NOTE: This writeup is from an acquaintance of mine who wrote some powerful meteorological software, Digital Atmosphere, that I use in my office. He used that software (and others) to analyze the Air France 447 crash from the meteorological perspective. h/t to Mike Moran – Anthony
by Tim Vasquez
Air France flight 447 (AF447), an Airbus A330 widebody jet, was reported missing in the equatorial Atlantic Ocean in the early morning hours of June 1, 2009. The plane was enroute from Rio de Janeiro (SBGL) to Paris (LFPG). Speculation suggested that the plane may have flown into a thunderstorm. The objective of this study was to isolate the aircraft’s location against high-resolution satellite images from GOES-10 to identify any association with thunderstorm activity. Breakup of a plane at higher altitudes in a thunderstorm is not unprecedented; Northwest Flight 705 in 1963 and more recently Pulkovo Aviation Flight 612 in 2006 are clear examples.
Back in the 1990s I did flight route forecasting for the Air Force. One of my assignments in summer 1994 was forecasting was the sector between Mombasa, Kenya and Cairo, Egypt for C-5 and C-141 aircraft. The Sudan region had tropical MCS activity similar to this with little in the way of sensor data, so this incident holds some special interest for me as one of our C-5s could easily have followed a very similar fate. Using what’s available to me I decided to do a little analysis and see if I could determine anything about the fate of AF447 and maybe through some circuitous, indirect means help give authorities some clues on where to look.
1. Reports and evidence
Reports indicate AF447 reported INTOL (S01 21.7′,W32 49.9′ or -1.362,-32.832) at 0133Z and was to proceed to TASIL (N4 00.3′,W29 59.4′, or +4.005,-29.990) in 50 minutes (a true track of 28.1 deg) (source) indicating that it flew high altitude route UN873 (see below).
Enroute High Altitude Caribbean and South America H-4, 30 AUG 2007 (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) |
Though the actual flight plan data was not accessible to me, this corresponds well with an actual flight plan found on the Internet for a Varig B767 from Rio de Janeiro to Frankfurt:
|
I decided to project the flight forward from INTOL. An altitude of FL350 and speed of 520 mph was given. Presumably this is ground speed according to the ACARS specification. Compensating for a 10 kt headwind as given by the SBFN sounding this yields an airspeed of M.80, which correlates well with the A330’s typical early cruise profile. This yields the following aircraft coordinates:
|
2. Meteorological analysis
Surface analysis showed the suspected crash region to be within the intertropical convergence zone (ITCZ), which at this time of year is usually found at about the 5-10N parallel. A region of strong trade winds covered most of the tropical North Atlantic and this kept the ITCZ in a somewhat southerly position. The linear convergence along the ITCZ and the unstable atmospheric conditions combined to produce scattered clusters of thunderstorms.
Surface analysis for 0000Z. (NCEP) |
Using McIDAS I acquired satellite GOES-10 satellite data from UCAR and centered it over the region between INTOL and TASIL. I then plotted the waypoints using McIDAS’s built-in coordinate entry panel. Since the source satellite images are georeferenced NOAA/GINI datasets, the points shown here are very accurate and are NOT placed by hand but by lat/long coordinates to the nearest 0.001 deg (0.06 mile). In the image below, the stationary southerly point in blue is INTOL and the aircraft’s estimated location from the above table is marked with a cross. Graticule spacing is 5 degrees. For the orange temperature plots I used the NCL/3aw curve; the sharp gradient of the enhancement from dark to light occurs at 243K (-30 deg C), indicating a cloud top of FL310 assuming the satellite pixel is completely overcast with that layer (which is not always true).
NOTE: If you have trouble seeing some of the large images, the source link is here -Anthony
| Frame Controls | Satellite images |
|---|---|
Loop Mode:
Adjust Speed:
Dwell First/Last:
Frame No: Omit Frame: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 |
 |
(Hit reload if you don’t see the satellite images in the looper above)
Raw infrared images are also available here: 0145Z, 0200Z, 0215Z, 0230Z.
And finally this image shows a zoomed image at 0215Z when AF447 made its last transmission:
click for a larger image
About 90% of the cloud material seen on this image is actually multiple levels of convective debris fields from dying storms and activity that occurred previously during the day, with only scattered cirrus fields at flight level. The active thunderstorm areas are defined by small-scale mottled areas of cold cloud tops. Compare with this structural diagram below of a similar tropical MCS in the same area in 1977. It illustrates that planes inflight are clear of most dangerous weather throughout a tropical system except when directly above an active updraft area.
Schematic of a typical tropical MCS observed in the Atlantic southwest of Dakar on 4 Sep 1974. (Structure and Dynamics of a Tropical Squall-Line System, R. A. Houze Jr., Mon. Wea. Rev., 105, 1540-1567) |
It appears AF447 crossed through three key thunderstorm clusters: a small one around 0151Z, a new rapidly growing one at about 0159Z, and finally a large multicell convective system (MCS) around 0205-0216Z. Temperature trends suggested that the entire system was at peak intensity, developing rapidly around 2300-0100Z and finally dissipating around dawn. From a turbulence perspective, these cold spots would be the areas of highest concern as they signal the location of an active updraft producing new cloud material in the upper troposphere.
The last communication from the plane was at 0214Z (12:14 am local meridian time). This was an automated ACARS message reporting an electrical fault and pressurization problem. This would be about the time the plane was beginning to exit the cluster, but not before having flown for 75 miles of numerous updrafts. The exact aircraft location cannot be determined with certainty, however, since a 1-minute time error in position or reporting time translates to 9 miles of spatial error.
The Fernando de Noronha sounding is available here and shows typical tropical conditions with modest positive energy throughout the column from the surface up to 45,000 ft. There is what looks like anvil level material above 25,000 ft. The significant dry mid-level air is somewhat unusual and suggests the potential for enhanced evaporational cooling in the upper troposphere enhancing downdraft production, and any synoptic-scale lift (if present) enhancing instability through adiabatic cooling of the layer.
I modified this sounding (see below) using the prevailing temperature/dewpoint field across that part of the ocean and modifying for some cooling due to nighttime loss of heating. This is my best guess at the parcel profile that fed this storm. It yields a worst case instability of 1048 J/kg of CAPE, which is moderately strong but considered borderline for typical severe weather. Vertical velocity can be obtained by w=2*CAPE^0.5 yielding a maximum possible updraft speed contribution of 45.8 m/s or 102 mph, though in reality this is usually much less (on the order of half or less) due to precipitation loading and other factors.
3. Conclusions
The satellite imagery indicates that numerous cumulonimbus towers were rising to at least 51,000 ft, and were embedded in extensive stratiform anvils with tops of 35,000 to 45,000 ft. This kind of configuration is actually quite normal for equatorial storms due to the higher tropopause height, but it emphasizes that the aircraft was certainly within the bulk of an extensive cumulonimbus cloud field for a significant amount of time and that storms could indeed have been a contributing factor to the crash.
I’ve edited this section Monday night to cut down on the speculation about the accident chain, especially since I don’t know a whole lot about A330 systems. The airliners.net board and other sites cover the aircraft and CRM systems quite well. What I will try to do, however, is summarize what the aircraft probably encountered based on the data and my own experience.
* Turbulence — Turbulence is a definite candidate as a contributing factor. There is an isolated storm at (1.6,-31.5) that appears suddenly at 0200Z just as the A330 enters the main MCS cluster. From a turbulence perspective it is by far the most dangerous formation found on the loop. However it is 10-25 km to the left of UN873 and it is doubtful the crew would have been deviating at this time. Other cells like this one embedded within the main MCS may have caused severe turbulence. Young updrafts are particularly dangerous to flights because they contain significant rising motion yet precipitation fields have not yet fully developed and airborne radar signatures are weak, reducing the likelihood the crew will deviate around the cell. Another concern is the extensive upper-level dry air shown on the SBFN sounding (not counting the anvil debris at 350-300 mb), which may have contributed to enhanced evaporative cooling in and around the anvil and aggravated the turbulence experienced by the flight, especially around the margins of anvil clouds and towers. It is worth considering that cumulative periods of heavy turbulence crossing through the cluster may have caused minor internal damage that progressed in some way into an emergency.
* Icing — With a flight level temperature of -43 deg C suggested by the proximity sounding the A330 would have been flying mostly in rime ice and possibly some clear ice and graupel. At -43 deg C, water cannot exist even in supercooled form (see here for an explanation). The equivalent potential temperature throughout the profile is absolutely insufficient to bring warmer air with supercooled water to flight level. Without the supercooled water there is very little ice buildup on the airframe. My conclusion is that unless the plane descended below FL300 icing would not be the culprit.
* Lightning — Due to the high cloud tops and freezing level at 16,000 ft, there was extensive precipitation by cold rain process and it is likely the MCS was electrified. Lightning of course being considered with good reason since the A330 is one of the most computerized and automated airliners in service. I will say based on my 25 years of meteorology the storms were almost definitely producing lightning. As far what a strike would do to the A330, I have to leave that to to the avionics experts. Some answers might be found at http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/.
* Precipitation — A dual engine flameout due to precipitation or ice ingestion is a noteworthy possibility as has been discussed on other sites (specific to the A330 type too). The precipitable water content in any tropical weather system can run very high. However a rain-induced flameout is not possible because supercooled water cannot exist at the -43C cruise altitude and insufficient equivalent potential temperature exists, even in updraft cores, to bring warmer air beyond a few degrees change to the flight level. Therefore the plane at FL350 was completely within some mixture of rime ice, graupel, or small hail. But again, as the link indicates, even ice poses risks to the engine.
* Hail — I got a few comments about hail. I am not entirely convinced that structural hail damage is a factor, partly because I can’t recall hearing much about large damaging hail at altitude in my experience with equatorial flight operations. This would require strong instability, which I’m not yet sure we have, not only to grow the stones but to loft large hailstones from the embryo “nursery” at FL200-250 up to flight level. A value of 1000 J/kg CAPE is really on the fence but not out of the question. The other problem is the mounting body of evidence (see SPC studies) suggesting well-sheared storms (this profile is poorly sheared) are the ones conducive to structures that support hail growth. Finally, another issue is airborne radars are be highly sensitive to hail because of the very high backscatter values of ice, making evasive action likely, and the “young updrafts” I pointed out earlier as a threat would not have provided the residence times necessary yet to contain hailstones; their main threat would be severe turbulence. I am not sure about the hail hypothesis, but I believe there is a high probability of graupel, small ice pellets, or small hail at FL350 in the storm complex (see Icing above).
Overall what we know for sure is weather was a factor and the flight definitely crossed through a thunderstorm complex. There is a definite correlation of weather with the crash. However the analysis indicates that the weather is not anything particularly exceptional in terms of instability or storm structure. It’s my opinion that tropical storm complexes identical to this one have probably been crossed hundreds of times over the years by other flights without serious incident.
Still, in the main MCS alone, the A330 would have been flying through significant turbulence and thunderstorm activity for about 75 miles (125 km), lasting about 12 minutes of flight time. Of course anything so far is speculation until more evidence comes in, and for all we know the cause of the downing could have been anything from turbulence to coincidental problems like a cargo fire.
My own opinion of the crash cause, as of Monday night, based on the complete lack of a HF radio call and consideration of all of the above, suggests severe turbulence (see the BOAC 911 and BNF 250 tragedies) combining in some unlikely way with CRM/design/maintenance/procedural/other deficiencies to trigger a failure cascade. We can almost certainly count on some unexpected surprises once the CVR is recovered. Until then, all we can do is await the investigation and hope that the world’s flight operations stay safe until AFR447’s lessons are revealed.
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IW wrote:
“A pilot flying 150 miles behind saw two very bright flashes. The complete and sudden breakup at altitude (leaving a debris field 30+ miles long on the ocean surface) is not consistent with engine failure, or electrical failure, or lightning strike. Weather notwithstanding, an onboard explosion seems most likely to me.”
Most terrorists organizations want to claim responsibility for their terrorists acts, as publicizing such events is an effective way of spreading the fear they want certain segments of society to have. Do we know of any such organization(s) claiming responsibility for this crash?
These very bright flashes and the presence of seismic activity at the same time has caused some speculation of an associated electrical discharge, however Anthony responded by saying:
“There is not any known connection between seismic activity and thunderstorm activity, except that of thunderstorms forming on active volcanic eruptions.”
However there are reports of electrical phenomena associated with non-volcanic seismic activity. See:
Early (1910-1967) references to earthquake lightning: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v228/n5273/abs/228759a0.html
Earthquake light: 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6V95-4GM45N4-3&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=529eae2596b25421ec1dfb587f3c9d51
Sumatra-Andaman earthquake of December 26, 2004: http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=17713974
Speculating that a seismoelectric event caused the crash, how could the blackbox data distinguish between that and regular lightning?
bimjim, I’m glad I don’t fly with you.
Why? Most pilots I chat with are very forthcoming, and don’t believe it necessary to protect me from myself or my interests. I’m not sure how you intended that post to sound, but it sounded extremely condescending. Insulting, actually.
We (regulars at WUWT) are hardly uneducated rubes. We understand that every flight contains an element of risk, especially when there is rough weather along our route. Fortunately, “we” also understand that there is probably a higher level of risk every time we drive our car to the local 7-11 than in any flight in a commercial airliner.
I can’t even imagine why this shouldn’t be discussed. Those who are squeamish or whatever can simply skip it. Most of the commenters here are fascinated by the mechanics of what happened. I know I am… and as my first post at the top stated, I also feel bad for family and friends (but they are in a different zone than this discussion).
Also, not to bring up a raging debate (elsewhere), I still have white knuckles whenever I find myself flying on those horrid Airbus planes…
Mike McMillan and others: I second all of the good analysis today, I an ex- professional Pilot myself, everything from Cessna 150’s to DC-7’s . I have flown Night Freight, and for the last ten years of my career, I was an Aerial Firefighter.-I sell Real Estate now.
I have been hit by lighting in: Piper Navajo,Cessna 402, and DC-7.Scorched paint, bright flash-bang! that was it.However I became a passenger-though flying the Aircraft,due to severe turbulence and Downburst conditions.Most memorable was mashed into the high New Mexican desert in a loaded (fire retardant) DC-7,by a Downburst.It was as close as I ever wanted to come to crashing.It’s a long story, but suffice to say when it happened,it took _ALL_ of our skill to come out alive.It is not good when you have time to think about it…
FYI -a loaded DC-7 is about 110-112,000 lbs. Gross. We were slapped like a mosquito by that smallish cloud. Flt.447 may have had something else happen,
but weather can and does crash airplanes…
I usually lurk, trying to learn the science presented on this website. But as a current 747 Captain who has flown the route in question many times in the last few years, I can’t help but respond to several of these comments (in no particular order)
1) Even with a double flameout or a catastrophic electrical system failure, the A330 in question would have automatically deployed its RAT – Ram Air Turbine – which provides enough power to run essential Flight Control Computers and at least one VHF and one HF radio. The aircraft is also certified to provide battery power for essential systems “for at least 30 minutes”. (so says the reg) Besides, the ACARS still worked, sending an HF data report. This tells me the crew didn’t have time to make a report, not that the radio didn’t work.
2) AF 447 was operating in a non-radar environment. Anthony mentioned it briefly in a response, but what it means is that ATC is blind, deaf, and dumb – they rely on Position Reports from aircraft, and have no idea what weather is out there. People often assume we have omnipotent radar and communication services spanning the whole globe. The reality is a lot less impressive.
3) AF447 could have a perfectly functioning WX Radar and still fly through nasty convective activity. A study done by FSF several years ago found that many corporate and air carrier pilots had a poor understanding of the use and limitations of their radar, and used the system in a way that limited the information they received. More importantly, you have to turn the damn thing on. I can’t count how many times I’ve come up to the flight deck to find two knuckleheads flying in an area of known thunderstorms with the radar off.
4) Someone speculated about AF 447 having a similar tail design to the American A300 which crashed in 2001, due to excessive rudder displacement. The A330 design is similar, but not the same in the most crucial aspect of this conjecture. The lugs which fasten the vertical stabilizer (tail) to the airframe failed on the American A300. They are a different design than that of the A330. In addition, all operators of A300s conducted extensive re-training of their crews after that incident. I find it highly unlikely that the AF crew did the same thing; the A330 is stronger in that respect anyway.
5) Someone commented about a bomb being the most likely reason for a 14 mile long debris field. Nonsense. Anytime an aircraft breaks up at altitude and traveling Mach .80, its going to leave a long elliptical debris field. The size in question is completely inconclusive; it tells us only that the aircraft didn’t hit the ocean intact.
My gut feeling is they flew into severe vertical shear, lost cabin pressure and probably destroyed a pressure bulkhead, and very quickly thereafter lost structural integrity. An Air Force C-141 flew into a tropical thunderstorm near Cam Ranh Bay in the early 70s. They gained 20,000+ feet in less than 60 seconds. They managed to limp back to Danang, missing a lot of parts. I am still amazed they lived at all. I fear AF447 met a similar, more severe fate.
Some anecdotal comments:
I couldn’t agree more with the folks here who say that lightening strikes on aircraft are not catastrophic. I managed to survive several lightning strikes in B-36’s decades ago. Despite the fact that we carried large quantities of highly volatile 115/145 avgas, we never suffered any fires, although losing the functionality of (roasting) some electronic equipment was not unexpected.
And I have seen “large fireballs” roll around the compartment, which combined with the explosive sound of the strike will make your knees limber for a few seconds, but turned out to be spectacularly harmless.
Thunderstorms are a different matter entirely. I remember an old accident report concerning an Air Force plane having baseball size hailstones thrown through the windshield at a distance of two miles from the nearest thunderhead.
This flight plan analysis is a superb bit of work, but I wouldn’t hazard a guess as to the final cause or causes.
Upon further reflection, it seems that it had to be either an onboard explosion (bomb) or severe turbulence.
The reason is simple: whatever brought the airplane down had to be able to physically break it up – lightning, hail,etc. have never done this to a modern Western aircraft. The mechanism would be a stretch – like TWA-800, for which investigators speculated, but were never able to actually duplicate what they thought happened (ignition of fuel vapors will not happen with a spark, or even a plausible open flame). Cracking at airplane open is NOT something that happens by hitting it with water or ice, or zapping it.
There ARE examples of wings being torn off of aircraft at very high G loading (C-130s, C-141s, and others), and highly localised turbulence is what did it to the C-141 aiming for RAF Mildenhall. These are, of course, ridiculously improbable wind shears — but the highly improbable *does* happen (ask any lottery winner). And the weather allowed for these conditions.
In terms of an onboard explosion: some bombs on aircraft are designed to go off well into the flight. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_India_Flight_182 for one such. As far as I know, no organization claimed credit for it.
AP provides more details in:Air France jet likely broke apart above ocean
Further from the AP article:
gaining ten or twenty thousand feet in a minute or under would NOT be my choice for an in flight experience.
those poor souls …
“Extreme” lightning often happens with extreme turbulence.
I agree, “average” lightning is not likely to cause catastraphic structural failure of a modern commercial jet airliner.
But taken in combination, “extreme” lightning and extreme turbulence, the two events in rapid and concurrent succession could cause catastraphic structural failure, and as pointed out by thoses more knowledgable, once structural failure has happened at high speed at high altitude, break up of the aircraft is a likely result.
When Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed outside Buffalo on 12 February, the initial reports quickly focused on icing conditions. And so it went for several days, with more experts chiming in for several days about the dangers of icing as the initial reports seemed to indicate icing problems from the cockpit voice recorders. However, upon more detailed reconstruction, thanks to the information gleaned from the ‘black boxes’, the latest report from the NTSB is that icing was not a serious problem, that the pilot may not have been adequately trained and, when the stick began vibrating to warn of stall conditions, the pilot pulled up, making a bad situation worse. Crew fatigue and cockpit chit chat may have been contributing factors. The problem with Flight 447 is that without data from the black boxes, we may never really know what happened and all we’d be left with is a best guess scenario.
Regardless of the actual cause behind the Aircraft break-up and crash, some of the Airbus A300 variants are notoriously unreliable when it comes to electronics. A highly experienced aeronautics expert whom I hold in the highest regard, quite literally told me that the new A380 was a disaster waiting to happen. It truly goes to show how the Boeing Hydraulics/Mechanical based systems are in many forms superior to anything Electronic in nature. Sure, Hydraulics can leak in rare instances, but Electronics, when they fail, can completely trash the entire system.
The Data Burst Transmission system indicates a major catastrophic failure, and if the failure was brought about due to a manufactured device, then the storm could have been the finishing touch per say. A severely breached cabin would present serious structural issues during normal flight conditions at that altitude, but imagine the chaos which would be brought about in addition due to lightning, high winds, and extreme pressure variances.
I would normally not jump towards the abhorrent possibility of a malfeasant and purposeful interference in this flight’s operations, but it must be considered, especially given the threat directed at Air France roughly One Week prior. A storm would also provide the perfect cover for such a scenario, so all possibilities must be looked at, both in parallel and combination.
Can’t….
resist…
It’s just weather!
“Anaconda (12:32:04) :
Pilots of commercial airliners had known of these phenomena for years, but were mostly leary of reporting them for fear that they wouldn’t be taken seriously and it might even impact their careers. (Where have we seen that before?) But early in the 1990s investigators began to take the rumors seriously and to look for evidence of lightning above the clouds.”
Similarly during WW2, fighter and bomber pilots/crews also refrained from reporting what they called “Foo Fighters”.
From what I heard, the crash location was some 60 miles South of the Cape Verde Islands somewhere about here.
It is a very deep part of the Atlantic.
Thank you for your information, TP. Much appreciated. I have learned much this day.
Something has crossed my mind as I have noticed many planes going down in recent months.
Is there be a possibility that a GCR strike at critical components of an airplane (such as their computer) could take the pilot’s automated systems out?
At the planes altitude, perhaps a chance strike is possible, but wouldn’t the upper atmosphere have already caught the ray and broken it up?
jeez (17:10:32) :
Can’t….
resist…
many Brahama’s….
in next year….oh!!! …many Brahama’s….
overall planning…
Steven Kopits (10:06:49) : “…the New York Times business model is doomed.”
the New York who?
dhogaza (10:09:13) : “We have a very likely candidate for the cause that’s irrefutable…”
Yes, the science is settled.
Rickj (10:22:10) : “This blog is PURE SPECULATION today…”
Hey, I missed the SPECULATION FORBIDDEN sign on the way in. When was it posted?
Jon, Ken: Science calls for exploring all the possibilities, no matter how remote. Well done.
I still think the fact [confirmed?] that there were two debris fields 60 km apart indicates catastrophic fuselage failure. Order of likelihood: bomb or other antipersonnel device; turbulence; lightning; and, uh, yes, meteorite.
The cascade of electrical failures is worrisome. It is possible they were hit with some extreme electrical discharge event. (Why I, perhaps irrationally, prefer the mechanical / hydraulic approach to things… I’ve had to fix too many computerized things when they quit in strange and unexpected ways..)
Per the tail fin: I have a big problem with a design that breaks apart if you move the rudder to full deflection. The “fix” of “don’t do that” did not inspire confidence… (Yes, you really can “break the tail off” by the simple expedient of moving the rudder to it’s normal full deflection position… so if you learned to fly in any of the thousands of airplanes where that is OK, it isn’t exactly obvious that moving the control surfaces as you normally would to control the plane in an emergency can break the airplane… IMHO, unforgivably bad human factors problem…)
But what to I know. I’ve flown a hot air balloon and sail planes and did a bit of hands on as a co-pilot in a Cesna, but nothing near what the pros do… they may be used to the idea that using a control can break your plane…
I’ve noticed that at the top of the solar max we had a couple of years with nearly no accidents, then with this sudden drop of solar output we’ve had a spike of plane crashes (including the FedEx plane that did a touch and go and crash act while trying to land). No idea if it’s a people problem, a random events have patterns problem, or a solar particles can cause what again? problem: But it is a pattern…
Personally, I’d be a bit cautious about flying a lot for a while. I’d fly if I needed to do it, but if it’s optional, I’d opt out. At least until things stabilize a bit more…
I tend to go with TP’s view, vertical shear. My guess is the aircraft would have been in the low 30000’s, where it would be in t-storm turbulence. The pilots didn’t report deviating for weather, so whatever they saw on the radar didn’t look bad enough to hurt them.
The maintenance reports went from first faults to system failures to loss of cabin pressure, which would come with a breakup. As I understand it the Airbus is completely fly-by-wire, no mechanical controls at all for the pilots, so loss of flight control computers would be disastrous.
Just don’t know. We’ll have to wait.
[snip ]
Yes, us slaves in the data mines often joke aboot a stray alpha particle that flipped a crucial bit in our otherwise immaculate data…servers (particularly those running large in-memory cubes and the like) can do the darndest things.
And as the Svensmark early experiments noted, the GCR’s which do make it to the surface are very high energy, by definition.
But I’m not flying Airbus A330/340 (the fully FBW jobbies) anytime soon. Or making any more water-cooler jokes about high-energy particles.
The list of failure messages which David L. Hagen posted are very informative. I’m sure the experts with the blueprints will find more interesting details.
Interestingly, it has been noticed that A330 flight control computers have taken unexpected and dangerous actions on other flights.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/time/20090602/wl_time/08599190242100
K: A methane bubble is far-fetched and is only an unlikelyhood due to the seismic event. I didn’t suggest ignition of the methane for several reasons, but the lesser density of methane would be irritating for an aircraft. But a large enough volume of methane to bother an airliner would also increase the chance of ignition, and that would be visible to other pilots. It’s real dark, except for the lightning. And I neglected to point out that if the seismic event was caused by an extraterrestrial rock…the impact happened over an hour before the aircraft flew near, and a rock on the ground would have difficulty bothering an aircraft.
The guy in New York who models business wear. Apparently he’s having a hard time.