The Climate ‘Crisis’ Isn’t What it Used to Be

From Climate Etc.

by Judith Curry

Growing realization by the climate establishment  that the threat of future warming has been cut in half over the past 5 years.

Summary:  The climate “catastrophe” isn’t what it used to be. Circa 2013 with publication of the IPCC AR5 Report, RCP8.5 was regarded as the business-as-usual emissions scenario, with expected warming of 4 to 5 oC by 2100. Now there is growing acceptance that RCP8.5 is implausible, and RCP4.5 is arguably the current business-as-usual emissions scenario. Only a few years ago, an emissions trajectory that followed RCP4.5 with 2 to 3 oC warming was regarded as climate policy success. As limiting warming to 2 oC seems to be in reach (now deemed to be the “threshold of catastrophe”),[i] the goal posts were moved in 2018 to reduce the warming target to 1.5 oC. Climate catastrophe rhetoric now seems linked to extreme weather events, most of which are difficult to identify any role for human-caused climate change in increasing either their intensity or frequency.

The main stream media is currently awash with articles from prominent journalists on how the global warming threat less than we thought.  Here are some prominent articles:

David Wallace-Wells is one of the most interesting journalists writing in the climate space.  In 2017, he wrote  a 2017 New York Magazine article titled “The Uninhabitable Earth”, with subtitle: “Famine, economic collapse, a sun that cooks us: What climate change could wreak—sooner than you think.”  Not long after publication of his book in 2019 entitled The Uninhabitable Earth, David Wallace-Wells made this statement: “Anyone, including me, who has built their understanding on what level of warming is likely this century on that RCP8.5 scenario should probably revise that understanding in a less alarmist direction.” DWW scores HUGE number of points with me for quickly adjusting his priors with the growing amount evidence that RCP8.5 is implausible.

Well, the “messaging” around DWW’s latest article is that we are succeeding with reducing emissions (no we are not).  The second message is to acknowledge that that warming will be less than we thought, but the impacts of the warming will be worse than we thought (nope).  The third message is that advances in science have brought us to this (relatively) happy place (nope)

At the heart of this good news is abandonment of RCP8.5 from UNFCCC policy making. The hero of science behind this abandonment is Justin Ritchie, a recent Ph.D. graduate (whose work has been cited in previous RCP8.5 posts at Climate Etc).

The COP26 and now the COP27 have quietly dropped RCP8.5 (and SSP5-8.5) from their considerations, focusing on the envelope between RCP4.5 and RCP2.6.  The grand poohbahs of the IPCC apparently didn’t see this coming (or preferred to keep spinning the alarm), since they instructed climate modelers for CMIP6 to continue a focus on SSP5-8.5, and climate researchers continue to focus on this scenario in their impacts publications.  The IPCC AR6 prominently featured SSP5-8.5, although WGI did make this lukewarm statement

“In the scenario literature, the plausibility of the high emissions levels underlying scenarios such as RCP8.5 or SSP5–8.5 has been debated in light of recent developments in the energy sector.”

The second so-called scientific advance is lower values of climate sensitivity.  The so-called advance is associated with the IPCC AR6 decision NOT to include values derived from climate models (which have dominated previous IPCC reports). They implicitly acknowledge that climate models are running too hot and that you can pretty much get whatever value of climate sensitivity that you want from a climate model (this has been blindingly obvious to me and many others for over a decade).  The IPCC AR6 lowered the upper likely bound of ECS to 4.0oC (from 4.5oC previously); this further acts to reduce the amount of projected warming.  The IPCC AR6 also raised the lower likely bound of ECS to 2.5oC (from 1.5oC).  Raising the lower bound of ECS is on very shaky ground, as per the recent publication by Nic Lewis 

The COP27 is working from a value of expected warming of 2.5oC by 2100.  This is arguably still too high for several reasons.  IPCC expert judgment dismissed values of climate sensitivity that are on the lower end (that should not have been dismissed as per Nic Lewis’ paper). Further, the IPCC projections do not adequately account for scenarios of future natural climate variability.  See these recent posts:

https://judithcurry.com/2022/01/23/crossing-or-not-the-1-5-and-2-0oc-thresholds/

https://judithcurry.com/2021/11/21/solar-variations-controversy/

In addition to an insufficient number of solar and volcanic scenarios, the climate models ignore most solar indirect effects, and the climate model treatment of multidecadal and longer internal variability associated with ocean circulations are inadequate.  While in principle these factors could go either way in terms of warmer vs cooler, there are several reasons to think these natural factors are skewed towards cooler during the remainder of the 21st century:

  • Baseline volcanic activity since 1850 has been unusually low
  • Most solar researchers expect some sort of solar minimum in the mid to late 21st century
  • Solar indirect effects are inadequately treated by climate models, which would act to amplify solar cooling
  • A shift to the cold phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation is expected in the next decade, which influences not only global temperatures but also Greenland mass balance and Arctic sea ice.

Once you include alternative scenarios of natural variability, temperature change by 2100 could easily be below 2oC and even 1.5oC.  Recall that this warming is with reference to a baseline of 1850-1900; 1.1oC warming has already occurred.

Impacts

David Wallace-Wells provides some “hope” for the climate alarmists with this sentence:

“It’s sadly apparent by now that scientists have underestimated, not overestimated, the impact of warming.”

I just don’t know what further to say here.  The IPCC AR6 provides very meager fodder to support DWW’s statement.  Apart from sea level rise, which is unambiguously associated with global warming, there is no prima facie reason that extreme weather events would worsen in a warming climate.  Observational evidence, provided that you go back at least to 1900, shows that nearly all horrible, recent weather and climate disasters have precedents in the 20th century and hence “detection” is very challenging.  Climate models are not fit-for-purpose to simulate extreme weather events, let alone to attribute them to human caused warming.  We are then left with back-of-the-envelope simple thermodynamic calculations to infer worsening of extreme weather events, which ignores the overwhelmingly dominant role of atmospheric and oceanic circulations.

Think about the implications of assuming extreme weather and horrible impacts are highly sensitive to a 0.5oC temperature change. If so, this leads to the conclusion that the dominant climate factor is natural climate variability, with year-to-year swings of several tenths of a degree from El Nino and La Nina, a substantial volcanic eruption, and/or multidecadal ocean oscillations.  The rationale for ignoring natural climate variability is based on the assumption that large amounts of fossil-fueled warming from climate model simulations spiked by RCP8.5 and high values of ECS will swamp natural climate variability.  Cut the warming in half (or reduce even further), and you lose the rationale for ignoring natural climate variability.

So is all this a “victory” for climate science?  I don’t think so.  But I told you so . . .

And finally Bret Stephen’s article includes this all important figure.  Are we to infer that warming causes fewer deaths (well there is a STRIKING correlation)?  Well maybe, but the real cause of this decline is increasing wealth, increased warnings, and adaptation to weather and climate extremes.

Extreme weather and climate events are something that needs to be dealt with independently of the AGW issue.  The world has always suffered from weather and climate extremes, and it always will; this will not change with further warming or with emissions reductions.

COP27

The policy implications of all this is enormous.  Unfortunately I suspect that the COP27 will focus too much on emissions reductions (which aren’t working and wont impact the climate in any event), and not enough on supporting development and adaptation for developing countries and most importantly supporting development in Africa by allowing them to benefit from their fossil fuels (other than by selling them to Europe).  With regards to the later, a shout out to Rose Mustiso’s recent Nature publication; Rose is my favorite African activist and thinker on this topic.

5 27 votes
Article Rating

Discover more from Watts Up With That?

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

70 Comments
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments
David Hoopman
November 4, 2022 8:50 am

With reference to the “summary” (top) paragraph, it appears the conventional wisdom is that the less we have to fear from a changing climate, the more stringent the restrictions on our behavior need to be. Is it unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that climate conditions are not the primary motivating interest?

November 4, 2022 9:58 am

The grand poohbahs of the IPCC apparently didn’t see this coming (or preferred to keep spinning the alarm), since they instructed climate modelers for CMIP6 to continue a focus on SSP5-8.5, and climate researchers continue to focus on this scenario in their impacts publications.

Your second option is correct.

The WG-I reports, AKA “The Physical Science Basis”, are probably the ones most WUWT readers (including myself) have focused on.

While the AR6 WG-I report admits … in the main report, not in the SPM … that both SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 (which neatly bracket RCP8.5) are “counterfactuals”, and that “the medium RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and SSP2-4.5 scenarios” should be considered as worst-case scenarios … ones with “the absence of additional climate policies” … there are two other Working Groups staffed by “the grand poohbahs of the IPCC”.

The AR6 WG-II, “Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”, report has a “Cross-Chapter Box CLIMATE” with a sub-section titled “AR6 WGI Reference Periods, Climate Projections and Global Warming Levels” (on page 1-22) :

The plausibility of emissions levels as high as the emissions scenario conventionally associated with the RCP8.5 and SSP5–8.5 concentration pathways has been called into question since AR5, as has the emissions pathway feasibility of the low scenarios (Hausfather and Peters, 2020; Rose and and M. Scott, 2020). However, these views are contested (Schwalm et al., 2020, for RCP8.5), and it is important to realise that emissions scenarios and concentration pathways are not the same thing, and higher concentration pathways such as RCP8.5 could arise from lower emissions scenarios if carbon cycle feedbacks are stronger than assumed in the integrated assessment models (IAMs) used to create the standard scenarios (Booth et al., 2017). In the majority of full-complexity Earth System Models, these feedbacks are stronger than in the IAMs (Jones et al., 2013), so the RCP8.5 concentration pathway cannot be ruled out purely through consideration of the economic aspects of emissions scenarios. Nonetheless, the likelihood of a climate outcome, and the overall distribution of climate outcomes, are a function of the emissions scenario’s likelihood.

– – – – –

The WG-III, “Mitigation of Climate Change”, authors were confident enough to promote these speculative ideas to the SPM for AR6 (paragraph C.1.3, page SPM-22) :

In modelled pathways consistent with the continuation of policies implemented by the end of 2020, GHG emissions continue to rise, leading to global warming of 3.2 [2.2–3.5]°C by 2100 (within C5-C7, Table SPM 1) (medium confidence). Pathways that exceed warming of >4°C (≥50%) (C8, SSP5-8.5, Table SPM.1) would imply a reversal of current technology and/or mitigation policy trends (medium confidence). Such warming could occur in emission pathways consistent with policies implemented by the end of 2020 if climate sensitivity is higher than central estimates (high confidence). (Table SPM.1, Figure SPM.4) {3.3, Box 3.3}

What’s in Box 3.3, “The likelihood of high-end emission scenarios”, you may well ask ?

Jumping to page 3-28 (of WG-III) we find :

At the time the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) were published, they included 3 scenarios that could represent emission developments in the absence of climate policy: RCP4.5, RCP6 and RCP8.5, described as, respectively, low, medium and high-end scenarios in the absence of strong climate policy (van Vuuren et al. 2011). RCP8.5 was described as representative of the top 5% scenarios in the literature. The SSPs-based set of scenarios covered the RCP forcing levels adding a new low scenario (at 1.9 W/m2). Hausfather and Peters (2020) pointed out that since 2011, the rapid development of renewable energy technologies and emerging climate policy have made it considerably less likely that emissions could end up as high as RCP8.5. Still, emission trends in developing countries track RCP8.5 Pedersen et al. (2020), and high land-use emissions could imply that emissions would [!] continue to do so in the future, even at the global scale (Schwalm et al. 2020). Other factors resulting in high emissions include higher population or economic growth as included in the SSPs (see subsection 3.3.1) or rapid development of new energy services. Climate projections of RCP8.5 can also result from strong feedbacks of climate change on (natural) emission sources and high climate sensitivity (see WGI Chapter 7), and therefore their median climate impacts might also materialise while following a lower emission path (e.g., Hausfather and Betts (2020)). The discussion also relates to a more fundamental discussion on assigning likelihoods to scenarios, which is extremely difficult given the deep uncertainty and direct relationship with human choice. However, it would help to appreciate certain projections (e.g., Ho et al. (2019)). All-in-all, this means that high-end scenarios have become considerably less likely since AR5 but cannot be ruled out. It is important to realize that RCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5 do not represent a typical ‘business-as-usual’ projection but are only useful as high-end, high-risk scenarios. Reference emission scenarios (without additional climate policy) typically end up in C5-C7 categories included in this assessment.

Even with the admission that SSP5-8.5 / RCP8.5 is not BaU, “the grand poohbahs of the IPCC” haven’t given up a damn thing when it comes to frightening people with “catastrophic” model projections.

ross
November 4, 2022 1:00 pm

It would be very interesting to see a chart of IPCC climate temp predictions from start to projected 2100. It should be showing a dramatic decline ?.

Reply to  ross
November 5, 2022 6:02 am

It would be very interesting to see a chart of IPCC climate temp predictions from start to projected 2100.

FAR numbers from SPM Figure 8, “Temperature Extreme Values”.

SAR (IS92) numbers from Figure 6.24, “Temperature Extreme Values”.

TAR (SRES) numbers from Appendix II, Table II.4.
NB : “Ensemble mean / 50%” values rather than “extremes”, hence the narrower range.

AR4 (SRES) numbers from Figure 10.26.
NB : “Min” values selected from the “-1 sigma” set, “Max” values from the “+1 sigma” set.

AR5 (CMIP5 / RCP) numbers from Appendix II, Table II.7.5.
NB : “Min” values selected from the “5%” columns, “Max” values from “95%”.

The AR6 (CMIP6 / SSP) projections I have found so far have all been “ensemble mean / 50%” data series, and are therefore not directly comparable (except with the TAR).

AR1-5_GMST-min-max_1985-2100.png
Kevin kilty
November 4, 2022 4:28 pm

There is something annoying about this article. People are being feted for coming to a belated realization that the technical data don’t support a true crisis, never has, something any number of people here have known for a long time, and have even been stating publically in any number of venues; but they still cannot bring themselves to recognize the more important truth that the proposed solution to the crisis is far worse than the crisis, itself, and is all but impossible to achieve. To fully commit a nation to it is ruinous.

I suspect there might be soon a tsunami of rationality released once the guilty parties figure out a way to reverse course without saying “What were we thinking? We were wrong.”

November 5, 2022 1:20 am

I respect Curry’s work but disagree. Based on measurements of global average temperature and both tide gauge and satellite measurements of average sea level trends, RCP2.6 is the “business as usual” scenario.

The RCP4.5 scenario predicts a temperature increase mean by 2100 of 1.8 °C (likely range of 1.1 to 2.6}. RCP2.6 predicts 1.0 (range of 0.3 to 1.7).

The UAH temperature trend measured since 1979 is 1.3 °C per century, well within the range of RCP2.6 and closer to its mean of 1.0 than the RCP4.5 mean of 1.8.

RCP4.5 predicts a sea level increase mean of 0.47 meters (likely range of 0.32 to 0.63). RCP2.6 predicts 0.4 meters (range of 0.26 to 0.55).

The satellite-measured sea level rise trend since 1993 is 3.3 (± 0.4) mm/yr, or 0.33 meters by 2100, barely in the lower end of the range of RCP2.6 and below its mean of 0.4 meters.

QED

ross
Reply to  stinkerp
November 5, 2022 1:54 pm

As you indicate the observed physical data in conjunction with IPCC modeling all points towards the absolute min of projections which in turn would be within natural variability and definitely no climate crisis.

Andy H
November 7, 2022 1:18 am

The RCP 8.5 scenario is impossible because there is not enough coal, oil and gas to make it happen based upon current reserves. It is not that hard to work out.

Add in the fact that the oceans are a huge CO2 absorber that will probably absorb all that CO2 over a few hundred years anyway and form a ocean-atmosphere balance at a much lower level than the peak.