Charles Rotter
Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry’s recent decision to cancel the Mid-Barataria Sediment Diversion—an eye-watering $3 billion coastal “restoration” mega-project—has predictably triggered howls of protest from the usual suspects. Funded by BP’s Deepwater Horizon settlement, this diversion was marketed as a climate change adaptation miracle: just open a massive gate and let the muddy Mississippi fix what decades of levees, dredging, and oil exploration broke. Simple, right?
Not so fast.
Let’s look at what really happened here, and why Landry’s skepticism appears not only justified but necessary.
First, the costs. What started as a $1.5 billion project quickly doubled to nearly $3 billion, with taxpayers left holding the bag for any overages. “Everything above $2.9 billion is on our dime,” Landry bluntly warned, exposing the fantasy that this was somehow “free” money from BP. In reality, it was a recipe for fiscal disaster. Once the bill passed $3 billion, it was Louisiana’s problem—not BP’s.
Second, the scientific foundation. The whole point of the diversion was to build new wetlands by funneling sediment-laden river water into vanishing marshes. That’s the theory, at least. But a confidential 2022 federal memo—finally dragged into daylight—shows the Corps of Engineers had serious doubts the project would deliver anything close to the promised land-building. In other words, the “best available science” quietly admitted it was little more than guesswork, but that didn’t stop the PR machine from selling it as a sure thing.
Meanwhile, those actually living on the coast—the shrimpers, oyster harvesters, and families whose livelihoods depend on stable salinity and functioning estuaries—knew full well what a freshwater flood would do. “You either move oysters or move people, and there’s only one answer to that question,” Landry quipped. The federal government promised compensation, but no government payout can revive a dead fishery or restore a destroyed cultural tradition.
Here’s the punchline: not only did the project threaten to break the back of Louisiana’s fishing culture, but its uncertain environmental benefit put $1.5 billion in federal funds at risk of being clawed back if the terms of the grant weren’t met. Over $600 million has already been spent—now possibly wasted.
The fundamental problem here is one skeptics have pointed out for years: grand, technocratic schemes cooked up by climate crusaders rarely survive contact with reality. The models are optimistic, the projections are wishful thinking, and the costs—in dollars and in destroyed communities—are always greater than advertised. Louisiana’s own history is a warning: previous interventions, from river channelization to massive dredging, have a long track record of unintended consequences and ecological backlash.
Landry’s critics say he’s “abandoning science.” On the contrary, he’s recognizing the difference between real science—which admits uncertainty—and expensive, bureaucratic groupthink dressed up as “climate resilience.” With budget-busting risks, legal uncertainty, and unreliable modeling, the only responsible course was to hit pause.
Is there a crisis of coastal land loss in Louisiana? Of course. But launching a $3 billion gamble based on shaky science and fragile economics isn’t crisis management—it’s policy malpractice.
If anything, this debacle is proof positive that so-called climate “solutions” must be treated with skepticism, not blind faith. When the unknowns far outweigh the promises, and when the livelihoods of entire communities are on the line, the rational response is not to double down on the gamble but to step back, question the dogma, and demand better.
Landry did just that. And skepticism may have saved Louisiana from disaster—both fiscal and cultural.
Why not just replant the trees and grasses throughout that entire section of coastal bayous? How much would that cost?
It is not “land loss,” unfortunately a term used too much, but mostly marsh where there is loss of salt tolerant grasses that can only be planted intertidally. Tree loss is nearly all in freshwater such as for cypress. It is mostly a relatively simple problem (river levees) which produced extremely complex solutions due to various interests with real and imagined concerns. I have several decades of experience there, some with diversions, and will get some feeble points out later because there is no ‘good’ solution. The delta is a very unusual one which formed terminal distributaries.
I grew up in Pearl River county MS, got family scattered across south Louisiana and into east Texas. We, humans, have created a helluva problem down there. Been a long time since I was around Barataria area, had aunt and uncle lived in Venice. Got bit by a LOT of mosquitos.
Trees? They would just become more targets for UK wood pellet burning with tax subsidies.
We clearly are not charging them enough. Suck up all that subsidy money and spend it on beer, beef and babes!!!!!!!
Mr. Rotter? You have sent me down the googlyerf rabbit hole. Been long time since I spent time in south Louisiana.
I’ve never been. Want to go badly.
One advisory, don’t go to a restaurant that serves crawfish on a plate. If they ain’t dumping the boiler basket on the table you are in the wrong place! Hahaha Seriously, when you make the trip get out of New Orleans, it is at best a day trip and a night of drinking in the French Quarter. Get down in Venice, Golden Meadow, Morgan City or Abbeville areas. Excellent fishing and hunting, and don’t be afraid to go into that place that looks like it is about to fall down from the last hurricane, they got the best food in the world and really appreciate your business. And the newspaper on the table is a place mat you can read.
Good advice, there is also a lot to see around the Atchafalaya north of Morgan City, including the 1-10 rest area, but be careful as they keep raising and lowering the speed limits. I worked in coasts at least some in 6 states, 4 Gulf, 2 Atlantic, and have visited most of the other US coasts and a couple in Canada. Louisiana is the most complex and different.
This is my week to clean up my office which will take longer, but this is a start. Never counted, but suspect that I have over a thousand references related to the subject, a fraction of those which are still coming. A thick encyclopedia could be, may have or will be, produced but this covers a lot of the dilemma. Hallowell, C. 2001. Holding Back the Sea. Harper Collins: 265pp.
During the spill the governor opened the gates which killed lots of oysters. The irony is that there is a clockwise gyre current out of Southwest Pass into the pass at Barataria making it maybe the most productive bay. Known from at least the 1950s, probably earlier, rediscovered by someone lacking homework that called the waters hypersaline because they were a little saltier than the bay which still had more ebb than flood tide. The gyre put a lot of oil in Barataria Bay, rediscovery found that if it didn’t kill the roots, plants were fertilized. Louisiana oyster industry has a long history of success due to their productivity with private leases, state helps a little with regulated seed grounds.
Condrey, R. E., D. E. Evers, and P. E. Hoffman. 2014. The last natural active delta complex of the Mississippi River (LNDM): Discovery and implications. pp. 33-50. in, J. W. Day, G. P. Kemp, A. M. Freeman and D. P. Muth. (Eds.), Perspectives on the Restoration of the Mississippi Delta, Estuaries of the World. Springer, Dordrecht.
They (Condrey, statistician; others historians) concluded that the river was more dendritic based on mid-16th century and later Spanish documents showing a huge (?) central coast oyster reef.
Current mouth of the river was not discovered, at least based on Gulf mapping, until nearly 1700. There is a 1682 sketch showing the ‘birdfoot’ as geologists call it now, with three main tributaries, Southwest Pass (Main shipping), South Pass and Pass a Loutre. Bayous Lafourche and Plaqumines were well upstream minor tributaries but were closed in 1868 and 1904, others minor (subdeltas) formed from the birdfoot. Atchafalaya now carries lots of Mississippi water up to a third, almost captured the river in 1973 and there is probably the what is the world’s longest dead reef at the bay’s end, last few oysters living about 1950. This was caused by too much freshwater from the Atchafalaya River which is building a new delta visible on Google Earth.
I don’t like to advertise but we covered a lot of ground (& marsh).
Loftin, L. B., H. D. Hoese, and M. A. Konikoff. 2011. Will overfishing and proposed Mississippi River diversions imperil Louisiana oyster fisheries: Commentary and review. Gulf of Mexico Science. 29(1):1-12. https://doi.org/10.18785/goms.2901.01
Our skeptical of the skeptical reviews pointing out a number of statistical and other errors including markets and oyster life history. Glass half full and falling seems to rule a lot of hypothetical science.
I’m not up on restoration, but the BP oil money was also spent on oysters, including this not very encouraging. Texas got money but no oil, but there was a paper that concluded that they hypothetically could have. There are other studies with variable results.
Brooke, S. and A. Alfasso. 2022. An accounting and summary of oyster restoration projects in the Gulf of Mexico funded by Deepwater Horizon oil disaster funds. Fla. State Univ. Mar. Lab. Coast. Submitted to Fla. Widl. Federation. 35pp.
Never know what expertise browses these pages. I love the idea of a journal dedicated to Gulf of America science.