Cherry Picking Climate Catastrophes: Response to Conor Clarke, Part II
WUWT Guest Post by Indur Goklany
Conor Clarke at The Atlantic blog, raised several issues with my study, “What to Do About Climate Change,” that Cato published last year.
One of Conor Clarke’s comments was that my analysis did not extend beyond the 21st century. He found this problematic because, as Conor put it, climate change would extend beyond 2100, and even if GDP is higher in 2100 with unfettered global warming than without, it’s not obvious that this GDP would continue to be higher “in the year 2200 or 2300 or 3758”. I addressed this portion of his argument in Part I of my response. Here I will address the second part of this argument, that “the possibility of ‘catastrophic’ climate change events — those with low probability but extremely high cost — becomes real after 2100.”
RESPONSE:
The examples of potentially catastrophic events that could be caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas induced global warming (AGW) that have been offered to date (e.g., melting of the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets, or the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation) contain a few drops of plausibility submerged in oceans of speculation. There are no scientifically justified estimates of the probability of their occurrence by any given date. Nor are there scientifically justified estimates of the magnitude of damages such events might cause, not just in biophysical terms but also in socioeconomic terms. Therefore, to call these events “low probability” — as Mr. Clarke does — is a misnomer. They are more appropriately termed as plausible but highly speculative events.
Consider, for example, the potential collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS). According to the IPCC’s WG I Summary for Policy Makers (p. 17), “If a negative surface mass balance were sustained for millennia, that would lead to virtually complete elimination of the Greenland Ice Sheet and a resulting contribution to sea level rise of about 7 m” (emphasis added). Presumably the same applies to the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.
But what is the probability that a negative surface mass balance can, in fact, be sustained for millennia, particularly after considering the amount of fossil fuels that can be economically extracted and the likelihood that other energy sources will not displace fossil fuels in the interim? [Remember we are told that peak oil is nigh, that renewables are almost competitive with fossil fuels, and that wind, solar and biofuels will soon pay for themselves.]
Second, for an event to be classified as a catastrophe, it should occur relatively quickly precluding efforts by man or nature to adapt or otherwise deal with it. But if it occurs over millennia, as the IPCC says, or even centuries, that gives humanity ample time to adjust, albeit at a socioeconomic cost. But it need not be prohibitively dangerous to life, limb or property if: (1) the total amount of sea level rise (SLR) and, perhaps more importantly, the rate of SLR can be predicted with some confidence, as seems likely in the next few decades considering the resources being expended on such research; (2) the rate of SLR is slow relative to how fast populations can strengthen coastal defenses and/or relocate; and (3) there are no insurmountable barriers to migration.
This would be true even had the so-called “tipping point” already been passed and ultimate disintegration of the ice sheet was inevitable, so long as it takes millennia for the disintegration to be realized. In other words, the issue isn’t just whether the tipping point is reached, rather it is how long does it actually take to tip over. Take, for example, if a hand grenade is tossed into a crowded room. Whether this results in tragedy — and the magnitude of that tragedy — depends upon how much time it takes for the grenade to go off, the reaction time of the occupants, and their ability to respond.
Lowe, et al. (2006, p. 32-33), based on a “pessimistic, but plausible, scenario in which atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations were stabilised at four times pre-industrial levels,” estimated that a collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet would over the next 1,000 years raise sea level by 2.3 meters (with a peak rate of 0.5 cm/yr). If one were to arbitrarily double that to account for potential melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, that means a SLR of ~5 meters in 1,000 years with a peak rate (assuming the peaks coincide) of 1 meter per century.
Such a rise would not be unprecedented. Sea level has risen 120 meters in the past 18,000 years — an average of 0.67 meters/century — and as much as 4 meters/century during meltwater pulse 1A episode 14,600 years ago (Weaver et al. 2003; subscription required). Neither humanity nor, from the perspective of millennial time scales (per the above quote from the IPCC), the rest of nature seem the worse for it. Coral reefs for example, evolved and their compositions changed over millennia as new reefs grew while older ones were submerged in deeper water (e.g., Cabioch et al. 2008). So while there have been ecological changes, it is unknown whether the changes were for better or worse. For a melting of the GIS (or WAIS) to qualify as a catastrophe, one has to show, rather than assume, that the ecological consequences would, in fact, be for the worse.
Human beings can certainly cope with sea level rise of such magnitudes if they have centuries or millennia to do so. In fact, if necessary they could probably get out of the way in a matter of decades, if not years.
Can a relocation of such a magnitude be accomplished?
Consider that the global population increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 6.8 billion this year. Among other things, this meant creating the infrastructure for an extra 4.3 billion people in the intervening 59 years (as well as improving the infrastructure for the 2.5 billion counted in the baseline, many of whom barely had any infrastructure whatsoever in 1950). These improvements occurred at a time when everyone was significantly poorer. (Global per capita income today is more than 3.5 times greater today than it was in 1950). Therefore, while relocation will be costly, in theory, tomorrow’s much wealthier world ought to be able to relocate billions of people to higher ground over the next few centuries, if need be. In fact, once a decision is made to relocate, the cost differential of relocating, say, 10 meters higher rather than a meter higher is probably marginal. It should also be noted that over millennia the world’s infrastructure will have to be renewed or replaced dozens of times – and the world will be better for it. [For example, the ancient city of Troy, once on the coast but now a few kilometers inland, was built and rebuilt at least 9 times in 3 millennia.]
Also, so long as we are concerned about potential geological catastrophes whose probability of occurrence and impacts have yet to be scientifically estimated, we should also consider equally low or higher probability events that might negate their impacts. Specifically, it is quite possible — in fact probable — that somewhere between now and 2100 or 2200, technologies will become available that will deal with climate change much more economically than currently available technologies for reducing GHG emissions. Such technologies may include ocean fertilization, carbon sequestration, geo-engineering options (e.g., deploying mirrors in space) or more efficient solar or photovoltaic technologies. Similarly, there is a finite, non-zero probability that new and improved adaptation technologies will become available that will substantially reduce the net adverse impacts of climate change.
The historical record shows that this has occurred over the past century for virtually every climate-sensitive sector that has been studied. For example, from 1900-1970, U.S. death rates due to various climate-sensitive water-related diseases — dysentery, typhoid, paratyphoid, other gastrointestinal disease, and malaria —declined by 99.6 to 100.0 percent. Similarly, poor agricultural productivity exacerbated by drought contributed to famines in India and China off and on through the 19th and 20th centuries killing millions of people, but such famines haven’t recurred since the 1970s despite any climate change and the fact that populations are several-fold higher today. And by the early 2000s, deaths and death rates due to extreme weather events had dropped worldwide by over 95% of their earlier 20th century peaks (Goklany 2006).
With respect to another global warming bogeyman — the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (AKA the meridional overturning circulation), the basis for the deep freeze depicted in the movie, The Day After Tomorrow — the IPCC WG I SPM notes (p. 16), “Based on current model simulations, it is very likely that the meridional overturning circulation (MOC) of the Atlantic Ocean will slow down during the 21st century. The multi-model average reduction by 2100 is 25% (range from zero to about 50%) for SRES emission scenario A1B. Temperatures in the Atlantic region are projected to increase despite such changes due to the much larger warming associated with projected increases in greenhouse gases. It is very unlikely that the MOC will undergo a large abrupt transition during the 21st century. Longer-term changes in the MOC cannot be assessed with confidence.”
Not much has changed since then. A shut down of the MOC doesn’t look any more likely now than it did then. See here, here, and here (pp. 316-317).
If one wants to develop rational policies to address speculative catastrophic events that could conceivably occur over the next few centuries or millennia, as a start one should consider the universe of potential catastrophes and then develop criteria as to which should be addressed and which not. Rational analysis must necessarily be based on systematic analysis, and not on cherry picking one’s favorite catastrophes.
Just as one may speculate on global warming induced catastrophes, one may just as plausibly also speculate on catastrophes that may result absent global warming. Consider, for example, the possibility that absent global warming, the Little Ice Age might return. The consequences of another ice age, Little or not, could range from the severely negative to the positive (if that would buffer the negative consequences of warming). That such a recurrence is not unlikely is evident from the fact that the earth entered and, only a century and a half ago, retreated from a Little Ice Age, and that history may indeed repeat itself over centuries or millennia.
Yet another catastrophe that greenhouse gas controls may cause is that CO2 not only contributes to warming, it is also the key building block of life as we know it. All vegetation is created by the photosynthesis of CO2 in the atmosphere. In fact, according to the IPCC WG I report (2007, p. 106), net primary productivity of the global biosphere has increased in recent decades, partly due to greater warming, higher CO2 concentrations and nitrogen deposition. Thus , there is a finite probability that reducing CO2 emissions would, therefore, reduce the net primary productivity of the terrestrial biosphere with potentially severe negative consequences for the amount and diversity of wildlife that it could support, as well as agricultural and forest productivity with adverse knock on effects on hunger and health.
There is also a finite probability that costs of GHG reductions could reduce economic growth worldwide. Even if only industrialized countries sign up for emission reductions, the negative consequences could show up in developing countries because they derive a substantial share of their income from aid, trade, tourism, and remittances from the rest of the world. See, for example, Tol (2005), which examines this possibility, although the extent to which that study fully considered these factors (i.e., aid, trade, tourism, and remittances) is unclear.
Finally, one of the problems with the argument that society should address low probability high impact events (assuming a probability could be estimated rather than assumed or guessed) is that it necessarily means there is a high probability that resources expended on addressing such catastrophic events will have been squandered. This wouldn’t be a problem but for the fact that there are opportunity costs associated with this.
According to the 2007 IPCC Science Assessment’s Summary for Policy Makers (p. 10), “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” In plain language, this means that the IPCC believes there is at least a 90% likelihood that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (AGHG) are responsible for 50-100% of the global warming since 1950. In other words, there is an up to 10% chance that anthropogenic GHGs are not responsible for most of that warming.
This means there is an up to 10% chance that resources expended in limiting climate change would have been squandered. Since any effort to significantly reduce climate change will cost trillions of dollars (see Nordhaus 2008, p. 82), that would be an unqualified disaster, particularly since those very resources could be devoted to reducing urgent problems humanity faces here and now (e.g., hunger, malaria, safer water and sanitation) — problems we know exist for sure unlike the bogeymen that we can’t be certain about.
Spending money on speculative, even if plausible, catastrophes instead of problems we know exist for sure is like a starving man giving up a fat juicy bird in hand while hoping that we’ll catch several other birds sometime in the next few centuries even though we know those birds don’t exist today and may never exist in the future.
Cherry Picking Climate Catastrophes: Response to Conor Clarke, Part II
Posted by Indur Goklany
Conor Clarke at The Atlantic blog, raised several issues with my study, “What to Do About Climate Change,” that Cato published last year.
One of Conor Clarke’s comments was that my analysis did not extend beyond the 21st century. He found this problematic because, as Conor put it, climate change would extend beyond 2100, and even if GDP is higher in 2100 with unfettered global warming than without, it’s not obvious that this GDP would continue to be higher “in the year 2200 or 2300 or 3758”. I addressed this portion of his argument in Part I of my response. Here I will address the second part of this argument, that “the possibility of ‘catastrophic’ climate change events — those with low probability but extremely high cost — becomes real after 2100.”
RESPONSE:
The examples of potentially catastrophic events that could be caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas induced global warming (AGW) that have been offered to date (e.g., melting of the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets, or the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation) contain a few drops of plausibility submerged in oceans of speculation. There are no scientifically justified estimates of the probability of their occurrence by any given date. Nor are there scientifically justified estimates of the magnitude of damages such events might cause, not just in biophysical terms but also in socioeconomic terms. Therefore, to call these events “low probability” — as Mr. Clarke does — is a misnomer. They are more appropriately termed as plausible but highly speculative events.
Consider, for example, the potential collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS). According to the IPCC’s WG I Summary for Policy Makers (p. 17), “If a negative surface mass balance were sustained for millennia, that would lead to virtually complete elimination of the Greenland Ice Sheet and a resulting contribution to sea level rise of about 7 m” (emphasis added). Presumably the same applies to the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.
But what is the probability that a negative surface mass balance can, in fact, be sustained for millennia, particularly after considering the amount of fossil fuels that can be economically extracted and the likelihood that other energy sources will not displace fossil fuels in the interim? [Remember we are told that peak oil is nigh, that renewables are almost competitive with fossil fuels, and that wind, solar and biofuels will soon pay for themselves.]
Second, for an event to be classified as a catastrophe, it should occur relatively quickly precluding efforts by man or nature to adapt or otherwise deal with it. But if it occurs over millennia, as the IPCC says, or even centuries, that gives humanity ample time to adjust, albeit at a socioeconomic cost. But it need not be prohibitively dangerous to life, limb or property if: (1) the total amount of sea level rise (SLR) and, perhaps more importantly, the rate of SLR can be predicted with some confidence, as seems likely in the next few decades considering the resources being expended on such research; (2) the rate of SLR is slow relative to how fast populations can strengthen coastal defenses and/or relocate; and (3) there are no insurmountable barriers to migration.
This would be true even had the so-called “tipping point” already been passed and ultimate disintegration of the ice sheet was inevitable, so long as it takes millennia for the disintegration to be realized. In other words, the issue isn’t just whether the tipping point is reached, rather it is how long does it actually take to tip over. Take, for example, if a hand grenade is tossed into a crowded room. Whether this results in tragedy — and the magnitude of that tragedy — depends upon how much time it takes for the grenade to go off, the reaction time of the occupants, and their ability to respond.
Lowe, et al. (2006, p. 32-33), based on a “pessimistic, but plausible, scenario in which atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations were stabilised at four times pre-industrial levels,” estimated that a collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet would over the next 1,000 years raise sea level by 2.3 meters (with a peak rate of 0.5 cm/yr). If one were to arbitrarily double that to account for potential melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, that means a SLR of ~5 meters in 1,000 years with a peak rate (assuming the peaks coincide) of 1 meter per century.
Such a rise would not be unprecedented. Sea level has risen 120 meters in the past 18,000 years — an average of 0.67 meters/century — and as much as 4 meters/century during meltwater pulse 1A episode 14,600 years ago (Weaver et al. 2003; subscription required). Neither humanity nor, from the perspective of millennial time scales (per the above quote from the IPCC), the rest of nature seem the worse for it. Coral reefs for example, evolved and their compositions changed over millennia as new reefs grew while older ones were submerged in deeper water (e.g., Cabioch et al. 2008). So while there have been ecological changes, it is unknown whether the changes were for better or worse. For a melting of the GIS (or WAIS) to qualify as a catastrophe, one has to show, rather than assume, that the ecological consequences would, in fact, be for the worse.
Human beings can certainly cope with sea level rise of such magnitudes if they have centuries or millennia to do so. In fact, if necessary they could probably get out of the way in a matter of decades, if not years.
Can a relocation of such a magnitude be accomplished?
Consider that the global population increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 6.8 billion this year. Among other things, this meant creating the infrastructure for an extra 4.3 billion people in the intervening 59 years (as well as improving the infrastructure for the 2.5 billion counted in the baseline, many of whom barely had any infrastructure whatsoever in 1950). These improvements occurred at a time when everyone was significantly poorer. (Global per capita income today is more than 3.5 times greater today than it was in 1950). Therefore, while relocation will be costly, in theory, tomorrow’s much wealthier world ought to be able to relocate billions of people to higher ground over the next few centuries, if need be. In fact, once a decision is made to relocate, the cost differential of relocating, say, 10 meters higher rather than a meter higher is probably marginal. It should also be noted that over millennia the world’s infrastructure will have to be renewed or replaced dozens of times – and the world will be better for it. [For example, the ancient city of Troy, once on the coast but now a few kilometers inland, was built and rebuilt at least 9 times in 3 millennia.]
Also, so long as we are concerned about potential geological catastrophes whose probability of occurrence and impacts have yet to be scientifically estimated, we should also consider equally low or higher probability events that might negate their impacts. Specifically, it is quite possible — in fact probable — that somewhere between now and 2100 or 2200, technologies will become available that will deal with climate change much more economically than currently available technologies for reducing GHG emissions. Such technologies may include ocean fertilization, carbon sequestration, geo-engineering options (e.g., deploying mirrors in space) or more efficient solar or photovoltaic technologies. Similarly, there is a finite, non-zero probability that new and improved adaptation technologies will become available that will substantially reduce the net adverse impacts of climate change.
The historical record shows that this has occurred over the past century for virtually every climate-sensitive sector that has been studied. For example, from 1900-1970, U.S. death rates due to various climate-sensitive water-related diseases — dysentery, typhoid, paratyphoid, other gastrointestinal disease, and malaria —declined by 99.6 to 100.0 percent. Similarly, poor agricultural productivity exacerbated by drought contributed to famines in India and China off and on through the 19th and 20th centuries killing millions of people, but such famines haven’t recurred since the 1970s despite any climate change and the fact that populations are several-fold higher today. And by the early 2000s, deaths and death rates due to extreme weather events had dropped worldwide by over 95% of their earlier 20th century peaks (Goklany 2006).
With respect to another global warming bogeyman — the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (AKA the meridional overturning circulation), the basis for the deep freeze depicted in the movie, The Day After Tomorrow — the IPCC WG I SPM notes (p. 16), “Based on current model simulations, it is very likely that the meridional overturning circulation (MOC) of the Atlantic Ocean will slow down during the 21st century. The multi-model average reduction by 2100 is 25% (range from zero to about 50%) for SRES emission scenario A1B. Temperatures in the Atlantic region are projected to increase despite such changes due to the much larger warming associated with projected increases in greenhouse gases. It is very unlikely that the MOC will undergo a large abrupt transition during the 21st century. Longer-term changes in the MOC cannot be assessed with confidence.”
Not much has changed since then. A shut down of the MOC doesn’t look any more likely now than it did then. See here, here, and here (pp. 316-317).
If one wants to develop rational policies to address speculative catastrophic events that could conceivably occur over the next few centuries or millennia, as a start one should consider the universe of potential catastrophes and then develop criteria as to which should be addressed and which not. Rational analysis must necessarily be based on systematic analysis, and not on cherry picking one’s favorite catastrophes.
Just as one may speculate on global warming induced catastrophes, one may just as plausibly also speculate on catastrophes that may result absent global warming. Consider, for example, the possibility that absent global warming, the Little Ice Age might return. The consequences of another ice age, Little or not, could range from the severely negative to the positive (if that would buffer the negative consequences of warming). That such a recurrence is not unlikely is evident from the fact that the earth entered and, only a century and a half ago, retreated from a Little Ice Age, and that history may indeed repeat itself over centuries or millennia.
Yet another catastrophe that greenhouse gas controls may cause is that CO2 not only contributes to warming, it is also the key building block of life as we know it. All vegetation is created by the photosynthesis of CO2 in the atmosphere. In fact, according to the IPCC WG I report (2007, p. 106), net primary productivity of the global biosphere has increased in recent decades, partly due to greater warming, higher CO2 concentrations and nitrogen deposition. Thus , there is a finite probability that reducing CO2 emissions would, therefore, reduce the net primary productivity of the terrestrial biosphere with potentially severe negative consequences for the amount and diversity of wildlife that it could support, as well as agricultural and forest productivity with adverse knock on effects on hunger and health.
There is also a finite probability that costs of GHG reductions could reduce economic growth worldwide. Even if only industrialized countries sign up for emission reductions, the negative consequences could show up in developing countries because they derive a substantial share of their income from aid, trade, tourism, and remittances from the rest of the world. See, for example, Tol (2005), which examines this possibility, although the extent to which that study fully considered these factors (i.e., aid, trade, tourism, and remittances) is unclear.
Finally, one of the problems with the argument that society should address low probability high impact events (assuming a probability could be estimated rather than assumed or guessed) is that it necessarily means there is a high probability that resources expended on addressing such catastrophic events will have been squandered. This wouldn’t be a problem but for the fact that there are opportunity costs associated with this.
According to the 2007 IPCC Science Assessment’s Summary for Policy Makers (p. 10), “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” In plain language, this means that the IPCC believes there is at least a 90% likelihood that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (AGHG) are responsible for 50-100% of the global warming since 1950. In other words, there is an up to 10% chance that anthropogenic GHGs are not responsible for most of that warming.
This means there is an up to 10% chance that resources expended in limiting climate change would have been squandered. Since any effort to significantly reduce climate change will cost trillions of dollars (see Nordhaus 2008, p. 82), that would be an unqualified disaster, particularly since those very resources could be devoted to reducing urgent problems humanity faces here and now (e.g., hunger, malaria, safer water and sanitation) — problems we know exist for sure unlike the bogeymen that we can’t be certain about.
Spending money on speculative, even if plausible, catastrophes instead of problems we know exist for sure is like a starving man giving up a fat juicy bird in hand while hoping that we’ll catch several other birds sometime in the next few centuries even though we know those birds don’t exist today and may never exist in the future.
Rob (11:11:52) said : “Perhaps you might explain what caused this sudden rise of 2-3 meters, was it CO2.”
It obviously happened without anthropogenic forcing. The Blanchon 2009 study shows that these kinds of events can happen spontaneously in a climate not too far from the present state. Warming obviously increases the chances of it happening. It tells us that there might be an ice sheet instability uncomfortably close to our present climate state. It would be good to try to understand just how close that instability is.
There are precedents for ice sheet collapse. It is not an unsupported theoretical hypothesis.
I know its off topic but Scafetta has posted a guest webblog at Pielke Sr blog criticising Schmitts recent paper on the solar signature.
The principal reason that governments in the ‘democratic’ west keep playing the AGW card is that it enables them to spend OUR money now to ward off catastrophes which are postulated to occur a hundred years or more hence. They can shout “Look what we are doing to save the planet” when the results of their spendthrift actions cannot be measured right now.
They garner the valuable (to them) ‘green vote’ without having to demonstrate any tangible results whatsoever. Unassailable dominance in some form of global governance is but a corollary of this fevered vote chasing by the present regimes in the UK and the USA.
Logic, reason and the scientific method have no part to play in this process; the ultimate aim of this catastrophe game-playing is dominance and power.
Allan M (11:53:30) : You are right. It seems that show business is running climate science (miss conducts & scandal included).
OT
Did you see Svensmarks newest publication? It seems to be a very important paper:
http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2009/2009GL038429.shtml
That’s because there was no Miami 😉
The only “catastrophe” would be the slow incursion of the coastal areas, which is something that planners should have accounted for. If sea levels were to recede, you can bet dollars to donuts that people would start building out where there used to be water. The real catastrophe is human stupidity.
Interesting post. I do think we have other issues in the here and now to be greatly concerned about, of course, and no, none of the GCM’s can give a definitive prediction 50, 100, 200 years into the future regarding climate, climate change and consequences. Still they are inputted with ranges, low, median and high end estimates and interestingly enough the 1988 median predictions input by Jim Hansen were remarkably accurate, (NOT that I agree with his more recent high end predictions, becuase, frankly I do not) and the combination of satellite data, tree ring & ice core proxy data have been shown to be remarkably accurate and useful. The charts created based upon a pooling of data, multi ensemble models, and direct observations have shown remarkablely high degrees agreement and correlation {95%} (2 standard deviations) between greenhouse gases and the real, current warming trend. Now, I too share concerns with some of my peers regarding a reduction in warming after 1998 from El Nino and a gobal warming pause from around 2001/2002; it appears that the “noise” of weather can become a signal, since we can measure climate in less than 30 year increments and we must look at various microclimates as we consider the bigger picture as well. Recent papers have suggested an 8-20 year abatement in global warming which even by the Meteological Society’s standards (and of course Gavin Schmiudt’s) would be a “climate trend.” This, on my part of course is sepculation as to whether this will actually occur or not, and only briefly enterained by the aforementioned authors of these papers (references upon request of course) and as it stands now the climate trend is still quite in tact. We are still warmer on a global mean scale than we were in 1850, 1880, 1940, 1975, 1985, etc… Of course there is not universal agreement among the various groups measuring Global mean temperature. as to the exact deviation on temp or total global mean, however, most are in very close agreement.
I do see that changes in weather patterns can at times contribute to climate trends, but at other times, are infinitesimal in contribution to overall climate; more data is needed, and as GCM’s are being improved we need to continue to analyze results against as much real world data as we can.
Yet the fact remains that sea ice is melting, (just watch Discovery channel footage, PBS footage, BBC footage, Economist pictures, Scientific American 3.0, Nature, and reports from many different news networks) ice sheets are becoming thinner, (the Artic is tahwing and releasing more CH4; Methane) black clouds from regions in Asia are increasing prevalence and incidence of respiratory diseases, and more harmful UV rays are getting through the atmosphere in a trend. I am not suggesting we do not find ways to adpat to the global issues, however, part of adapting is utlizing alternative energy sources, sequestering CO2 and reducing GHG emissions in general. New technologies afford us these abilities more than ever before in history. It is foolhardy to continue in a business as usual, “staus quo,” fashion.
I am not worried about the year 2200, but I am concerned about now, and 2050, 2070, etc… The high degrees of correlation and confidence in AGW currently and median predictions for the next 50 years is enough cause for concern for me as a US citizen and member of the human race on Earth.
@ur momisugly Nogw (11:21:29) : Well you and whoever can live in some kind of anthill society if you wish, but personally I like my 200 acres, and have no intention of giving it up. There’s more to life than just existence.
It’s all based upon the precautionary principle, but you need to remember the precautionary principle only applies when it’s man, not nature, to blame for the potential disaster.
Even that’s a simplication. The precautionary principle is primarily invoked when Western civilization, capitalism and ‘big business’ are the villians. It does not apply to terrorism, rogue nations, the third world or left-wing dictatorships.
I am reasonably sure that icesheet elevation rather than atmospheric temperatures is the primary determinant of ice mass gain and loss for the Antarctic icesheet over centuries to millenia, and probably Greenland as well.
This is because almost constant adabatic winds make Antarctica one of the driest places on earth.
A warmer (and hence wetter) atmosphere would result in ice mass gain for Antarctica until increased elevation and consequently stronger adabatic winds resulted in equilibrium through reduced precipitation.
Jacob Mack (13:20:51) …so you are in the carbon share business!, congratulations!. You will pay some third world people US$3.- per jungle hectare and sell it at US$30000. Congratulations, again!
Don’t need to tell you that CO2 it’s a scam, you know it and that’s good for your clients.
The precautionary principle also does not envision throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
Fer crissake, we are on an upward swoop. That may (will) be a somewhat dirty process. It leads to an ultimately cleaner process. But we cannot get there if we never go there. We must not turn our backs on the starving. Or on history.
Wealth is the solution. We must not destroy the wealth. I may be a liberal swine, but it has not escaped me that liberalism, whatever else it isn’t, is EXPENSIVE. If the liberals want it, by gum, we have to generate it, not wipe it flat. Most of my fellow liberals seem to have a supreme lack of perspective coupled with an extremely short point of view.
evanmjones (13:40:06) : Who the ** cares about a baby!, it’s about business!
Even more brilliantly they are saying we could solve the problem by eating bugs and scorpions etc.
There are religious proscriptions against this sort of thing depending on the religion. Will they be having religious exemptions? I might become a more devout Jew just for the meat.
Throwing out the business with the wastewater?
And they never could conceive of those billion-dollar babies.
Nogw….what? C02 is most definitely a real danger. Alos there is enormous investment in domestic infrastructure to develop these technologies here in the US and to create whole new job/market sectors. Read Forbes, Economist, Fortune, and Scientific American.
Who knows, after all, perhaps the 666 is behind all this! 🙂
noaaprogrammer,
The 09:30 post you referenced was only talking millions of years and said nothing about the sun. I think the sun is very important to the discussion. Billions are a lot bigger than millions.
Are you really a programmer? I hope you do not routinely drop 3 orders of magnitude. It could be inconvenient. 😉
And noaa,
May I add that the moderators today seem slow. They probably have real jobs. I’m semi-retired and can devote myself to whatever…..
[REPLY – Slow, the man says! I have moderated over 100 today. There’s been a bunchload of traffic. ~ Evan]
@Nogw
The color of CO2 in the visible part of the spectrum is irrelevant for it’s IR absorption.
Irrelevant, nobody is advocating removing all CO2, besides during the ice ages we had atmospheric levels of CO2 down to about 200ppm.
Not true, mid-troposphere concentrations are about 375ppm and the drop to the stratosphere is of the order of 5-10ppm.
Irrelevant for the greenhouse effect
Here’s an experiment in the visible, KMnO4 solutions of 600, 380 and 200ppm. The effect of CO2 is similar, it’s just happening in the infrared (and yes, water vapor is absorbing in the infrared, too)
Nonsense, read up on greenhouse effect. Wikipedia is a good starter, IPCC TAR has an explanation, too.
NO comment.
C02 is most definitely a real danger.
And the side effects of capping it are a humongous, deathly danger. Not to mention that if we do, we may never generate the wealth to get past it.
Safety, you want? There isn’t any. (Never was, either.)
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Jacob Mack (13:20:51) :
and the combination of satellite data, tree ring & ice core proxy data have been
shown to be remarkably accurate and useful.
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You’ve been watching too much TV and listening to NPR haven’t you?
Ron de Haan (08:48:54) :
Sooo, DDT was banned? Interesting. Google for “WHO DDT”, first hit:
Frequently asked questions on DDT use for disease vector control
Oh, and keep in mind there may be a reason for not using DDT everywhere. Ever heard of pesticide resistance?
Bluegrue:
You read on the non existing “green house effect”:
http://www.giurfa.com/gh_experiments.pdf
bluegrue (14:08:23) : So…you are one of those guys who warm your feet with a bottle filled with hot air!!…Remarkable!!