By Christopher Monckton of Brenchley
Climate skepticism has four failings: a lack of elementary professionalism; a tendency to be over-skeptical of both sides of the argument; a striking absence of the intuitive ability of the mathematician, who wanders cheerfully and competently from the concrete to the theoretical and back; and unjustifiable discourtesy towards the scientific labors of fellow-skeptics.
Therefore, the skeptical argument – which is, objectively speaking, correct – has gained a lot less traction that it deserves. An interesting instance of all four failings was a 2400-word rebuttal directed at me that was published here recently.
First, unprofessionalism. The author lacked the common sense to contact me for comment before publishing the rebuttal. However, this opportunity to reply, promptly granted when I asked for it, purges that lack of professional courtesy.
Secondly, over-skepticism. I had published a piece at WattsUpWithThat outlining a highly significant and useful result attained after careful research by Douglas Pollock, an expert on the scientific and economic impact of wind and solar power on national electricity grids.
Pollock consulted widely among grid operators, generators and academic experts. He found widespread puzzlement that after a certain point – varying from species to species and grid to grid – adding more renewables either did not increase that species’ share of total grid output or resulted in ever-growing capacity-constraint payments or do-not-generate orders to renewables generators at times of high wind, strong sun or low demand. He investigated, worked through the math and found he could answer the industry’s question. He proposes – justifiably, in my view – to submit his result to a leading journal for peer review.
He discovered a counter-intuitive and unexpected fact hitherto entirely unknown in the industry: namely, that the maximum national renewables fraction (the maximum share of total output on a national grid contributable by a weather-dependent renewable species without either prohibitively costly and logistically unfeasible static battery backup or wasted generation covered by cripplingly expensive capacity-constraint payments or disconnect orders) – is equal to the mean national capacity factor of that species (the average share of that species’ nameplate capacity that is achievable given national average annual weather patterns). Surprisingly, the mean national capacity factor of a renewable species – the greatest penetration achievable without great cost and waste – is its Pollock limit in that national grid.
Now, a true skeptic would have begun by reading through my article with due care and attention. The author of the rebuttal, like some of the commenters on my article here, chose not to do that. Instead, having cited a sentence without its context from my article, he then restated it in terms twice explicitly contradicted elsewhere in my article – a context that he regrettably withheld from his readers throughout, for without it his entire criticism would have been seen to be entirely without foundation:
“Monckton (and Pollock) thus seem to be saying that if (for example) a wind turbine system can only generate about 35% of nameplate capacity ‘realistically achievable under real-world conditions’, then it’s futile to build any more wind turbines once you get to 35% wind penetration into output, because the 35% penetration is a mathematical limit that cannot be exceeded.”
Just two sentences after the sentence he thus rewrote from my original article so that that he could more readily tilt against the straw man than against what I had actually written, I had written:
“What Douglas Pollock’s brilliant and, at first blush, unexpected result means is that the miserably low capacity factor R is in fact also the fundamental limit fmax on the contribution that unreliables can make to the grid without prohibitively expensive and logistically unachievable large-scale static-battery backup.”
To make sure there was no doubt as to my meaning, I went on to say: “This means that wind and solar power cannot contribute more than about a quarter of total electricity demand, unless there is battery backup. However, as Professor Michaux’s 1000-page paper of 2021 for the Finnish Geological Survey has established, there are nothing like enough techno-metals to provide battery backup of the entire grid worldwide.”
I did not need to state the corollary that, without battery backup, which Professor Michaux has proven to be impossible on the required scale, one would either need capacity-constraint payments or disconnect orders to subsidy farmers to stop their windmills and solar panels. Both capacity payments and disconnect orders are cripplingly expensive and dangerously wasteful given the growing scarcity and cost of energy.
The author of the rebuttal, when writing to give me this opportunity to reply, wrote that Mr Pollock’s result “does not address the questions of cost and waste of overbuilding”.
However, not only my original article but also this article, like Mr Pollock’s paper, had of course mentioned the “cost and waste of overbuilding”. In addition to the mention of “prohibitively expensive and logistically unachievable large-scale battery backup”, which appeared in both articles, I had made the following further references to cost in the original article:
“As a direct result of this fatuity, Britain now suffers the costliest electricity in the world.”
Next I explained that, as a result of our excessive electricity prices, “The manufacturing industries in which we once led the world have died or gone overseas to Communist-led China, India and Russia.”
Later in the article, I drew further attention to the cost and wastefulness of installing wind and solar capacity in excess of the Pollock limit by explaining that, to take one example, “just for the first generation of static-battery backup for the global grid, the Professor [Michaux] calculates that one would need the equivalent of 67,000 years’ total current production annual production of vanadium, to name but one of the scarce techno-metals that would be required in prodigious quantities.”
Having thus misrepresented my article, the author of the rebuttal said his immediate reaction was that I “couldn’t possibly be right”.
I have seldom seen a more blatant instance of the Aristotelian logical fallacy excoriated by the medieval schoolmen as argumentum ad ignorationem elenchi.
Thirdly, defective mathematical intuition. The author actually admits that it is his custom to avoid theory, which he calls “fancy proofs”, and to “stick to simple arithmetic”. As a result of his approach – all too common among skeptics – he entirely missed the main point of Mr Pollock’s result and, therefore, its importance. Instead, as shown above, he misrepresented it. So let me present the Pollock result, step by inexorable step. Judge for yourself, gentle reader. You will see that the conclusion is justifiable.
The mean national capacity factor R of a weather-dependent renewable species (typically wind or solar) is the ratio of generation achievable by that species in annual mean weather to its nameplate capacity. Capacity factors vary both from nation to nation (with varying weather) and from species to species. In the UK, to take one example, the mean national onshore-wind capacity factor is about 0.25. Note in passing that for several reasons one cannot, as the author did, naively add the capacity factors of wind and solar.
The minimum demand-satisfying nameplate capacity C of either wind or solar is the minimum installed nameplate capacityof that species that would be required to satisfy the mean demand D met by the national grid. It is simply the ratio of D to R. Thus –
C = D / R.
The national wind (or solar) fraction f is the fraction of national grid generation actually contributed by wind or solar power.
The fractional minimum demand-satisfying nameplate capacity N of wind (or solar) is the minimum installed nameplate capacity needed to generate f. It is the product of f and C:
N = f C = f D/ R.
The maximum national wind or solar fraction fmax occurs when N = D. Then:
N = D = D fmax / R, so that fmax = R.
Therefore, the maximum national wind fraction fmax is equal to the mean national capacity factor R for wind power, which is the Pollock limit: in this example, 0.25.
By now, most national grid authorities know what Ris for each renewable species. But hitherto they have not known that R is equal to the minimum installed demand-satisfying nameplate capacity. Install more than that iron limit R and the additional electricity generated will be cripplingly expensive, or wasted, or both. That new knowledge is valuable and readily usable.
Precisely because until now the Pollock limit was not known, several national grid authorities are already generating more electricity from renewables than the Pollock limit. In doing so, they are unwittingly subjecting customers to very heavy and needless additional costs, which could have been, and could henceforth be, avoided by knowing of and respecting the Pollock limit.
Yet, remarkably, the author of the rebuttal cited the existence of over-generation in various countries as evidence that Mr Pollock was wrong in that there is no Pollock limit. For good measure, he also said that I had “assumed that no overbuilding is allowed”. Neither I nor Mr Pollock had assumed, stated or implied any such thing. I had instead twice implied the opposite. The existence of overbuilding is evidence not that there is no Pollock limit but rather that grid authorities do not know of the Pollock limit.
Fourthly, ungenerosity towards the work of other skeptics. Mr Pollock’s result is proven above. He is to be congratulated, not condemned, for his insight. The equations are simple, as were Einstein’s, but originating them was very far from easy.
If the author of the rebuttal had not misrepresented Mr Pollock’s result, and if he had found a genuine error, it would have been fair enough to point that out. He found no error, but was discourteous anyway. He preached that I had “launched into a sad round of name-calling … [i]nstead of simply recognizing that a small modification to [my] conclusion was in order”. No “modification” was needed, since the original article had already covered the point.
Next, the author of the rebuttal says: “I think that Monckton ultimately concedes that his result only applies to a situation where overbuilding is not allowed.” As will be seen from the quotations above, in the original article I had explicitly pointed out, twice, that battery backup would be needed if wind or solar generation exceeded their Pollock limits: i.e., if overbuilding occurred. One would not need battery backup otherwise. I had not “ultimately conceded” anything: I had started out, in the original article, by stating, twice, what ought in any event to have been obvious from the outset.
The author ends with a discourtesy to the effect that I had gone “somewhat over the edge on this one”. And yet, in writing to grant me this opportunity to reply, for which I am grateful, he says: “I would strongly urge you that name-calling does not advance your argument.” Goose, gander. Pot, kettle. We skeptics do need to raise our game.
I would like to point out that some amount of overbuilding, of wind in particular, has occurred for any nameplate capacity that could end up exceeding the instantaneous grid demand at any point in time in the daily and seasonal usage pattern (assuming no export or storage.) This is because for some fraction of the time, high wind output can occur during low demand. So it’s not only about averages. The shape of the usage profile matters too. The degree of overbuilding and the resulting need for occasional curtailment might be willingly tolerated, I suppose, if minor.
Mr Dibbell is correct. The intermittency both of supply by weather-dependent renewable species and of demand for electricity cause mismatches which must be expensively resolved minute by minute to keep the grid balanced. Grid balancing cost the UK grid $1.3 billion last year alone, entirely because of the destabilizing effect that Mr Dibbell mentions.
With due respect to his Lordship, the “counter-intuitive and unexpected fact” has been qualitatively obvious to objective (i.e. sceptical) observers ever since the start of the renewable-energy mania. Pollock has quantified the limit in an interesting way.
It is also obvious (and clearly articulated by his Eminence, but not fully grasped by the Contrarian) that the Pollock Limit is not a “hard” limit. It is a soft limit that will vary with the willingness of a captive population to tolerate high energy prices and/or intermittent delivery (i.e. blackouts). Our earnest politicians, in thrall to the sermons of St. Greta et al., will keep pushing the limit further until their voters have had enough. Additionally to the voters having had enough, there will be no change until political parties appear who actually oppose the green nonsense. In most of the western democracies, voters currently have a choice between Green, Slightly Less Green, and Even More Green.
There are always tradeoffs in life. That means there isn’t always a right or wrong answer. Often, it is an opinion such as whether or not paying more for electricity is a reasonable exchange for some claimed goal of reducing CO2.
However, one can’t make an informed judgement about the exchange unless it can be demonstrated unequivocally that having more expensive electricity will result in reduced atmospheric CO2 and that it will result in a lowered warming rate. Those are still contentious issues.
Smart Rock has conflated two concepts: that of the general uselessness of unreliables, which has long been known to all, and the particular point in their penetration at which their presence on the grid suddenly becomes egregiously wasteful, destabilizing and expensive. That point is the Pollock limit, which was hitherto entirely unknown.
The Pollock limit is indeed a hard limit. The equations prove it. Install capacity above that limit and that additional capacity will be expensively wasted, or will require expensive battery backup to soak up the surplus.
Monckton and the “consensus” scientists and Curry have failed to recognise that the effect on temperature of the tiny amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is too small to measure. Sceptics should concentrate on broadcasting this simple idea to the general public at every opportunity.
Here are quotes from my Blog http://climatesense-norpag.blogspot.com/
“……….5. CO2 -Temperature and Climate.
The whole COP Net Zero meme is founded on the flawed assumptions and algorithms which produced the IPCC- UNFCCC model forecasts of coming dangerous temperature increases.
The “consensus” IPCC models make the fundamental error of ignoring the long- term decline in solar activity and temperature following the Millennial Solar Activity Turning Point and activity peak which was reached in 1990/91 as shown in Figure 1
The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is .058% by weight. That is one 1,720th of the whole. It is inconceivable thermodynamically that such a tiny tail could wag so big a dog. (13)
Stallinga 2020 (14) concludes: ” The atmosphere is close to thermodynamic equilibrium and based on that we……… find that the alleged greenhouse effect cannot explain the empirical data—orders of magnitude are missing. ……Henry’s Law—outgassing of oceans—easily can explain all observed phenomena.” CO2 levels follow temperature changes. CO2 is the dependent variable and there is no calculable consistent relationship between the two. The uncertainties and wide range of out-comes of model calculations of climate radiative forcing (RF) arise from the improbable basic assumption that anthropogenic CO2 is the major controller of global temperatures.
Miskolczi 2014 (15) in “The greenhouse effect and the Infrared Radiative Structure of the Earth’s Atmosphere “says “The stability and natural fluctuations of the global average surface temperature of the heterogeneous system are ultimately determined by the phase changes of water.”
Also See AleksandrZhitomirskiy2022 Absorption of heat and the greenhouse gas effect. https://independent.academia.edu/AleksandrZhitomirskiy (16) which says:
“The molar heat capacities of the main greenhouse and non-greenhouse gases are of the same order of magnitude. Given the low concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, their contribution to temperature change is below the measurement error. It seems that the role of various gases in the absorption of heat by the atmosphere is determined not by the ability of the gas to absorb infrared radiation, but by its heat capacity and concentration. ”
Zaichun Zhul et al 2016 (17) in Greening of the Earth and its drivers report “a persistent and widespread increase of growing season integrated Leaf Area Index (greening) over 25% to 50% of the global vegetated area from 1982 – 2009. ………. C02 fertilization effects explain 70% of the observed greening trend.”
Policies which limit CO2 emissions or even worse sequester CO2 in quixotic CCS green-washing schemes would decrease agricultural food production and are antithetical to the goals of feeding the increasing population and bringing people out of poverty.”
For the solar activity – temperature correllation see Figs 1,2,3 in the link above
Here is Fig 1
<a href=”https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/820570527003668244/5227646452724385684#” target=”_blank” rel=”noopener nofollow ugc”
Fig 1 Correlation of the last 5 Oulu neutron cycles and trends with the Hadsst3 temperature trends and the 300 mb Specific Humidity. ( 5,6 )
The Oulu Cosmic Ray count in Fig.1C shows the decrease in solar activity since the 1991/92 Millennial Solar Activity Turning Point and peak There is a significant secular drop to a lower solar activity base level post 2007+/- and a new solar activity minimum late in 2009. In Figure 1 short term temperature spikes are colored orange and are closely correlated to El Ninos. The hadsst3gl temperature anomaly at 2037 is forecast to be + 0.0
True. Is what I said…..
Your comment is mainly a big pile of baloney and I’m going to be rude by not wasting much time explaining why:
There is a large greenhouse effect mainly from water vapor.
Adding CO2 makes the greenhouse effect a little larger.
Nothing to worry about because CO2 is a wek greenhouse gas above 400ppm
The exact effect of CO2 can be measured in a laboratory. The actual effect of added CO2 in the atmosphere can’t be measured because there are so many other variables that can cause climate change.
You claim that CO2 effects are too small to measure is FALSE, just like the opposite claim that CO2 causes all measured global warming. The correct ECS of CO2 is a number WE DO NOT KNOW.
Henry Glad you agree with me. I said “the effect on temperature of the tiny amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is too small to measure. “
You said “The actual effect of added CO2 in the atmosphere can’t be measured because there are so many other variables that can cause climate change.”
QED.
Mr Page and Mr Pool are both wrong. There is a greenhouse effect. But we are unable to alter it enough to be dangerous.
Monckton. Do you accept or reject the Zhitomirskiy statement quoted in my comment
“The molar heat capacities of the main greenhouse and non-greenhouse gases are of the same order of magnitude. Given the low concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, their contribution to temperature change is below the measurement error. It seems that the role of various gases in the absorption of heat by the atmosphere is determined not by the ability of the gas to absorb infrared radiation, but by its heat capacity and concentration. ” ?
I would appreciate any comment you might make on the Solar activity/temperature correlation shown in Fig 1 above
Monckton,Pool,Green This discusion would be helped if y’all took the time to read the Zhitomirskiy paper .The link above doesn’t work This one does
https://www.academia.edu/86911306/WHAT_IS_THE_EVIDENCE_FOR_THE_EXISTENCE_OF_THE_GREENHOUSE_EFFECT
I agree that we are unable to alter it enough to be dangerous I said.”The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is .058% by weight. That is one 1,720th of the whole. It is inconceivable thermodynamically that such a tiny tail could wag so big a dog”The anthropogenic contribution is like that of a flea on the tail. The whole Net Zero meme is delusional – an example of the ” CO2 Derangement Syndrome” see my Blog from 2019
http://climatesense-norpag.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2021-08-19T14:49:00-05:00&max-results=10&start=3&by-date=false
Your argument is the same as claiming that a small convection heater cannot heat a room, because it only heats a tiny fraction of the air in that room directly. Experience tells you that the heat diffuses throughout the room. In the case of the atmosphere the heaters are already well diffused. If they get switched on by absorbing a photon they will soon heat the nearby molecules that cannot absorb the photons, but can become more energetic through collisions.
Thanks, Christopher. As I pointed out in your previous article, Ireland has FAR exceeded the “Pollock Limit” without adding battery capacity. There, at present, the share of electricity from wind is 23.5% higher than the Pollock limit.
Here is the data again:
And here is your claim again (emphasis mine):
Despite that claim, not only are the Irish exceeding the Pollock limit, but they’ve done so every year since 2018, and they have increased the excess every year since then. And the increase in the wind share of electricity didn’t even slow down as it approached the Pollock Limit, much less stop.
Your only comment on the Irish data was “And now much of the Irish generation is being wasted, with consequent capacity payments?”
I’m sorry, but that’s totally unresponsive. Your claim in the head post was that without batteries, the share of electricity from wind simply could not exceed the Pollock Limit. Your claim was “The Pollock limit means that all electricity generated during over-producing seasons by renewables exceeding the limit will be wasted.”
In 2021 on the order of 11% of Irish wind electricity was subject to “dispatch-down” (the combination of curtailment and capacity reductions). And that 11%, as you point out, is indeed “being wasted”.
But as is obvious from the chart above, which does not include the dispatch-down wasted electricity, a goodly amount of the excess energy above the Pollock Limit is indeed being utilized, not wasted.
Please be clear. I do think that the Pollock Limit is important. And I think that your highlighting of the limit is a valuable contribution to the climate discussion. However, I do not see it as any kind of absolute limit. Rather, it appears to be the point where costs start rising very fast due to dispatch-down. The huge amount of money spent in the UK to pay wind producers to NOT produce electricity is a national disgrace.
And further, I think that looking hard at those locations that exceed the limit would be useful. That’s why I brought up Ireland. As the old saying has it, “The exception tests the rule”.
(Yes, I know the saying is “The exception proves the rule”. But that’s such an old saying that it is using an archaic sense of “prove” meaning “to test”. There are a few places where that meaning still is current usage,such as in the phrase “proving grounds”, which as everyone knows means “testing grounds”, and in the phrase “the proof of the pudding is in the eating”.)
My best to you and yours as always,
w.
Doesnt Ireland have undersea power connectors from which power can draw as ‘backup’. The UK grid being so much larger than Ireland its just a blip on their demand.
The existing main connector to the republic is a hefty 400kV and 500MW and is DC thus switchable , there is another to Northern Ireland again 500MW and DC
Thanks for the graph, it’s help me answer a question “will more renewables make my energy bill lower?”. Not according to data supplied from BOXT:
Rank Country Price – pence per kWh
1 United Kingdom 19.31 per kWh
2 Ireland 18.99
3 Spain 18.51
3 Belgium 16.34
3 Japan 15.64
6 Australia 14.01
7 Switzerland 14.00
8 Netherlands 13.98
9 Germany 13.58
10 Czech Republic 12.69
From this list it doesn’t seem like that’s going to happen any time soon and it’s only the bad management of the UK market that will keep the UK in top spot.
With just one Willie E.’s usual easy to read charts and Pollock is no longer a relevant rule of thumb. Now it is just a type of fish again.
Mr Greene is wasting everyone’s time here. I had already replied in detail to Willis Eschenbach in the previous thread, but he continues, in effect, to misinterpret the original head posting, and has not taken sufficient account of the clarifications in the present head posting. The Irish grid is in fact a fine demonstration of the cost and wastefulness of generating unreliable power above the Pollock limit.
I gave a detailed answer to Willis on the extent of EIRgrid’s interference in wind and . solar generation in the earlier thread. The conclusion was that any generation over the Pollock limit was in various ways disproportionately expensive, a point that is further explained in the current head posting. The Irish grid, then, is not a counterexample to the Pollock limit: on the contrary, it is quite a good demonstration of it.
I have already explained to Willis that the Pollock limit tells grid operators the point at which adding more wind and solar capacity will become disproportionately costly, wasteful and destabilizing. I have also explained to him that he had taken a single sentence out of context and then misinterpreted it in a manner directly contrary to a sentence that appeared just two sentences later.
Thanks, Christopher. What you previously said was:
It seems I’m missing something. If all of these compulsory shutdowns are simply lost income to the unreliables generators, how does this make Irish electricity more expensive?
And in fact, despite Ireland exceeding the Pollock limit in 2018, Irish electricity prices to the consumer remained flat until the second half of 2021, when electricity prices around the planet rose because of increasing fossil fuel prices.
Next, you say:
I fear that you have moved the goalposts, not just a little, but into the next county. Your original claims in your first post were (emphasis mine):
and
and
[In fact, wind capacity factor in the UK is 27% and wind share is 21%, so it’s still a ways from the Pollock limit … but I digress …]
and
and
I see nothing in there about “costly, wasteful and destabilizing”. Instead, you made a number of flat statements that sans batteries, unreliables CANNOT CONTRIBUTE MORE than their capacity factor.
Not that it’s expensive, not that it’s wasteful, but that it cannot be done.
In other words, you started out by claiming that the Pollock limit is a physical limitation.
However, when I actually looked at the real-world data and pointed out that Ireland surpassed the “Pollock limit” in 2018, that it is surpassing that “limit” more and more each year, that the windpower share didn’t even slow down as it approached and surpassed the “limit” as it would if the limit were physical, and that the windpower share in Ireland is currently 23.5% higher than the Pollock limit, you’ve now changed to claiming it’s not a physical limitation, it’s actually an economic limitation.
Now, I’d agree that it’s true that wind and solar are “costly, wasteful and destabilizing”. But that’s true at all levels of penetration, not just above the Pollock limit. The moment you start including wind and solar in the mix it’s costly, wasteful and destabilizing, and that has nothing to do with the Pollock limit.
My best to you, as always,
w.
Willis has not followed Monckton’s Rule: “Read The Head Posting.” The head posting makes it plain that if one generates above the Pollock limit the surplus will have to go to battery backup, which, as Mr Locock points out hereunder, is cripplingly expensive. As the head posting explains, I did not need to add the self-evident corollary: that, in the absence of battery backup for generation in excess of the Pollock limits for the weather-dependent generating species, the extra generation would either have to be dumped to neighbouring grids via the interconnectors or prevented by disconnect orders or capacity-constraint payments.
As to Willis’ suggestion that stop orders are expensive for the generators but not for the public, he should perhaps refer to an elementary textbook of economics. If you have gone to the expense of installing a costly asset and are then told that for significant periods you cannot use it to generate revenue, then you will suffer a loss compared with the fuller use of the asset that would otherwise have been possible. If you are a business, then in due course you will pass on that loss to your customers. If you have experienced such interference with your revenue-generating use of the asset before, you will already have priced in the cost of disconnect orders in your existing price structure. Either way, the customer ends up paying more for his electricity.
Thus, wind and solar are costly, wasteful and destabilizing even below the Pollock limits: but, for obvious reasons, the cost, waste and destabilization will begin to increases sharply as the Pollock limits are approached, particularly in periods of high wind, strong sun and low demand. The Pollock limits reveal the point at which that very substantial additional cost and waste and destabilization will have become evident.
I might add that even after moving the goal posts the Pollock limit is only empirical, not, as Lord Monckton claimed, a “beautifully simple and simply beautiful instance of the logical application of mathematical principles to derive a crucially-important but unexpected and hitherto wholly overlooked result.” And that empirical result is greatly dependent upon the fact that individual wind turbines’ outputs are highly correlated. We can demonstrate this by removing that correlation.
Consider in this connection a turbine located in such a region that its capacity factor is “about a quarter” as Lord Monckton reported for the UK. To this end we’ll assume that the probability that its output without curtailment would be a given fraction of the turbine’s nameplate capacity is proportional to the negative 2/3 power of that fraction. (actual.P.over.nameplate.P <- runif(365 * 24) ^ 3)
Now let’s add more, identical turbines and have them operate independently. In contrast to real life, that is, the speed of the wind that drives one turbine will not in general be very correlated with the speed of the wind that drives another. If we curtail the resultant aggregate output in accordance with ERCOT’s 2018 load we find that the point of diminishing returns is much higher than the Pollock limit of 25%.
Specifically, suppose that dividing wind farms’ average annual output into the annual debt service imposed by their (let’s assume all-debt) financing would come to $40/MWh without curtailment. The chart nearby depicts the resultant marginal cost of adding after-curtailment wind power. As you can see, the marginal cost of additional wind power remains flat well beyond the 25% Pollock limit; it doesn’t begin to increase until after penetration has exceeded 60%.
Again, wind turbines’ outputs do tend to be highly correlated in real life, so perhaps with enough interpretation the Pollock limit could serve as a rough rule of thumb for something. For reasons others have already explained, though, Lord Monckton’s math is not how you get there.
There you go finding my ~60% again…
I’ve encountered it time and again in very different locations and regimes of wind and solar production. For example, I previously drew attention to my examination of the situation on Thursday Island. King Island is at the other end of the country in the Bass Strait, and Roger Andrews took a look at data for their system here:
https://euanmearns.com/a-first-look-at-the-king-island-tasmania-renewable-energy-integration-project/
He finds a cliff at 65%. He looked at wind for the UK in 2013 and found the need for curtailment rising from just below 60%. And so it goes.
Very interesting: a real-world example in which a site having a 39% capacity factor and only one hour’s worth of battery storage achieved 64% penetration with only 3% curtailment. The battery muddies the water a little, but the fact that it’s only one hour’s worth suggests that the Pollock “limit” isn’t of much use even as a rough rule of thumb.
My chart is based on no battery or other storage, but it’s also based on synthetic wind-power data obtained by assuming an unrealistically low correlation among the simulated turbines’ outputs. The purpose was to show that any validity the Pollock “limit” may have depends on correlation among the turbines’ outputs.
Also, I don’t have any idea what a single turbine’s output distribution might be, so I made an arbitrary guess. The nearby chart depicts the distribution of a typical one of the 10,000 simulated turbines I used to generate synthetic data having a 25% capacity factor. The load data come from the real world, although at only one-hour resolution.
This page has a nice animated chart showing individual wind farm duration curves alongside the fleet average for the UK offshore. It is important to understand that Moray East has frequently taken the paid curtailment price option, while Hywind will never curtail voluntarily because of the high subsidy it gets for every MWh produced.
https://energynumbers.info/uk-offshore-wind-capacity-factors
The fleet average curve can be approximated by a combination of my n=1 and n=2 cases, or by an intermediate exponent (approx 1.3 for the entire wind fleet including onshore). Note that the charts at the link are with the x-axis reversed compared with my exposition.
Thank you so much!
I’m afraid I have my limitations as a researcher, and I doubt I would ever have found that on my own.
You report that Ireland doesn’t have take or pay contracts (no curtailment payments). Wonderful, that should be universal. But the first thing that comes to mind is how can the generators make money in that structure. Only two possibilities, make it up somewhere else or have a generous tariff. Which one is it? Or are wind generators going broke and all wind installations stopped?
The Pollack tool simply shows that overbuilding is wasteful, it doesn’t say if it is wasteful to the generator, the utility, the consumer or any other stakeholder, it just shows when it becomes wasteful. It’s not complicated.
If you accept the Polluck limit, and say its been reached, and then consider the lifetime of the renewables (as perhaps 25 years) you can then posit the size of the sustainable renewables industry output.
4% of existing material. Domestic consumption stalemate.
More than that doesn’t increase overall usage but increases prices if government pays for non usage, and will cause simple storage of product (more costs) while driving businesses into bankruptcy.
A Monopoly will develop.
(Assumes no cost effective storage and no export market.)
Playing devil’s advocate, how do states like Iowa and South Dakota exceed the Pollack limit? My understanding is that both states generate around 50% of their energy from renewables. They also don’t seem to suffer from high utility costs. What are they doing differently?
Part of a larger grid is why . They arent a self contained system. look at the larger area grid to see what it can do . Even then theres power interconnectors with adjacent systems to ‘fill the gaps’ that we know wind renewable needs .
Even better if the backup is hydro as that is on demand and has those large turbines proving steady 50hz ( or 60hz for US)
They dump it to Illinois where its absorbed into their large paid for nuclear component. Wind enthusiast’s like to talk about Iowa, but they never mention Illinois.
There are at least two reasons. One was stated by Lord Moncton, but given the fact he’s felt the need to heated a couple of times, hasn’t always soak in.
1. The Pollock limit is local, meaning the value for the UK is not necessarily the value for Germany or North Dakota. He specifically notes that the Pollock limit for onshore wind and offshore wind even the same country are somewhat different.
2. The second reason is no assumption, which I don’t recall seeing stated by Lord Moncton. He was careful to explicitly note the issue of battery backup, but I think the availability of power from distant sources (for purchase or for sale) is relevant. I haven’t seen this discussed very much except it did come up just above in the discussion of Ireland.
I don’t know enough about the UK power situation to know the extent to which the UK can acquire or sell power off island. If it is very limited that it was an implicit assumption the deserves explicit discussion. Iowa and South Dakota have the ability through the electrical grid to buy and sell power from locations that might have very different wind/solar conditions
Perhaps a less contentious view of the maximum useful amount of renewanlbles without econimic storage is the amount if non-renewables required despite cheap renewables …. because of periodic lack of wind and sun.
If we look at wind and solar, what maximum amount is NOT available through the year? If renewables were 100% available – even 200% available – are there times when so little light abd wind is available that there would be blackouts?
In theory, renewables “out of State” could supply excess-to-need power. However, at night in winter with no wind conditions can be almost nation-wide. When these extreme conditions happen, would we need 80% immediate backup to kick in?
We know where the power comes from for any municipality. If we look to where wind and solar work (more energy produced by the system than consumed in creating the system), we can work out the geographic capacity (“face plate”) for the country, and then the deliverable potential. And the variance in deliverable potential.
If the entire country were integrated into one grid, we would still need some spinning reserves. At times we would need a lot.
This calculation of needed spinning reserves would also tell us how much total deliverable storage we would need. Not being used. Total backup just sitting there, not necessarily charged even. But available to be charged …. within the time our analysis shows the system is about to fail.
Unfortunately the word “skeptic” has developed a connotation amongst liberals and left-leaners as “someone of contrary viewpoint not worth talking to”. Much better to refer to oneself as being a climate “realist”, “rationalist”, or “pragmatist”, maybe “practicalist”.
“story tip” ?
That’s one option.
I’d prefer to reclaim the term, as any honest science should describe themselves as skeptical in general. That ought to be the very essence of science. You make a claim, I don’t simply accept it because you said so, but poke and prod and see if there are holes in the argument which could lead to a refined and improved claim.
I confess this may be a losing strategy as the media has not only defined skeptic in a negative way, it often conflates skeptics and deniers, sometimes implicitly sometimes explicitly, and maybe this isn’t a battle worth fighting.
I generally like being a pragmatist but occasionally there are windmills worth tilting at. Some days I think this one’s worth tilting at, some days I don’t.
Just suggesting stealing a page from the watermelon playbook. Changing global warming, to climate change…. to global heating….and climate crisis seems to have increased their media coverage by a couple of kiloGretas per day…..where a single Greta is wooden nickel’s worth of end-of-the-world content.
Perhaps the best that can be said of the so-called Pollock limit is that it’s been empirically found to coincide roughly with the point of diminishing grid-power returns to installed unreliables capacity. The chart nearby illustrates that coincidence for the case of 2018 ERCOT wind power. But that’s a result of particular wind and demand distributions and correlations, and one can readily conceive of sets of distributions for which returns wouldn’t start to diminish until well above the Pollock limit. (Whether such distributions occur in the real world is a different question, of course, but this just means that the point of diminishing returns is an empirical matter, not, as Lord Monckton’s original post contended, something to be derived mathematically.)
For right now, though, let’s set aside the distribution question and look at what the marginal costs of wind power might be in that ERCOT case without batteries or other storage. We have to bear the capital cost of almost 100% backup–say, by gas plants–no matter what the unreliables penetration is, so we’ll ignore that fixed cost. That is, we’ll consider the gas plants’ cost as already spent, so it won’t come into play in deciding whether to add more wind. And for the sake of this discussion we’ll assume that our gas plants’ only variable cost is fuel.
Now suppose that dividing wind farms’ average annual (pre-curtailment) output into the annual debt service imposed by their (let’s assume all-debt) financing comes to $30/MWh. And suppose that at current prices gas costs $22 per generated megawatt-hour. This would mean that adding more wind capacity wouldn’t make sense even at penetrations well below the Pollock limit. So if unreliables’ greater real cost hasn’t yet stopped us from installing them it’s hard to see why talking about the Pollock limit will change things.
As the chart nearby also illustrates, moreover, prices varied within a higher range during the spring, summer, and fall of ’22, and, if our assumptions are realistic, penetration beyond the Pollock limit would make sense if prices in that range persisted. (Naptown Numbers‘ “Will Batteries Make Wind and Solar Reliable?” sheds some light on those assumptions’ plausibility.)
For these reasons I’m pessimistic about the possibility that noting a coincidence between the point of diminishing returns and the “Pollock limit” will be the “final nail in the coffin of ‘renewable’ energy.”
Agree. Politicians don’t like to understand things that negatively impact their campaign contributions.
You state ,”As the chart nearby also illustrates, moreover, prices varied within a higher range during the spring, summer, and fall of ’22, and, if our assumptions are realistic, penetration beyond the Pollock limit would make sense if prices in that range persisted”.
Really? Take Germany for example their new high NG prices will be around for a few years. The Pollock tool says, don’t exceed the grid CF with unreliables or you’ll cause economic inefficiency, and it’s correct. The answer is to do what Germany did, restart their coal (lignite). They fully intend to double down on wind and solar, and they will ,because political expediency Trump’s economic efficiency every time ,But under Pollock they shouldn’t..
I’m sorry, but I’m having trouble identifying what the logical relationship might be between your second paragraph and your first.
I have long believed that the route usually taken to combat the warmistas relies too much on using equally obtuse mathematics of the climatic system as they use to justify their position. What I believe is the more useful approach is to continually stress 2 major simple facts.
First, thermodynamicly speaking, there is no way that an intermixed gas comprising .04% of the atmosphere can possibly overpower the remaining 99.96%. All gasses have about the same specific heat value except for water vapor, which is about 5 times higher in specific heat, and up to 100 times the amount of CO2 by % content in the atmosphere. The “control system feedback” dodge is totally erroneous because the controlled element must have its own source of independent power to be so controlled by positive feedback. Their “control system positive feedback” theory is like saying that Thermostat on your wall generates the heat in your house. It won’t do much without being connected to a large source of energy driven heat generation. In all physical systems, be they electrical, hydraulic, or fuel driven, the positive feedback is merely a valve that turns on and off the (separately powered) driven system, or proportionally operates them. No complex control system theory required to refute their claims, just this simple observation of reality.
Secondly, probably most importantly, there has been no emperical proofs that CO2 actually seriously effects the temperatures, only biased models. In fact the ice core evidence shows the opposite: CO2 levels follow, not precede, temperature increases; they are telling us that the future controls the past. Plus, the geological records show that CO2 has been much higher in the distant past, and the planet and its inhabitants survived and obviously prospered.
Nice! Thank you. Probably the best ever explanation. Einstein, is credited with saying, “the simplest explanation is the best, but not too simple”, or words to that effect:
Your statement fits:
“there is no way that an intermixed gas comprising .04% of the atmosphere can possibly overpower the remaining 99.96%. All gasses have about the same specific heat value except for water vapor, which is about 5 times higher in specific heat, and up to 100 times the amount of CO2 by % content in the atmosphere”.
Sorry, but that statement is not true. See my answer above. This is why I depend on data rather than theoretical statements like the one above from some anonymous internet popup without the albondigas to even sign his own words.
w.
albondigas means meatballs
(I looked it up)
What part is not true about my statement? That CO2 is .04% of the atmosphere? That all gases have about the same specific heat?
slowroll January 16, 2023 12:47 pm
Using satellites, we can measure how much of the upwelling longwave radiation from the surface is absorbed by the atmosphere. It turns out to be about 160 W/m2.
By basic physics, we know that the absorbed radiation must warm the atmosphere. So I fear your first “major simple fact” is simply untrue.
w.
Sure, absorbed radiation warms the atmosphere, but it warms all of it at an amount commensurate with its specific heat. While CO2 has a bit more reflectivity than oxygen and nitrogen, it’s still only .04% of the total. The slight extra reflectivity of CO2 is trivial compared to every thing else, especially water vapor. I suspect specific heat values dominate. I believe my statement is valid.
On this point, I am with Willis Eschenbach. The simplest way to demonstrate that the greenhouse effect is real and not negligible is to consider the position in 1850, when the climate was in thermal equilibrium: there would be no trend inn global temperature throughout the following 80 years. That year, global temperature, in round numbers, was 288 K. The emission temperature, that would prevail in the absence of greenhouse gases, was 28 K, of which 8 K was direct warming by greenhouse gases, chiefly CO2. The remainder was feedback response, chiefly by more water vapor in the warmer air resulting from direct forcing by the preindustrial noncondensing greenhouse gases.
I don’t see where these replies apply to what I said. I said that CO2 is such an insignificant component of the atmosphere it can’t have much effect over the total warming component of all other gases including water vapor, which is the major GHG. Not sure what you mean by feedback effect concerning water vapor.
The above comment of yours, I am a little confused. To my understanding it should be that the reference temperature in 1850, in the absence of greenhouse gases was 268 K. Of that 268 K the sun produces 260 K and the remaining 8 K comes from Non-condensing greenhouse gases chiefly CO2. The remaining 20 K comes from the feedback response chiefly from the sun (about 97%) and the remaining 3% from the non-condensing greenhouse gases.
Please correct me if I am incorrect.
On that note, how is your feedback paper going?
I would love to see this paper get published because it is a very important piece of research by your eminent team and will certainly rock the climate communists ship of fools 🙂
Best Regards
TheSunDoesShine
“Climate skepticism has four failings:”
Sure, it has those and other failings. But, it’s up against a rising religion and that’s historically always difficult. Even if all the skeptics behaved better as you suggest, I’m now thinking it’s hopeless until the new religion crashes and burns on its own. Maybe we should sarcastically pretend we agree with them but turn up their propaganda another few levels to total absurdity- so crazy, ordinary people would begin to wake up. 🙂
Me thinks that the Dear Mr. Mockton may be protesting a little too loudly here. After all, the critic he is defending his honor against here basically agreed with him on all the main points in his original post. It seems that this may be more about semantics than anything substantive. Perhaps he should consider that this sort of thing may actually do more to encourage the “dark side’ that enlighten the “climate skeptic community”. Perhaps a stiff upper lip would be more in order than an emphatic joust to defend one’s honor here.
If HutchesHunches would follow Monckton’s Rule and read the head posting before commenting on it, he would see that the Pollock limit equations are set out clearly therein, with very detailed definitions to prevent the often wilful misunderstandings of the original head posting here.
At the insistence of the moderators here, I was also required to add a detailed section explaining just what Mr Menton had gotten wrong. He had, regrettably, taken a single sentence out of context from the original head posting, had restated it in terms that were easier for him to attack, had ignored a sentence just two below the out-of-context sentence, which showed that his restatement was incorrect in its meaning, and had then used a certain amount of discourteous and rather preachy language. So I explained all that in the current head posting, have said to the moderators that I reckoned it would make the new head posting less interesting to the general reader.
In general, I do not like to demonstrate so large a failure of logical reasoning on the part of a well-meaning interlocutor, because – as Socrates found to his cost – doing that is humiliating to the interlocutor. That is why I had not included the dissection of his error in the original draft. But sometimes it is necessary to stop an improper bandwagon of criticism from rolling.
It would appear clear that the “Pollock limit” is poorly named since it isn’t a limit at all. After all according to the author:
“Precisely because until now the Pollock limit was not known, several national grid authorities are already generating more electricity from renewables than the Pollock limit.”
so it is clear that this limit can be exceeded. At best it might be the point at which costs start to increase. And even that is not obvious since it would appear to assume that all renewable generation stops and starts at the same time. To take a simple (and unrealistic) counter-example — suppose in a country there are two wind generators one in the north and one in the south each of which only works for 50% of the team. According to the Pollock limit the maximum fraction of the nation’s electricity that they can supply is then 50% but that is only true if the wind conditions in the north and the south are identical. But if the wind conditions are anti-correlated then you could supply 100% of the country’s electricity even though each wind farm only worked 50% of the time.
Now Mr. Monckton might want to claim that this is a case of “prohibitively expensive and logistically unachievable large-scale battery backup” but it is far from clear when something becomes prohibitively expensive as opposed to more expensive that the cheapest and most polluting alternative.
Izaak walton says it is far from clear when something becomes prohibitively expensive. No: it is now very clear. If the Pollock limit is exceeded – and at no point have I suggested that it was not physically possible to add more generation to the grid than the Pollock limit – then the additional capacity will be disproportionately expensive, wasteful and destabilizing. The limit remains a limit, even if individual grid operators, not having known of that limit until now, have chosen to subject their customers to the fearsome costs of exceeding it.
Again what does “disproportionately expensive” actual mean? The Pollock limit might make sense for solar power since most countries cross only a limited number of time zones meaning that all solar farms will stop working at roughly the same time but for wind farms different conditions are likely in different parts of the country meaning that the cost of exceeding the Pollock limit would increase linearly and so not be prohibitively expensive.
You state “the cost of exceeding the Pollock limit would increase linearly and so not be prohibitively expensive”. So only non linearly cost increases are prohibitively expensive? hmmm.
Using daily data from the UK’s largest aggregator of renewables,over a 2 year period the cheapest system to supply 1 GW of power, 24/7/365, involves a substantial overbuild (based on nameplate capacity). It would use no offshore wind, 8 GW of unpopular onshore wind, 4 GW of solar, and 60 GWh of batteries. Batteries are half the total cost. It comes to about $30B for 1GW of baseload, but on average the system will also supply 1.5 GW that is not worth capturing in the batteries. A nuclear plant would cost about $10B for 1 GW, possibly less, fossil fuel 1 or 2 billion. A cheaper non nuclear low carbon system would replace the battery with a natural gas peaker, which would run 10% of the time. This drops the overall cost to $15B.
The reported energy output from the various windfarms shows that wherever they are in the UK the daily output between farms, offshore and offshore, are strongly correlated. There are also days at a time where both solar output and wind output are low.
Mr Locock’s excellent point is reinforced by the news that, in the UK at any rate, it is possible to go three months with insufficient wind to turn the turbines. Imagine how much battery backup would need to be installed, and at what prodigious cost, to provide three months’ backup to an entire grid.
Maybe this is overly intuitive, but if one wind turbine sampling all weather conditions over time cannot exceed its mean capacity factor, e.g., 0.25, then it seems utterly reasonable that many wind turbines simultaneously sampling all weather conditions over space cannot exceed their mean capacity factor, e.g., 0.25.
Overbuilding, e.g., 4x nameplate to supposedly satisfy national demand, would cause havoc trying to whipsaw power transmission from high-generation regions to low-generation regions in following ever-changing weather patterns.
They’re not renewables. They’re burdenables. The whole thing is a grift stealing huge monies from ordinary folk to the benefit of wealthy thieves.
I enjoyed your mention of 67,000 years of vanadium production. Christopher. Vanadium was one of my metals of study. Species of sea squirts (Ascidiacea) filter vanadium from sea water and concentrate it by a factor of about 1 million in certain blood cells, along with pH ~2 sulfuric acid.
They’re very successful, living unchanged since the Cambrian (540 million years). I’d suspect all ascidians filtering all the seas across 540 million years didn’t manage to sequester the equivalent of 67,000 years of human vanadium production. I don’t plan to carry out the estimate, however. 🙂
Pat Frank January 16, 2023 9:29 pm
Pat, that’s not the Pollock/Monckton claim. Their claim is that the share of energy delivered to the grid by wind turbines cannot exceed their capacity factor.
Or at least that was his original claim. Now, he’s changed the goalposts, and his new claim is that yes, they can exceed the capacity factor but it’s expensive and destabilizing.
But of course, regardless of how much they’re feeding into the grid they are expensive and destabilizing, so I don’t see how the limit makes it any different.
w.
Mr Eschenbach is now being openly and deliberately dishonest. He had originally taken a single sentence out of its context from my original head posting, and had neglected the next two sentences, the second of which made it quite explicit that neither Mr Pollock nor I was asserting that it was physically impossible to exceed the Pollock limit. That sentence said that if the Pollock limit were exceeded there would need to be costly battery backup. The same point is then repeated further down the head posting, to which about a quarter is devoted to the question of battery backup.
When Mr Eschenbach posted his original misinterpretation of what had been written, I corrected him in detail. He has, however paid no attention. That is why, with regret, I call him out as dishonest. There has been no “changing of the goalposts” at all, and he knows it, and yet he writes that there has. For shame! After all, if it were physically impossible to exceed the Pollock limits – a self-evidently daft proposition – then everyone would know that by now.
Mr Eschenbach is, of course, entitled to his opinion that the Pollock limit does not make any difference: however, grid operators battling behind the scenes against climate-fanatical governments driving them to overbuild unreliables now have a powerful weapon in their armory. To to them, if not to Mr Eschenbach, the Pollock limits – if they survive peer review – may matter a great deal.
Monckton of Brenchley January 17, 2023 4:19 am
Christopher, this is why I and others are reluctant to debate with you. You are always more than willing to take the gutter route.
I was brought up under what in my family was called “The Captain’s Code”. My great-grandfather was a seafaring captain, and his Code contained a number of instructions for life. One of these was:
Now, it’s no longer 1860, so I don’t kill people for falsely calling me a liar. But I view any man who makes such slimy false accusations about me as beneath contempt. I am an honest man, and it appears you are not familiar with my breed. So let me inform you that we don’t lie, and we don’t take such bogus accusations lightly. So I’ll simply invite you to gently place such false claims about my honesty as far up the distal end of your alimentary canal as your arms can reach.
I have NOT ignored the question of the battery backup. Nor are we dealing with “a single sentence”. From my comment elsewhere in this thread:
====================
Your original claims in your first post were (emphasis mine):
and
and
[In fact, wind capacity factor in the UK is 27% and wind share is 21%, so it’s still a ways from the Pollock limit … but I digress …]
and
and
I see nothing in there about “costly, wasteful and destabilizing”. Instead, you made a number of flat statements that sans batteries, unreliables CANNOT CONTRIBUTE MORE than their capacity factor.
==================
Note that, far from lying about what you said, and far from ignoring the caveat about batteries, I have quoted your exact words including the battery issue.
The problem with that claim is that Ireland has far exceeded the Pollock limit, and has done it without battery backup. To date, neither you nor anyone else has explained how this is possible.
And to make matters worse, there hasn’t even been a slowing down of the increase in the share of wind energy in the Irish grid. If the Pollock limit were real, we’d expect to see an asymptotic slowing of the increase, with the “Pollock limit” as the asymptote. Instead, the data looks like this.
The windpower share of the grid electricity has not slowed at all as it approached the “Pollock limit”. It surpassed the limit in 2018 and has increased steadily since, without battery backup.
All I’ve done is to point out that these are real and valid objections to the idea that there is some “limit”, objections that you are attempting to bury under false accusations that I am lying.
I am not.
I am posting both your exact words and the facts as I have researched them. All I’ve done is the capital crime of not blindly believing your revealed wisdom, and simply asking for an explanation of the Irish situation. There may indeed be such an explanation, but bogus accusations about my honesty are not the way to provide that explanation.
You have specifically said that sans batteries, the Pollock limit cannot be exceeded. I’ve shown that it can. You don’t like the facts so you call me a liar. Not a good look on you.
There is nothing I would like more than to see the Pollock limit be verified by real-world data and survive peer review. It’s an elegant theory. However, you have failed to provide even the slightest scrap of such data, and when I provided some of that ugly data, rather than deal with it as a true scientist would do, you have resorted to meaningless ugly puerile schoolyard-level ad hominem accusations.
Sigh …
w.
Eschenbach reports that Ireland doesn’t have take or pay contracts (no curtailment payments). Wonderful, that should be universal. But the first thing that comes to mind is how can the generators make money in that structure. Only two possibilities, make it up somewhere else or have a generous tariff. Which one is it? Or are wind generators going broke and all wind installations stopped?
The Pollack tool simply shows that overbuilding is wasteful, it doesn’t say if it is wasteful to the generator, the utility, the consumer or any other stakeholder, it just shows when it becomes wasteful. It’s not complicated.
Very good to hear from Pat Frank, who has experienced in the publication of his landmark paper of 2019 proving the models worthless as predictors of global warming the same campaign of attack from apparent “skeptics” as that to which Mr Pollock is now being subjected.
What Mr Pollock has proved is that the national capacity factor of a renewable species is equal to the maximum penetration of that species (the fraction of total grid output that it can contribute) without generating surplus power that must be sent to cripplingly expensive batter storage. In the absence of such storage, the obvious does not need to be stated but let it be stated anyway: the surplus power must be discarded, or its generation prevented by temporary disconnect orders, or shipped by interconnectors to another grid.
I am fascinated by Pat’s work on sea squirts filtering vanadium from seawater and concentrating it. No doubt there will soon be sea-squirt farms all round our coasts providing us with the vanadium we need for the static battery backup for unreliables – at vastly subsidized cost, of course, paid for – as ever – by the long-suffering taxpayer.
I assure you that my question is not ask totally tongue in cheek. While the results of Professor Michaux’s work might be true, is there enough to enable the obviously exhausted with itself western world to commit the culture suicide it is currently so determined on?
Forgive my brevity, but it seems appropriate to say. Wind and Solar energy is just a load of Pollocks….
The Pollock Theory is a guess, and an average, of not much use for a specific electric utility. Even less useful than the average temperature.
I propose the Flounder Theory (Nobel Prize pending):
(over) Building of unreliables will continue, assuming money is available, until the electric utility flounders (aka blackouts).
Most important will be blackouts that affect a lot of people in a nation. If that nation happens to have an average of 30% of its electricity from wind and solar, that 30% will be viewed as a Flounder Limit. It will be viewed as too risky to try to go above 30% from unreliables, even if money is available.
The Flounder Limit will be based on the first big blackout in a nation with a relatively high percentage of unreliables. It could be 20%, 25%, 30% or even 40% of electricity output from combinem wind and solar. Your guess is as good as mine.
The Flounder Limit is not based on science or engineering. It is based on common sense: If an electric grid stops working in one nation, don’t do the same thing in your nation.
Mr Greene, a disruptive and intrusive but irrelevant influence, is floundering. He should recall the Chinese proverb, for he exemplifies its second half: Those who know do not speak: those who speak do not know.
Another excellent piece by Christopher Monckton. But I would question his first paragraph, in which he summarises Why Climate Skepticism Has Not Yet Succeeded. I think climate scepticism struggles to succeed because sceptical voices are effectively silenced in all the mainstream media with very few exceptions.
It’s no good being right if nobody can hear you.
For example, here are two completely provable facts that give scepticism very powerful ammunition:
Have these inconvenient facts been reported by the Guardian or BBC News? Of course not.
What proportion of the population are aware of these facts? I would be surprised if it were more than, say, 2%
Unless this changes the climate madness will go unchecked and it will destroy any hopes of a better future for our children.
Chris
I agree with Mr Wright that the ever-tightening censorship by Communists in control of all forms of media outlets is a very serious problem.
Agree. Wind and solar are both so economically destructive that if we add ruinous energy for the next 10 years at the projected rates that alarmists propose, there won’t be an economy left for the following 10 years. Willfully uninformed voters are a problem but one other issue:
Changing the IPCC “charter/mission”. Cost benefit analysis is outside the IPCC scope. They aren’t authorized for that activity. their scope is to recommend what to do for “conservatism of the climate with an emphasis of conserving/preventing sea level rise. That’s it, nothing else.
OK, they’ve been telling us for 34 years to stop burning fossil fuels to limit CO2 induced warming, especially to slow/stop sea level rise. We got it.
IMHO the UN General Assembly should change the IPCC charter/mission/scope for the next 34 years to studying how more CO2 and warming may benefit “global climate for present and future generations of mankind”. My preference would be to shut down the whole political mess, but I’m a political realist as well as a climate and energy realist so I know that’s not going to happen.
copy/paste (significantly abbreviated)
6 December, 1988
43/53 Protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind.
The General Assembly, …”Conservatism of climate as part of the common heritage of mankind.”
Concerned that human activities could change global climate patterns, threatening present and future generations with potentially economic and social consequences’
.
Noting with concern that the emerging evidence indicates that continued growth in atmosphere concentrations of “greenhouse” gases could produce (sea level rise)
.
The Pollock Limit is based on averages while ignoring variance. This leads to The Lie of Averages.
You cannot balance a blackout with over-supply, any more than you can be comfortable with one hand in the fire and the other in the freezer.
The Pollock Limit works because we have gas turbine peaker plants that can load follow, giving the grid the appearance of near zero variance.
Without load following plants the grid variance would significantly reduce the effective Pollock Limit.
Of course but keep in mind that the purpose of the Pollock tool is to look at a functioning grid system and determine if addition ruinous renewables is possible without adding storage or paying for curtailment. .
The Berple Limit says the percentage of renewable a grid can handle is equal to the percentage of load following generation installed.
The percentage of batteries installed is irrelevant because a battery takes more energy to produce than it can store in its lifetime. This includes lithium batteries.
The load following strategy is a dispatch strategy whereby whenever a generator operates, it produces only enough power to meet the primary load. Lower-priority objectives such as charging the storage bank or serving the deferrable load are left to the renewable power sources.
Lord Monckton, I suggest to you that in general, a practical application of a theory, as applied to a real-world example, is often the best tool for communicating both the concepts and the details of said theory.
The next step for the Pollock Limit is to demonstrate how it can be practically applied in a real-world setting for assessing the true costs and the true risks of making the Net Zero transition inside of a specifically-identified political and geographical location.
I suggest that the perfect test case for the application of the Pollock Limit to a real world example in the United States would be New York’s aggressive plans for a Net Zero transition as dictated by the state’s 2019 climate act.
I suggest further that Francis Menton and Roger Caiazza could be of valuable assistance to you and your team in the work of demonstrating just how the Pollock Limit could be employed for use in demonstrating how and why New York’s transition to Net Zero can and will become ruinously expensive for the state and its citizens.
As someone who has been a member of project feasibility teams who did cost estimating and project risk assessments for nuclear projects in the realm of ten to fifteen billions dollars, I will say that the best use of the Pollock Limit might be in using it as one tool among several in assessing the range of possible risk outcomes from various levels of wind & solar penetration within a specific regional power market.
Not that you couldn’t do something similar in the UK. However, the question must be asked, would conservative members of the UK’s parliament be more receptive to the results of such a study than would be conservative members of New York state’s legislature — if any of those are still left there?
Climate skepticism has four failings: a lack of elementary professionalism; a tendency to be over-skeptical of both sides of the argument; a striking absence of the intuitive ability of the mathematician, who wanders cheerfully and competently from the concrete to the theoretical and back; and unjustifiable discourtesy towards the scientific labors of fellow-skeptics. towards the scientific labors of fellow-skeptics.
“First, unprofessionalism. The author lacked the common sense to contact me for comment before publishing the rebuttal. “
welcome to the rough and tumble of the web!!!
and folks before you respond to my comments or down vote please be professional
and kiss my damn ring
Lord Mosher
Menton’s overbuilding argument against Monkton/Pollock is defeated by transmission losses from proliferation of renewable sources. More and more transmission lines and links increase losses. Something analogous to this relating to blood vessel vascular supply in animals limits the maximum size of an animal to something like that of the blue whale. Any bigger and the resource losses caused by the volume occupied by all the vessels would defeat adequate vascular supply. 🐋