor. They also saw the advantage of the American Christie suspension, which the AUSA didn’t.
We could have given the 90mm tank destroyer a covered turret to field a Pershing-like tank sooner in the war, but at the cost of numbers produced. That was Patton’s call & he blew it.
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Did you know that during his tough siege of Metz Patton had his staff take a survey of all the armored units under his command concerning the M4? Among other things Patton was asking his men if they wanted their M-4s guns upgraded to the new 76 mm long barreled rifle that was coming available to replace the current short barreled 75s.
The answer from the troops was an overwhelming NO!
This why when you see the picture of the M-4A3E2 Jumbo “Cobra King”, the first tank into to get into Bastogne and break the siege that came from Abrams CC of the 4th Armored, it has a short barreled 75. The story of the service, discovery, and restoration of Cobra King, the most famous Sherman of all time, is one you should check out if you aren’t familiar with it. Here is the story: http://armorfortheages.com/NACM/NACMmain/Projects/CobraKingProject/CobraKingProjectPage.htm you will notice that there is strong circumstantial evidence that Cobra King was abandoned when it was part of Task Force Baum by which time it had the long barreled 76 on it.
And along those same lines I just never have gotten the decision to move the Armored and Calvary Museum to Ft. Benning, GA. Benning is the the home of the Infantry, the Airborne, and of course the Rangers. It was far less so for the Armor or the Calvary though the 2nd Armored Division did form there under Patton and though the 1st Calvary formed there in their air mobile version that was used in Vietnam. Ft. Knox seems a far more appropriate place for the Armored history to be.
RAH says:
June 11, 2014 at 7:14 am
Or even Ft. Hood.
Thanks for Cobra King link.
It’s common among soldiers to like the equipment with which they’re familiar, unless it’s obviously inferior & unreliable. Also, by the time big tank on tank battles were over, the 75mm pop gun might have been good enough for most uses, with more ammo storage (90 rounds v. 77 in Firefly & 55 in US 76mm gun M1).
McNair (with whom Patton agreed on Sherman over Pershing tank production) made a lot of costly mistakes before his friendly fire death, to include preferring towed AT guns over SP tank destroyers.
RAH says:
June 11, 2014 at 5:46 am
Thanks very much for your time with the teams.
RAH says:
June 11, 2014 at 4:09 am
IMO Iwo-based USAAF fighters didn’t add much capability beyond what USN & USMC carrier-based fighters, plus USAAF from Okinawa already provided.
Had the Japanese mustard-gassed Downfall landing beaches, we’d have gassed their defensive positions with nerve agent. As I granted, FDR didn’t know about nerve gas when he overruled his theater COs. Had he & they known how heavy our losses would be, however, they might have decided otherwise.
milodonharlani says:
June 11, 2014 at 10:28 am
RAH says:
June 11, 2014 at 5:46 am
Thanks very much for your time with the teams.
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No thanks necessary. I worked hard and during my time spent between 3 different ODAs I was gone somewhere an average of 8 months of every year but my experiences while serving more than paid off for the effort. How many people have Berg Heiled the three highest peaks in Europe? Had the satisfaction of successfully treating Malarial Babies in Africa ? Touched the Sleeve of one of Napoleons uniforms? Gotten to Blow things up that would make the Myth Busters jealous? Spend a morning in the demo ranges under a house at the H&K factory busting caps through about every small arm they made. Had an Opal Cadet and three weeks to tour the entire battlefield of the Battle of the Bulge? Gotten to drive Soviet made armored vehicles and tanks? Told a US Ambassador to “F*&@ur momisugly off” and get away with it. Witness the longest 16″ barrage ever fired by an Iowa Class BB when the USS New Jersey fired into Lebanon? Take many a great ride in various aircraft from the US and other countries. And so many other things while working with some of the most quality people you would ever want to work and live with and while doing it all get PAID for it?
milodonharlani says:
June 11, 2014 at 10:35 am
RAH says:
June 11, 2014 at 4:09 am
IMO Iwo-based USAAF fighters didn’t add much capability beyond what USN & USMC carrier-based fighters, plus USAAF from Okinawa already provided.
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Except NUMBERS! Yes the US had a lot of carriers but the unsinkable kinds like Iwo can operate a heck of a lot more aircraft.
RAH says:
June 11, 2014 at 11:05 am
Well, thanks anyway. I feel that my tax dollars were well spent providing you & your comrades with those & other experiences.
A buddy of mine in the Rangers during your time & AO now thinks he was dumb to get out before 20 years.
RAH says:
June 11, 2014 at 11:08 am
But carriers & Okinawa were closer.
Here’s an article on the long-range patrols of Mustangs from Iwo written by my brother, who more often covers naval aviation:
http://www.506thfightergroup.org/mustangsofiwo.asp
milodonharlani says:Here’s an article on the long-range patrols of Mustangs from Iwo written by my brother, who more often covers naval aviation:
http://www.506thfightergroup.org/mustangsofiwo.asp
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Excellent! Thanks.