Guest post by David Middleton
The movie Deepwater Horizon is probably the only movie ever made that actually tried to realistically depict oil drilling operations. While it didn’t get every detail right, it was compellingly realistic (too realistic for me watching it on IMAX) and told the story of how ordinary people, just doing their jobs, can become heroes when everything goes wrong. I won’t go into detail about everything that went wrong leading up to the terrible disaster on April 20, 2010. BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report is fairly comprehensive. Ultimately it boiled down to the normalization of deviance. The 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster has also been attributed to the normalization of deviance. When dangerous jobs become routine, corners get cut, people become complacent and a sense of impunity sets in. The safety director for my first employer, Enserch Exploration used to start almost every safety meeting with this question and answer:
What kills the most people in industrial accidents? Impunity.
The Deepwater Horizon disaster caused the entire industry recommit itself to rigorous adherence to safety procedures… Because no one wants go to work and not come home.
Deepwater Horizon Myths
BP’s prospect was located in Mississippi Canyon Block 252 (MC 252). It was called “Macondo.” At the time of the blowout and efforts to regain control of the well, a lot of myths were propagated. People said things like, “The well encountered the highest pressures ever recorded”… “Macondo was the largest oil discovery in the world”… “BP was keeping the geological data secret – Not even revealing it to the government.” In reality, there was nothing particularly anomalous about Macondo.
Macondo was estimated by BP to be a 50 million barrel discovery. Kind of small by major oil company standards… A “home run” by smaller independent oil company standards.
One blogger actually wrote this in June 2010:
“No one outside of BP knows the details of the geology under the well site because BP did the geological survey and refuses to release the information – classifying it as proprietary trade secrets.”
BP’s partners (Anadarko and Mitsui) knew exactly what BP did about the geology. The Minerals Management Service (MMS) had all of the data that BP had. Operators had to provide all data to the MMS (now BOEM) – even on “tite holes” and proprietary geophysical surveys. All of the companies that bid against BP in OCS 206 on March 19, 2008 knew at least as much about the geology as BP did. BP’s high bid barely beat out smaller independent oil company LLOG Exploration…
- BP Exploration & Production Inc. $34,003,428.00
- LLOG Exploration Offshore, Inc. $33,625,000.00
- Noble Energy, Inc. $17,225,650.00
- Red Willow Offshore, LLC $14,075,000.00
- Eni Petroleum US LLC $4,577,115.00
- Anadarko E&P Company LP $2,145,950.00
Only one of BP’s competitors for the lease, Eni, was a major oil company. The rest were small, mid-sized and large independents. All of those companies knew enough about the geology to bid on the lease. I don’t work that particular area, but I knew enough about the geology to know the approximate size of the reservoir, thickness of the sands and that the sands are Middle Miocene age and trapped against a Cretaceous unconformity. Any company that is a member of the Offshore Oil Scouts Association (OOSA) also knew a great deal about the drilling procedures and hole conditions.
From April through July 2010, the blowout spilled an estimated 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. By mid-July, the well was capped. By August, most of the oil was gone… Either recovered by clean up procedures, evaporated, burned and/or consumed by microbes.
Deepwater Horizon Perspective
Just prior to the Macondo blowout, this was on the MMS (now BOEM) website:
Since 1980, OCS operators have produced 4.7 billion barrels (bbl) of oil and spilled only 0.001 percent of this oil, or 1 bbl for every 81,000 bbl produced. In the last 15 years, there have been no spills greater than 1,000 bbl from an OCS platform or drilling rig. The spill risk related to a diesel spill from drilling operations is even less. During the 10-year period (1976-1985) in which data were collected, there were 80 reported diesel spills greater than one barrel associated with drilling activities, compared with 11,944 wells drilled, or a 0.7 percent probability of occurrence. For diesel spills greater than 50 bbls, only 15 spills have occurred, or a 0.1 percent probability.
Natural seepage of oil in the Gulf of Mexico (unrelated to natural gas and oil industry operations) is far more extensive. Researchers have estimated a natural seepage rate of about 120,000 bbl per year from one area (23,000 square kilometers) offshore of Louisiana.
U.S. Minerals Management Service ca April 2010
This passage disappeared from the website shortly after the blowout.
Of the nearly 53,000 wells drilled in the Federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico since 1947, there has been one Macondo.
Relative to the number of wells drilled and volume of hydrocarbons produced, the volume of oil spilled in the history of oil & gas drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico has been minuscule.
Having trouble seeing the spills? Here’s a plot of just the spills and natural seepage estimate:
Putting Macondo into perspective is in no way meant to diminish this terrible tragedy. Eleven men died in this disaster. However, our government’s reaction to it was, in itself, a disaster. Thirty three rigs that were drilling in deepwater were forced to shut down and temporarily abandon the wells they were drilling. This created an even greater accident risk than allowing them to complete the wells they were drilling. The Obama administration’s unlawful drilling moratorium and subsequent “permitorium,” led to the loss of over 200,000 bbl/day of oil production from 2010-2015:
Deepwater Horizon EpiLOGG
Did you ever wonder if anyone ever went back in and re-drilled Macondo?
10/12: LLOG Exploration is making waves in the Gulf
DAVID JACOBS
APRIL 22, 2015 | BUSINESS
When the Obama administration announced a moratorium on deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, politicians and industry spokespeople howled. The explosion on the Deepwater Horizon rig at the Macondo well was tragic, some said, but there was no reason to shut down an entire industry sector that otherwise was following the rules and operating safely.
Conspiracy theories that President Barack Obama would try to kill the industry with onerous new regulations proliferated in some circles. Even if the moratorium eventually was lifted, the naysayers said, companies might take their rigs, jobs and tax money to new locales and not come back for many years.
But at LLOG Exploration, it was no time to panic.
[…]
THE RIGHT PLAY
LLOG was founded in 1977, primarily to develop prospects in south Louisiana. As the company grew, its focus expanded to include the depths of the Gulf of Mexico.
In 2004, LLOG purchased seismic data covering a portion of the Gulf known to the offshore industry as the Mississippi Canyon.
[…]
LLOG Exploration at a glance
- Founded: 1977 in Metairie
- President and CEO: Scott Gutterman, who joined the company in 1993 and became CEO in 2007
- Headquartered in Covington, with offices in Scott and Houston
- 170 employees
- Ranked in 2014 as the top privately owned liquid producer in the United States
- One of the top 20 exploration and production companies in the Gulf of Mexico, public or private
- Has drilled more than 350 wells in the Gulf of Mexico and the Texas/Louisiana Gulf Coast since 2001
- 2014 net production: 26,000 BOE (barrels of oil equivalent) per day
Source: LLOG
This article was originally published in the Spring 2015 issue of 10/12 Industry Report.
LLOG Exploration was the second-highest bidder on MC 252. In the wake of Macondo, LLOG was able to purchase the lease from BP and put together a strong lease position in the area.
Drilling To Start at Macondo Reservoir
by The Associated Press|Cain Burdeau|Wednesday, May 13, 2015
NEW ORLEANS (AP) — Deep-water drilling is set to resume near the site of the catastrophic BP PLC well blowout that killed 11 workers and caused the largest U.S. offshore oil spill five years ago off the coast of Louisiana.
A Louisiana-based oil company, LLOG Exploration Offshore LLC, plans to drill into the Macondo reservoir, according to federal records reviewed by The Associated Press.
[…]
Richard Charter, a senior fellow with the Ocean Foundation and a longtime industry watchdog, said drilling into that reservoir has proved very dangerous and highly technical, and it raises questions about whether a small company like LLOG has the financial means to respond to a blowout similar to BP’s.
Eric Smith, associate director of the Tulane University Energy Institute in New Orleans, dismissed those concerns. He called LLOG “an extremely well-financed and well-organized” company.
“If I were to pick anyone to go into that field after so many problems, I would pick LLOG,” Smith said. “They have demonstrated their ability to drill in the area.”
Since 2010, LLOG has drilled eight wells in the area in “analogous reservoirs at similar depths and pressures,” Fowler said. The company has drilled more than 50 wells in the Gulf since 2002, he said.
He said the company has studied the investigations into the Macondo disaster and “ensured the lessons from those reports are accounted for in our design and well procedures.”
[…]
LLOG Exploration renamed the prospect “Niedermeyer”… part of an Animal House theme (we named our deepwater prospects after Caddyshack characters).
Niedermeyer was a nice discovery.
- Four wells on MC 208, 209, 252 and 253. Feb. 2015 through July 2017.
- 21.7 million barrels of oil (mmbo) and 57.5 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas.
- MC 252 SS-1 Well: 6.1 mmbo & 15.6 bcf. Oct. 2015 through July 2017. Avg. 9,600 barrels of oil per day (BOPD) and 24 million cubic feet of natural gas per day (mmcf/d).
The Niedermeyer, Marmalard and Son of Bluto 2 fields were completed as subsea tiebacks to LLOG’s “Delta House” floating production system (FPS) on MC 254.
LLOG began drilling the Delta House prospects in 2011 and by 2015 had the Delta House FPS completed and commenced production.
LLOG eyes 2015 Delta House startup
06/06/2013
Strategic partnership lets Louisiana operator ramp up deepwater E&P
Russell McCulley
Senior Technical Editor
Louisiana independent LLOG Exploration Co. is gearing up for an ambitious deepwater Gulf of Mexico drilling campaign at the Delta House project, scheduled for first oil in 2015. As of April 2013, the company had drilled two successful wells: one at the Son of Bluto 2 prospect, in Mississippi Canyon 387, and another at Marmalard, in MC 300, and had the Ensco 8502 semisubmersible drilling a third Delta House well at the Marmalard prospect. The three wells will supply initial production to the Delta House platform, to be moored in 4,500 ft (1,372 m) of water in MC 254.
Early this year, LLOG lined up two newbuild DP drilling rigs to carry out work at Delta House and the company’s other central Gulf prospects. A cylindrical Sevan Drilling rig under construction at Cosco Quidong shipyard in China, to be dubbed Sevan Louisiana, will start a three-year, $550-million charter with LLOG in January, 2014. In 3Q 2014, Seadrill’s West Neptune is scheduled to arrive at the Delta House complex to begin an initial three-year, $662-million term. The dual BOP drillship is under construction at Samsung Heavy Industries in South Korea.
[…]
In less than five years, the Delta House development went from spudding the first well to 80,000 bbl/d of oil production.
https://youtu.be/dduSRcCnqNo
LLOG Exploration is just one of many, efficient and highly competent independent oil companies, that most people have never heard of, developing deepwater prospects in the Gulf of Mexico and around the world.
Oil’s well that end’s well!
Addendum
I composed this post over the past few weeks. Apparently while I was finalizing the article Delta House suffered a minor mishap…
The Delta House floating production facility about 40 miles (64 kilometers) southeast of Venice, Louisiana, released 7,950 to 9,350 barrels of oil from early Wednesday to Thursday morning, according to closely held operator LLOG Exploration Co. That would make it the largest spill in more than seven years, data from the U.S. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement show, even though it’s a fraction of the millions of barrels ejected in the 2010 incident.
“Way offshore, the oil had time to dissipate before it could cause lots of damage,” Edward Overton, emeritus professor of the Department of Environmental Sciences at Louisiana State University, said by telephone. “I’m sure there’s some impact associated with this spill out in the deep water, but I don’t think there was enough for the oil to sink.”
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2017/10/gulf_of_mexico_oil_spill_may_b.html
The fracture was immediately isolated and that particular field was shut in until the line is repaired and inspeccted. Little or no environmental damage, production drops to 57,000 bbl/d until repairs are completed. LLOG will probably be assessed a fine of about $1,000/bbl.
H/T to Cbone for bringing this to my attention.
A more detailed article about the spill, without speculative comments from an environmental science professor…
The offshore oil and gas operator reported to BSEE that production from the field that flows through the subsea infrastructure was shut-in. The release of oil has ceased. A sheen was observed and reported through the National Response Center. Monitoring of the residual sheen continues. No shoreline impacts have been reported and there are no reports of personnel injuries.
LLOG reported to BSEE that the volume of oil released was estimated to be in the range of 7,950 to 9,350 barrels. LLOG has communicated to BSEE that there was no recoverable oil on surface. Two skimming vessels sourced from Clean Gulf Associates and Marine Spill Response Corporation were on location and prepared to respond.
The location of the release has been identified. LLOG reported that through the use of a remotely-operated vehicle, a fracture was observed in a jumper pipe leading from Mississippi Canyon Block 209, Well No. 1 to a manifold located on the seafloor. As a result of shutting in the well, the flow through the fracture in the pipe has ceased.
A BSEE engineer was on-site at LLOG’s incident command on Thursday to verify the release location via the live feed from the ROV. Two BSEE inspectors traveled offshore on Friday to LLOG’s Delta House platform and have initiated BSEE’s investigation. BSEE is coordinating with the U.S. Coast Guard on the response.
According to a report by the Coast Guard, four over flights were conducted on Saturday and have identified no additional visible oil. The previously reported sheens have dissipated.
https://mobile.offshoreenergytoday.com/llog-shuts-in-gulf-of-mexico-well-after-oil-spill/
LLOG discovered the leak. LLOG reported the leak to BSEE. One well was shut-in. The spill has totally dissipated.
Discover more from Watts Up With That?
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
The same accolades could be said of the medium sized energy players that put the onshore oil shale plays on the world map of production. The majors had to buy their way in later.
You can’t see the log scale in figure 1, are those 10′ intervals on each horizontal line?
I still don’t know how the blowout happened in the first place. Wasn’t production casing already set? How do you continue to lose returns when casing is set? How does a formation — especially one that is as insignificant as you say — blowout through unperforated casing?
The whole story has always sounded fishy to me, a blowout after casing was set and no cement bond log? Is there no mandate to run bond logs on offshore wells like there is for onshore? Not to mention both BoPs failing and oil flowing to surface as if its formation pressure far exceeds what is claimed.
I didn’t say it was insignificant. Just that it wasn’t really anomalous. The reservoir pressure was 12,000 – 13,000 psi.
They had set the final 9-5/8″ casing. The cement job was inadequate and gas flowed into the pipe. They didn’t run a cement bond log, even though the Schlumberger crew had set up to run one. BP was in a hurry to move on to the next location. When they displaced the riser, they ran a negative pressure test… which they misinterpreted. A slurry of gas, drilling mud and saltwater began to flow out of the well…
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19425-the-eight-failures-that-caused-the-gulf-oil-spill/
The BOP probably wouldn’t have worked even if it didn’t have those problems…
https://www.workboat.com/news/offshore/deepwater-horizon-blowout-preventer-failed-due-to-unrecognized-pipe-buckling-report-says/
The well was started by the Transocean Marianas. It was damaged by a Hurricane Ida and forced to T&A the well and return to port for repairs. Deepwater Horizon re-entered and finished drilling the well, which was, at that point, over 40 days behind schedule. BP was in a hurry to finish Macondo, so the rig could move on to a much larger prospect.
Seems incredible, like Murphy’s Law^10. I bet BP now follows the law of C.Y.A.
The BOP actually DID SEAL AND STOP THE FLOW when surface flow first erupted, but only TEMPORARILY. The crew closed an annular, which leaked (likely high flow erosion on slow closing packer), then closed a PIPE RAM WHICH DID SEAL. Major surface flow continued due to the large amount of riser gas that the very late kick detection caused. A few minutes later, as described by CSB report, the automatic blind shear ram system likely then fired, closing the blind shear ram; but after severing the drill pipe, the ram failed to seal due to an off-center pipe, reopening a flow path across the BOP. The risk from an off-center drill pipe in a blind shear ram had not been previously recognized and is a new technology lesson to learn. Is not clear what is being done to reduce this risk while waiting for off-center capable shears to be developed and installed. Note that the CSB report concluded that if the crew had closed their upper pipe ram (in addition to the middle one), the blind shear WOULD HAVE PROBABLY SEALED. An operational lesson…
It’s about time a drilling engineer chimed in! What was the single biggest mistake? Not running the cement bond log?
It’s a 1″ log. The minor horizontal lines are 10′ and the heavy horizontal lines are 50′, with labels every 100′.
This image might be a little more clear…
Thanks. Sounds like that block will surpass the 50 million EOR after being halfway there in just two years. Good for LLOG.
David: You said: “The 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster has also been attributed to the normalization of deviance. ” I’ve spent considerable time studying that incident. In detail, there were 3 causes.
First, the field joint seal was a bad design. It was an o-ring piston seal on a 10 foot diameter machined pair. Machining tolerances were far bigger than accepted practice for this type of seal. The o-ring had to jump out of the gap and into the gland. The Bernoulli effect was the driving force behind this, and the jump had to be made before the gasses got hot enough to burn the seal. An acceptable design would be either an o-ring face seal, or a spring energized lip seal. NASA got unsolicited letters from the o-ring manufacturer that this design would not work, but the manufacturer was ignored.
Second, when NASA recognized the problem several years later when solid rocket boosters were recovered and inspected, rather than fix the problem, they characterized it. A series of tests were done to determine the minimum ambient temperature at which the o-rings jumped fast enough to work. Below that temperature, the rubber was too stiff to jump fast enough.
Third, during the day of the launch, responsible engineers recognized the ambient temperature was too low. They advised NASA not to launch, but NASA managers ignored the engineers.
Fixing any one of these three would have prevented the incident. I suppose this is a tutorial on how to accomplish the “normalization of deviance”. Reference from the Rogers Commission report:
https://www.amazon.com/Presidential-Commission-Challenger-Accident-President/dp/B005OC9WZS/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1508522671&sr=1-3&keywords=rogers+commission+report
Apologies if I got off-topic.
Unfortunately, this sense of impunity goes on at railroad derailments with oil spills and other toxic materials and even among the safety consultants monitoring conditions and advising the spill crews. This includes willful deflection of concerns expressed by some workers and observing experts. That’s where management of the contractors is getting a free pass, until it fails.
I’ve worked on deep water projects, subsea controls and ROV systems. Could not watch five seconds of MSM coverage without throwing the BS flag.
I felt MSM was purposely misleading and spreading chemophobia.
Of course I am old enough to remember Ixtoc blowout in Mexican waters. And how that fouled beaches in Texas. The GoM recovered.
We had a minor fire on a shelf well we were abandoning a few years ago. It actually made the local news. The local Fox station was showing stock footage of the DW Horizon fire while reporting on our minor incident.
First of all, the MSM is a bunch of clueless idiots. Their collective understanding of the industry (especially the offshore) approaches zero.
Their sole purpose in life is to attract ears and eyeballs. It doesn’t matter how.
Facts don’t matter.
With respect to his newspapers, Rupert Murdoch (of News Corporation, parent of Fox) once said, “The articles are what we use to fill the space between the advertisements.”
First off, I am not a petroleum engineer.
If a total of 4.9 million barrels was released in the 87 days the well was uncontrolled, that (roughly) accords with a flow rate of roughly 57-61,000 BOPD.
Based on a flow rate of 60K BOPD, you get first year production of nearly 22 MMBO. I don’t pretend to know what sort of decline curve would apply, but even a very conservative 20% first year decline rate suggests that the Macondo reservoir held far more than 50 MMBO.
By the way, thank you for this very excellent piece. It nicely summarizes both the disaster and the wildly inaccurate claims and assertions of the professional haters of this essential industry.
LLOG has produced over 20 million barrels in 2 years of production from 4 wells. Only one of those wells has cut any water. 50 mmbo is probably conservative.
I’ve never fully believed that the spill was as much as 60,000 bbl/d… That number always seemed too high to me.
I was reviewing the imagery, satellite and aerial during the spill. While I didn’t have the Ixtoc materials for comparison at the time, it just never looked like the flow rate was 60,000 bbl/d to me. I am convinced that the Obama Administration and the environmentalists wanted this to be the petroleum industry’s Three Mile Island.
I think part of the problem was that the government was reporting total fluid (oil, gas & water) volume as oil.
Simulation of the well coming in gave a reservoir flow rate of 50,000 BPD after the gas/oil passed the BOP. Using Macondo shrinkage to surface bbls (~50% liquid volume loss from gas evolution), that gives initial rate though fully open BOP of about 25,000 ST BPD. The subsequent on-going spill was through leaking and eroding BOP flowing out to seafloor (into a slightly slower hydro-static back pressure. Maybe the reservoirs cleaned up some plus downhole leak path eroded larger?
Spill volume: shrinkage of reservoir to surface barrels was considered in the MDL trial that come up with the spill rate and volume. Looks like they used about 50% shrinkage. (pg 1216-1217 – MDL DAY 5, MORNING SESSION transcript).
Ditto. Retired petroleum geologist here (actually former BP, working for BP at the time). Prior to the blowout BP and Transocean made a lot of mistakes… BP had a culture of doing things on the cheap and the cost pressure were widely felt. But almost immediately afterwards BP handled the well kill ops and subsequent cleanup very very well.
For all the mistakes they made leading up to the blowout, BP’s efforts to control the well and cleanup the spill were exemplary.
Well, now I’ve read the linked accident report, and I must say that the maintenance and modification practices described seem extremely sloppy and positively dangerous to somebody who has worked in the aerospace.sector. If Deepwater Horizon had been an aircraft it would definitely have been grounded by the FAA.
Thank you for this article David, if I may call you by your first name.
As a Mate on the tankers that collected and delivered the crude we were well aware of the dangers and even the loss of one man was felt deeply. I don’t think I could watch a film which commercialized the death of 11 people so soon after the event. Their families must be acutely aware that Hollywood is cashing in on their misfortune. Hollywood may be short of scripts (and how!) but I think it is a little obscene. A documentary perhaps, but a dramatization, I think not.
I recall 17 people who died at sea in our small outfit that I knew personally, not all from accidents, in my 20 years at sea and I still feel for their families and friends. It was 30 years ago that I came ashore.
Not saying that it is “wrong” to make and watch such films, just saying that I don’t feel comfortable with it.
I viewed the movie as a tribute to the crew of Transocean Deepwater Horizon… and all of the other “every day heroes” who aren’t often the subjects of Hollywood movies. Peter Berg and Mark Wahlberg are carving out a niche in this area.
Great article, always wondered if anyone in the industry followed up on the Macondo discovery. Being a retired petroleum geologist from the Permian Basin, and knowing nothing of offshore work, I was hoping to learn something from the inserted video covering LLOG’s production facilities. Too bad the entire feature was focused on the speaker without visual aids. Oh well, I’m still catching up with long laterals in the desert.
Can you spot Macando?
http://extension.msstate.edu/newsletters/mississippi-marketmaker/2017/vol-7-no-11-commercial-white-shrimp-fishing-the-gulf-mexico
See figure 3.
Data source NOAA
Another subject but the demise of shrimp has been predicted for along time due to things like wetland loss, too much nitrogen, etc. We have spent too much time chasing human effects, real or imagined, instead of problem solving. Solutions looking for problems.
From the link–“most shrimp die after they spawn” Actually most shrimp die (mostly eaten) before they spawn.
Though not the scale of the spill that was experienced by BP at Macondo, there was a spill here in western Colorado that, I think, demonstrates the heavy and misguided hand of the EPA.
The spill was not significant, was self reported and was immediately moved onto to remediate the effects. The spill was located on a creek fed from the Bookcliffs. A creek feeding through oil shale rock.
The EPA was not satisfied with the progress and took over the cleanup. A function that they are, by law, entitled to do; though they are not that competent in understanding or assessing the true damage or proper solution.
The spill was monitored by the most sensitive equipment available. After spending a significant amount of the oil company’s money, they were satisfied that the spill was remediated. They must have had a hard time determining which hydrocarbons were from the release and which were naturally occuring due to the high exposure to oil shale rock prior to claiming success.
Not long after this event, the EPA accidentally released a significant amount of mine tailings water into the Animas River in southern Colorado. What did they do to clean up the spill? Nothing. Instead they stated that “dilution is the solution”. Absolutely correct but also an absolutely two faced approach to a spill when they are the issue as compared to how they handle private industry spills.
Great post David.
Reminds me of the bit in Spike Milligan’s war history where he asked a returned Dunkirk bloke “How was it?” Answer “A cock up; a highly successful cock up”
David Middleton, as an employee of the oil/gas industry, it is plainly evident that you are nothing more than a shill for the fossil fuel industries. As such, your posts are biased, and devoid of objectivity. With said bias, your posting is not scientific, but rather a good example of proselytizing an industry point of view.
RK, and of course your comment is content free.
Posting facts is “content-free?”…..wow, who taught you that?
What, pray tell, did Middleton write that was untrue, or propaganda. Your comment was pure ad hominem.
Middleton is a petroleum geologist. No ad-hominem in calling a spade a spade.
(You failed to answer Tom’s question,this now gets my attention) MOD
So commentary by someone who knows the field he is dealing with is somehow improper? Again, why is any of it “propaganda”?
Robert Kernodle says (October 20, 2017 at 7:16 pm):
“Middleton is a petroleum geologist. No ad-hominem in calling a spade a spade.”
Robert Kernodle says (October 20, 2017 at 6:49 pm):
“David Middleton,” …. “As such, your posts are biased, and devoid of objectivity”.
Robert,
1) it is clear you attack the character not the argument. What you do is ad hominem,
2) plus you do not understand what ad hominem is.
Ad hominem :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem
“short for argumentum ad hominem, is where an argument is rebutted by attacking the character, motive, or other attribute of the person making the argument, or persons associated with the argument, rather than attacking the substance of the argument itself.”
RK, please include a rebuttal to his statements and figures, then. If Mr. Middleton is wrong, it should be a cinch for you to point out his errors.
And what, exactly, are you Robert Kernodle?
You and your ilk should be cut off from all fossil fuels, and all benefits that are derived from them.
Robert, how much of an increase in traffic have you seen to your Art site? Interesting that you set up a link to your site by clicking on your name and then throw hand grenades at this article to get some attention. How are your Atoms feeling now?
It’s quit obvious you have no real interest in this article, only an interest in sending traffic to your sife.
Go away.
The Deepwater-Horizon blowout looks like it might’f been a job for Stingray!
Loved that show. I have the DVD set, along with Fireball XL5, Captain Scarlet and UFO.
Or the Thunderbirds!
They had the equivalent of the Thunderbirds. About half of the Macondo fleet were Helix Energy Solutions Group vessels.
http://www.helixesg.com/
The Q4000 was used to lower a containment dome. The HP1 floating production unit stored oil “produced” from the blowout. And the Canyon Express operated ROV’s.
I enjoy your knowledgable articles on O&G immensely, your enthusiasm for sober analysis of the much maligned fossil fuel industry and its giant contribution to human wellbeing. With the greening of the planet, expansion of habitat, burgeoning harvests, public policy for sensible politicians is a no brainer.
I’m confident we will be surrendering more land to natural habitat, feeding a world population that will peak this mid century at 9-10B – we are over 80% there -, enjoying world prosperity and fending off the next ice age courtesy of the fossil fuel industry. Hopefully we will choose a Garden of Eden over establisment of a fiefdom of Clinton-Steyer-Soros-eurogrouchomarxism to ru(i)n our affairs for us. Imagine, it took Donald Trump to put this into our grasp!
Kudos to Dave. Top notch article. The kind I keep returning to WUWT to read. Factual, concise, logical flow, interesting, informative. Discussion on log scale is juvenile. Graphic was completely appropriate and best way to present info. If you ignore the peanut gallery, Dave, it’s OK by me.
Isn’t rule number 1 of fighting a fire on a boat or floating platform: Don’t sink it.
Robert points out an interesting issue related to the question of whether the fireboats sank the Deepwater Horizon. As long as it was afloat with the riser connected, a lot of the oii was being burned (not going onto the sea); after the rig sank, the fire stopped, more spill rate, but the well flow rate reduced, as it now had to flow against the sea floor hydro-static of 2,200 psis instead of the surface 15 psia. Don’t know how long rig could have stayed afloat. Offers a Hobson’s choice for the responders… 9which arm do you want to cut off?)
P.S. my 15 psia back pressure needs to add something (500 psi?) for head and pressure drop of gassy oil through the large ID riser. Still a lot less than 2200 psi, plus some pressure drop through some riser with kink on sea floor.