Cherry Picking Climate Catastrophes: Response to Conor Clarke, Part II
WUWT Guest Post by Indur Goklany
Conor Clarke at The Atlantic blog, raised several issues with my study, “What to Do About Climate Change,” that Cato published last year.
One of Conor Clarke’s comments was that my analysis did not extend beyond the 21st century. He found this problematic because, as Conor put it, climate change would extend beyond 2100, and even if GDP is higher in 2100 with unfettered global warming than without, it’s not obvious that this GDP would continue to be higher “in the year 2200 or 2300 or 3758”. I addressed this portion of his argument in Part I of my response. Here I will address the second part of this argument, that “the possibility of ‘catastrophic’ climate change events — those with low probability but extremely high cost — becomes real after 2100.”
RESPONSE:
The examples of potentially catastrophic events that could be caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas induced global warming (AGW) that have been offered to date (e.g., melting of the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets, or the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation) contain a few drops of plausibility submerged in oceans of speculation. There are no scientifically justified estimates of the probability of their occurrence by any given date. Nor are there scientifically justified estimates of the magnitude of damages such events might cause, not just in biophysical terms but also in socioeconomic terms. Therefore, to call these events “low probability” — as Mr. Clarke does — is a misnomer. They are more appropriately termed as plausible but highly speculative events.
Consider, for example, the potential collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS). According to the IPCC’s WG I Summary for Policy Makers (p. 17), “If a negative surface mass balance were sustained for millennia, that would lead to virtually complete elimination of the Greenland Ice Sheet and a resulting contribution to sea level rise of about 7 m” (emphasis added). Presumably the same applies to the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.
But what is the probability that a negative surface mass balance can, in fact, be sustained for millennia, particularly after considering the amount of fossil fuels that can be economically extracted and the likelihood that other energy sources will not displace fossil fuels in the interim? [Remember we are told that peak oil is nigh, that renewables are almost competitive with fossil fuels, and that wind, solar and biofuels will soon pay for themselves.]
Second, for an event to be classified as a catastrophe, it should occur relatively quickly precluding efforts by man or nature to adapt or otherwise deal with it. But if it occurs over millennia, as the IPCC says, or even centuries, that gives humanity ample time to adjust, albeit at a socioeconomic cost. But it need not be prohibitively dangerous to life, limb or property if: (1) the total amount of sea level rise (SLR) and, perhaps more importantly, the rate of SLR can be predicted with some confidence, as seems likely in the next few decades considering the resources being expended on such research; (2) the rate of SLR is slow relative to how fast populations can strengthen coastal defenses and/or relocate; and (3) there are no insurmountable barriers to migration.
This would be true even had the so-called “tipping point” already been passed and ultimate disintegration of the ice sheet was inevitable, so long as it takes millennia for the disintegration to be realized. In other words, the issue isn’t just whether the tipping point is reached, rather it is how long does it actually take to tip over. Take, for example, if a hand grenade is tossed into a crowded room. Whether this results in tragedy — and the magnitude of that tragedy — depends upon how much time it takes for the grenade to go off, the reaction time of the occupants, and their ability to respond.
Lowe, et al. (2006, p. 32-33), based on a “pessimistic, but plausible, scenario in which atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations were stabilised at four times pre-industrial levels,” estimated that a collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet would over the next 1,000 years raise sea level by 2.3 meters (with a peak rate of 0.5 cm/yr). If one were to arbitrarily double that to account for potential melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, that means a SLR of ~5 meters in 1,000 years with a peak rate (assuming the peaks coincide) of 1 meter per century.
Such a rise would not be unprecedented. Sea level has risen 120 meters in the past 18,000 years — an average of 0.67 meters/century — and as much as 4 meters/century during meltwater pulse 1A episode 14,600 years ago (Weaver et al. 2003; subscription required). Neither humanity nor, from the perspective of millennial time scales (per the above quote from the IPCC), the rest of nature seem the worse for it. Coral reefs for example, evolved and their compositions changed over millennia as new reefs grew while older ones were submerged in deeper water (e.g., Cabioch et al. 2008). So while there have been ecological changes, it is unknown whether the changes were for better or worse. For a melting of the GIS (or WAIS) to qualify as a catastrophe, one has to show, rather than assume, that the ecological consequences would, in fact, be for the worse.
Human beings can certainly cope with sea level rise of such magnitudes if they have centuries or millennia to do so. In fact, if necessary they could probably get out of the way in a matter of decades, if not years.
Can a relocation of such a magnitude be accomplished?
Consider that the global population increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 6.8 billion this year. Among other things, this meant creating the infrastructure for an extra 4.3 billion people in the intervening 59 years (as well as improving the infrastructure for the 2.5 billion counted in the baseline, many of whom barely had any infrastructure whatsoever in 1950). These improvements occurred at a time when everyone was significantly poorer. (Global per capita income today is more than 3.5 times greater today than it was in 1950). Therefore, while relocation will be costly, in theory, tomorrow’s much wealthier world ought to be able to relocate billions of people to higher ground over the next few centuries, if need be. In fact, once a decision is made to relocate, the cost differential of relocating, say, 10 meters higher rather than a meter higher is probably marginal. It should also be noted that over millennia the world’s infrastructure will have to be renewed or replaced dozens of times – and the world will be better for it. [For example, the ancient city of Troy, once on the coast but now a few kilometers inland, was built and rebuilt at least 9 times in 3 millennia.]
Also, so long as we are concerned about potential geological catastrophes whose probability of occurrence and impacts have yet to be scientifically estimated, we should also consider equally low or higher probability events that might negate their impacts. Specifically, it is quite possible — in fact probable — that somewhere between now and 2100 or 2200, technologies will become available that will deal with climate change much more economically than currently available technologies for reducing GHG emissions. Such technologies may include ocean fertilization, carbon sequestration, geo-engineering options (e.g., deploying mirrors in space) or more efficient solar or photovoltaic technologies. Similarly, there is a finite, non-zero probability that new and improved adaptation technologies will become available that will substantially reduce the net adverse impacts of climate change.
The historical record shows that this has occurred over the past century for virtually every climate-sensitive sector that has been studied. For example, from 1900-1970, U.S. death rates due to various climate-sensitive water-related diseases — dysentery, typhoid, paratyphoid, other gastrointestinal disease, and malaria —declined by 99.6 to 100.0 percent. Similarly, poor agricultural productivity exacerbated by drought contributed to famines in India and China off and on through the 19th and 20th centuries killing millions of people, but such famines haven’t recurred since the 1970s despite any climate change and the fact that populations are several-fold higher today. And by the early 2000s, deaths and death rates due to extreme weather events had dropped worldwide by over 95% of their earlier 20th century peaks (Goklany 2006).
With respect to another global warming bogeyman — the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (AKA the meridional overturning circulation), the basis for the deep freeze depicted in the movie, The Day After Tomorrow — the IPCC WG I SPM notes (p. 16), “Based on current model simulations, it is very likely that the meridional overturning circulation (MOC) of the Atlantic Ocean will slow down during the 21st century. The multi-model average reduction by 2100 is 25% (range from zero to about 50%) for SRES emission scenario A1B. Temperatures in the Atlantic region are projected to increase despite such changes due to the much larger warming associated with projected increases in greenhouse gases. It is very unlikely that the MOC will undergo a large abrupt transition during the 21st century. Longer-term changes in the MOC cannot be assessed with confidence.”
Not much has changed since then. A shut down of the MOC doesn’t look any more likely now than it did then. See here, here, and here (pp. 316-317).
If one wants to develop rational policies to address speculative catastrophic events that could conceivably occur over the next few centuries or millennia, as a start one should consider the universe of potential catastrophes and then develop criteria as to which should be addressed and which not. Rational analysis must necessarily be based on systematic analysis, and not on cherry picking one’s favorite catastrophes.
Just as one may speculate on global warming induced catastrophes, one may just as plausibly also speculate on catastrophes that may result absent global warming. Consider, for example, the possibility that absent global warming, the Little Ice Age might return. The consequences of another ice age, Little or not, could range from the severely negative to the positive (if that would buffer the negative consequences of warming). That such a recurrence is not unlikely is evident from the fact that the earth entered and, only a century and a half ago, retreated from a Little Ice Age, and that history may indeed repeat itself over centuries or millennia.
Yet another catastrophe that greenhouse gas controls may cause is that CO2 not only contributes to warming, it is also the key building block of life as we know it. All vegetation is created by the photosynthesis of CO2 in the atmosphere. In fact, according to the IPCC WG I report (2007, p. 106), net primary productivity of the global biosphere has increased in recent decades, partly due to greater warming, higher CO2 concentrations and nitrogen deposition. Thus , there is a finite probability that reducing CO2 emissions would, therefore, reduce the net primary productivity of the terrestrial biosphere with potentially severe negative consequences for the amount and diversity of wildlife that it could support, as well as agricultural and forest productivity with adverse knock on effects on hunger and health.
There is also a finite probability that costs of GHG reductions could reduce economic growth worldwide. Even if only industrialized countries sign up for emission reductions, the negative consequences could show up in developing countries because they derive a substantial share of their income from aid, trade, tourism, and remittances from the rest of the world. See, for example, Tol (2005), which examines this possibility, although the extent to which that study fully considered these factors (i.e., aid, trade, tourism, and remittances) is unclear.
Finally, one of the problems with the argument that society should address low probability high impact events (assuming a probability could be estimated rather than assumed or guessed) is that it necessarily means there is a high probability that resources expended on addressing such catastrophic events will have been squandered. This wouldn’t be a problem but for the fact that there are opportunity costs associated with this.
According to the 2007 IPCC Science Assessment’s Summary for Policy Makers (p. 10), “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” In plain language, this means that the IPCC believes there is at least a 90% likelihood that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (AGHG) are responsible for 50-100% of the global warming since 1950. In other words, there is an up to 10% chance that anthropogenic GHGs are not responsible for most of that warming.
This means there is an up to 10% chance that resources expended in limiting climate change would have been squandered. Since any effort to significantly reduce climate change will cost trillions of dollars (see Nordhaus 2008, p. 82), that would be an unqualified disaster, particularly since those very resources could be devoted to reducing urgent problems humanity faces here and now (e.g., hunger, malaria, safer water and sanitation) — problems we know exist for sure unlike the bogeymen that we can’t be certain about.
Spending money on speculative, even if plausible, catastrophes instead of problems we know exist for sure is like a starving man giving up a fat juicy bird in hand while hoping that we’ll catch several other birds sometime in the next few centuries even though we know those birds don’t exist today and may never exist in the future.
Cherry Picking Climate Catastrophes: Response to Conor Clarke, Part II
Posted by Indur Goklany
Conor Clarke at The Atlantic blog, raised several issues with my study, “What to Do About Climate Change,” that Cato published last year.
One of Conor Clarke’s comments was that my analysis did not extend beyond the 21st century. He found this problematic because, as Conor put it, climate change would extend beyond 2100, and even if GDP is higher in 2100 with unfettered global warming than without, it’s not obvious that this GDP would continue to be higher “in the year 2200 or 2300 or 3758”. I addressed this portion of his argument in Part I of my response. Here I will address the second part of this argument, that “the possibility of ‘catastrophic’ climate change events — those with low probability but extremely high cost — becomes real after 2100.”
RESPONSE:
The examples of potentially catastrophic events that could be caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas induced global warming (AGW) that have been offered to date (e.g., melting of the Greenland or West Antarctic Ice Sheets, or the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation) contain a few drops of plausibility submerged in oceans of speculation. There are no scientifically justified estimates of the probability of their occurrence by any given date. Nor are there scientifically justified estimates of the magnitude of damages such events might cause, not just in biophysical terms but also in socioeconomic terms. Therefore, to call these events “low probability” — as Mr. Clarke does — is a misnomer. They are more appropriately termed as plausible but highly speculative events.
Consider, for example, the potential collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS). According to the IPCC’s WG I Summary for Policy Makers (p. 17), “If a negative surface mass balance were sustained for millennia, that would lead to virtually complete elimination of the Greenland Ice Sheet and a resulting contribution to sea level rise of about 7 m” (emphasis added). Presumably the same applies to the West Antarctic Ice Sheet.
But what is the probability that a negative surface mass balance can, in fact, be sustained for millennia, particularly after considering the amount of fossil fuels that can be economically extracted and the likelihood that other energy sources will not displace fossil fuels in the interim? [Remember we are told that peak oil is nigh, that renewables are almost competitive with fossil fuels, and that wind, solar and biofuels will soon pay for themselves.]
Second, for an event to be classified as a catastrophe, it should occur relatively quickly precluding efforts by man or nature to adapt or otherwise deal with it. But if it occurs over millennia, as the IPCC says, or even centuries, that gives humanity ample time to adjust, albeit at a socioeconomic cost. But it need not be prohibitively dangerous to life, limb or property if: (1) the total amount of sea level rise (SLR) and, perhaps more importantly, the rate of SLR can be predicted with some confidence, as seems likely in the next few decades considering the resources being expended on such research; (2) the rate of SLR is slow relative to how fast populations can strengthen coastal defenses and/or relocate; and (3) there are no insurmountable barriers to migration.
This would be true even had the so-called “tipping point” already been passed and ultimate disintegration of the ice sheet was inevitable, so long as it takes millennia for the disintegration to be realized. In other words, the issue isn’t just whether the tipping point is reached, rather it is how long does it actually take to tip over. Take, for example, if a hand grenade is tossed into a crowded room. Whether this results in tragedy — and the magnitude of that tragedy — depends upon how much time it takes for the grenade to go off, the reaction time of the occupants, and their ability to respond.
Lowe, et al. (2006, p. 32-33), based on a “pessimistic, but plausible, scenario in which atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations were stabilised at four times pre-industrial levels,” estimated that a collapse of the Greenland Ice Sheet would over the next 1,000 years raise sea level by 2.3 meters (with a peak rate of 0.5 cm/yr). If one were to arbitrarily double that to account for potential melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, that means a SLR of ~5 meters in 1,000 years with a peak rate (assuming the peaks coincide) of 1 meter per century.
Such a rise would not be unprecedented. Sea level has risen 120 meters in the past 18,000 years — an average of 0.67 meters/century — and as much as 4 meters/century during meltwater pulse 1A episode 14,600 years ago (Weaver et al. 2003; subscription required). Neither humanity nor, from the perspective of millennial time scales (per the above quote from the IPCC), the rest of nature seem the worse for it. Coral reefs for example, evolved and their compositions changed over millennia as new reefs grew while older ones were submerged in deeper water (e.g., Cabioch et al. 2008). So while there have been ecological changes, it is unknown whether the changes were for better or worse. For a melting of the GIS (or WAIS) to qualify as a catastrophe, one has to show, rather than assume, that the ecological consequences would, in fact, be for the worse.
Human beings can certainly cope with sea level rise of such magnitudes if they have centuries or millennia to do so. In fact, if necessary they could probably get out of the way in a matter of decades, if not years.
Can a relocation of such a magnitude be accomplished?
Consider that the global population increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 6.8 billion this year. Among other things, this meant creating the infrastructure for an extra 4.3 billion people in the intervening 59 years (as well as improving the infrastructure for the 2.5 billion counted in the baseline, many of whom barely had any infrastructure whatsoever in 1950). These improvements occurred at a time when everyone was significantly poorer. (Global per capita income today is more than 3.5 times greater today than it was in 1950). Therefore, while relocation will be costly, in theory, tomorrow’s much wealthier world ought to be able to relocate billions of people to higher ground over the next few centuries, if need be. In fact, once a decision is made to relocate, the cost differential of relocating, say, 10 meters higher rather than a meter higher is probably marginal. It should also be noted that over millennia the world’s infrastructure will have to be renewed or replaced dozens of times – and the world will be better for it. [For example, the ancient city of Troy, once on the coast but now a few kilometers inland, was built and rebuilt at least 9 times in 3 millennia.]
Also, so long as we are concerned about potential geological catastrophes whose probability of occurrence and impacts have yet to be scientifically estimated, we should also consider equally low or higher probability events that might negate their impacts. Specifically, it is quite possible — in fact probable — that somewhere between now and 2100 or 2200, technologies will become available that will deal with climate change much more economically than currently available technologies for reducing GHG emissions. Such technologies may include ocean fertilization, carbon sequestration, geo-engineering options (e.g., deploying mirrors in space) or more efficient solar or photovoltaic technologies. Similarly, there is a finite, non-zero probability that new and improved adaptation technologies will become available that will substantially reduce the net adverse impacts of climate change.
The historical record shows that this has occurred over the past century for virtually every climate-sensitive sector that has been studied. For example, from 1900-1970, U.S. death rates due to various climate-sensitive water-related diseases — dysentery, typhoid, paratyphoid, other gastrointestinal disease, and malaria —declined by 99.6 to 100.0 percent. Similarly, poor agricultural productivity exacerbated by drought contributed to famines in India and China off and on through the 19th and 20th centuries killing millions of people, but such famines haven’t recurred since the 1970s despite any climate change and the fact that populations are several-fold higher today. And by the early 2000s, deaths and death rates due to extreme weather events had dropped worldwide by over 95% of their earlier 20th century peaks (Goklany 2006).
With respect to another global warming bogeyman — the shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (AKA the meridional overturning circulation), the basis for the deep freeze depicted in the movie, The Day After Tomorrow — the IPCC WG I SPM notes (p. 16), “Based on current model simulations, it is very likely that the meridional overturning circulation (MOC) of the Atlantic Ocean will slow down during the 21st century. The multi-model average reduction by 2100 is 25% (range from zero to about 50%) for SRES emission scenario A1B. Temperatures in the Atlantic region are projected to increase despite such changes due to the much larger warming associated with projected increases in greenhouse gases. It is very unlikely that the MOC will undergo a large abrupt transition during the 21st century. Longer-term changes in the MOC cannot be assessed with confidence.”
Not much has changed since then. A shut down of the MOC doesn’t look any more likely now than it did then. See here, here, and here (pp. 316-317).
If one wants to develop rational policies to address speculative catastrophic events that could conceivably occur over the next few centuries or millennia, as a start one should consider the universe of potential catastrophes and then develop criteria as to which should be addressed and which not. Rational analysis must necessarily be based on systematic analysis, and not on cherry picking one’s favorite catastrophes.
Just as one may speculate on global warming induced catastrophes, one may just as plausibly also speculate on catastrophes that may result absent global warming. Consider, for example, the possibility that absent global warming, the Little Ice Age might return. The consequences of another ice age, Little or not, could range from the severely negative to the positive (if that would buffer the negative consequences of warming). That such a recurrence is not unlikely is evident from the fact that the earth entered and, only a century and a half ago, retreated from a Little Ice Age, and that history may indeed repeat itself over centuries or millennia.
Yet another catastrophe that greenhouse gas controls may cause is that CO2 not only contributes to warming, it is also the key building block of life as we know it. All vegetation is created by the photosynthesis of CO2 in the atmosphere. In fact, according to the IPCC WG I report (2007, p. 106), net primary productivity of the global biosphere has increased in recent decades, partly due to greater warming, higher CO2 concentrations and nitrogen deposition. Thus , there is a finite probability that reducing CO2 emissions would, therefore, reduce the net primary productivity of the terrestrial biosphere with potentially severe negative consequences for the amount and diversity of wildlife that it could support, as well as agricultural and forest productivity with adverse knock on effects on hunger and health.
There is also a finite probability that costs of GHG reductions could reduce economic growth worldwide. Even if only industrialized countries sign up for emission reductions, the negative consequences could show up in developing countries because they derive a substantial share of their income from aid, trade, tourism, and remittances from the rest of the world. See, for example, Tol (2005), which examines this possibility, although the extent to which that study fully considered these factors (i.e., aid, trade, tourism, and remittances) is unclear.
Finally, one of the problems with the argument that society should address low probability high impact events (assuming a probability could be estimated rather than assumed or guessed) is that it necessarily means there is a high probability that resources expended on addressing such catastrophic events will have been squandered. This wouldn’t be a problem but for the fact that there are opportunity costs associated with this.
According to the 2007 IPCC Science Assessment’s Summary for Policy Makers (p. 10), “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.” In plain language, this means that the IPCC believes there is at least a 90% likelihood that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (AGHG) are responsible for 50-100% of the global warming since 1950. In other words, there is an up to 10% chance that anthropogenic GHGs are not responsible for most of that warming.
This means there is an up to 10% chance that resources expended in limiting climate change would have been squandered. Since any effort to significantly reduce climate change will cost trillions of dollars (see Nordhaus 2008, p. 82), that would be an unqualified disaster, particularly since those very resources could be devoted to reducing urgent problems humanity faces here and now (e.g., hunger, malaria, safer water and sanitation) — problems we know exist for sure unlike the bogeymen that we can’t be certain about.
Spending money on speculative, even if plausible, catastrophes instead of problems we know exist for sure is like a starving man giving up a fat juicy bird in hand while hoping that we’ll catch several other birds sometime in the next few centuries even though we know those birds don’t exist today and may never exist in the future.
If we burn all our fossil fuels, we might reach 550 – max 700 ppm atmospheric CO2, probably in the 550 – 600 ppm range, assuming that emitted CO2 is absorbed in current proportions (about 50% absorbed, 50% to the atmosphere.)
If your 50/50 number is correct it indicates a natural source of CO2. Because the ratio of atmospheric CO2 to ocean CO2 is 1 to 50.
Fusion? Here is one possibility:
We Will Know In Two Years
1. Temperatures were much higher about 7K years ago than they are now. Greenland’s ice didn’t “collapse”.
2. Sea levels were higher (about 2m higher) 7K to 5K years ago than they are now. It doesn’t appear that there was a great catastrophe.
3. The previous interglacial was warmer than this one. Study of sediment samples from the Arctic Ocean floor suggest that during the last interglacial the ocean was “ice free” in the summer. Greenland’s ice sheet didn’t “collapse”.
It seems that most of the “problems” with this study are based on assumptions rather than facts.
I read to about this point: “climate change would extend beyond 2100, and even if GDP is higher in 2100 with unfettered global warming than without, it’s not obvious that this GDP would continue to be higher ‘in the year 2200 or 2300 or 3758’.” and thought … gee, this guy should be able to tell me what the stock market will be on this date next year.
This climate catastrophe prophecy stuff is beyond cherry picking.
This is announcing the flavor of your one cherry after you’ve prepared the business plan for your cherry orchard and while starting to plant the orchard.
One could try to imagine some young diplomat tasked in 1909 to write up a policy paper concerning the relations of the US and the European powers for the 20th Century. I can just imagine how it would begin….”Concerning the relations with the House of Hapsburgs and its role as a broker of 20th Century peace…”
One big assumption about the 21st Century is global population growth. Yes, in the developed and undeveloped world people are generally living longer. But in Europe, North American, and much of Asia fertility rates have plummeted since 1970. In Russia, Japan, Greece, Spain, Italy, and China, fertility rates are the lowest of the lows (around 1.1 to 1.2 children per female). In the US, where the fertility rate hovers around 1.9 to 2.1, large numbers of immigrants are counted. In Africa, AIDS and civil war have decimated the populations. Even in Thailand, where in 1965 fertility rates were 4.6 children per female, the fertility rate in 2009 is around 1.7 per female. The IPCC perdicts the population at large will peak in 2050-2070 at around 9 billion. Thier predictions concerning industrial output is based on past economic growth rates and ever increasing populations. I don’t see either happening.
If things don’t change soon, in 2100 Europe’s population will be half of what it is now; ditto for Japan, Russia, and China. India still has decent fertility rates, but within its more educated technical class, it is no better than the US.
Most of the world’s wealth is contained in nations with anemic fertility rates, growing elderly populations, and large social insurance states. I cannot see how the rate of CO2 concentrations will rise to the even the lowest of the IPCC’s SPM predictions. You need people in order grow any economy -and a sizeable portion of that population better have young people.
If the Alarmists want to chase catastrophe’s they should be focus on the demographic time bomb set to go off, and leave thier Science Fiction to the Sci Fi Chane.
Chris Mooney, author of “Unscientific America, How scientific illiteracy threatens the future.”, was on the Ronn Owens show with Brian Copeland (KGO Radio AM810) in the second hour this morning. He mentioned global warming more that any other issue, so much so that he came off as a shill for the IPCC’s take on the matter. During the interview, the news on the half hour reported that the state of California issued a warning that its citizens need to prepare for rising sea levels and “hotter” temperatures.
It is ironic that a published writer drawing attention to scientific illiteracy is himself scientifically illiterate when it comes to climate change—an issue he was clearly promoting.
He will be at the Common Wealth Club in Santa Clara this evening at 7p.
The entire interview can be heard in the KGO audio archives (free at http://members.kgoradio.com/kgo_archives/archives.php) later today.
Don’t you just love the use of the word unfettered by those who favour regulation of just about everything?
Assy (08:36:27) :
I will also note that there is evidence that during a climatically stable period of the Last Interglacial, sea level suddenly rose by 2-3 m withing a few centuries (Blanchon et al, Nature 2009). It shows that we must consider the possibility of a catastrophic ice sheet collapse to be plausible.
Perhaps you might explain what caused this sudden rise of 2-3 meters, was it CO2.
There have been a few economic studies but this reponse by Indur Goklany is a gem. We have managed to “relocate” 4.3 billion people since 1950 and about 80 to 90% of our infrastructure has had to be built and rebuilt since then when income was less than 30% of what it is now. How’s that for planning!! This is the kind of stuff that needs to get air and print to a wide audience. “Don’t worry, we can relocate 10 billion of you and renew infrastructure a couple of times before 2100 and will be 5 times as wealthy while were at it! Hey, and the CO2 and warmer climate will ensure you all can eat.
Another great article. And on the issue noted by Steven Kopits of how much C02 can we even contribute to the atmosphere if we burned all available fossil fuels (First of all, I agree) but if man’s contribution is roughly 3% of the total, and the yearly increase runs roughly 50% of this, how does ANYONE prove our contribution made the difference? To do so, one must assume the concentration would be static without our contribution, or declining by 1/2 our contribution every year. If greater C02 feeds and therefore augments the biomass, the yearly uptake by the biomass increases as well. Freeman Dyson noted this very issue. I don’t think it’s even POSSIBLE to determine if man’s contribution is causing the rise in concentration. It is just being assumed.
Peter J. Dare (10:12:14) : Wrong!. It has been calculated that if properly managed, all the existing population would fit and prospere in an area equal to Texas. Whoever thinks so, must be consequent with his/her conviction and to do what is needed for their own disapperance from this world of the living, so making a contribution to humanity, an humanity, if they are right, will thankr them for ever.
Peter J. Dare (10:12:14) : …do not forget, if you apply those most corrected measures regarding climate, etc.,etc. chances are that we south americans will miss you ,believe me, after your charming self fulfilled prophesies.
“In a year or so the headlines might read, not enough food to go around, global cooling limiting food production.”
They’ll blame global warming
Brilliant –
The BBC are even as I type running a popular science programme which is pointing out that cows are producing more greenhouse gas than all the cars and trucks in the world.
Even more brilliantly they are saying we could solve the problem by eating bugs and scorpions etc.
Well it is a popular science programme. And they have admitted that hammering cars is far from the solution. Will this leech pout into the serious BBC media?
I take issue with the use of “plausible” here. In my experience plausible means “not unlikely” or “not extremely unlikely”-I think the word you are looking for is the situations described are “possible” meaning that they could hypothetically happen, but are exceedingly unlikely…
It is important to know that until today, NON of the alarmist predictions, that started in the sixties, have materialized.
Funny enough they first started to predict a new ice age and today runaway Anthropogenic Global Warming and dozens of related disasters that are suppose to scare the hell out of people.
The only objective alarmists have is to obtain some form of Global Governance and population control in order to reduce the number of inhabitants on our planet to a “sustainable” of 2 billion.
This is what Lord Christopher Monckton had to say about the subject:
Genocide Is Real Aim of Global Warming Swindle
June 7, 2009—British influential Lord Christopher Monckton said in a June 2 interview with 21st Century Science & Technology that the cabal’s intentions in promoting the global warming fraud, was never about the climate but was always about setting up world government.
Lord Monckton also reiterated his view that the motive for promotion of the triple frauds of global warming, biofuels, and the DDT scare, is the genocidal reduction of the world population, especially in Third World nations.
Lord Monckton has special authority in stating this. His grandfather played a key
role in arranging the 1936 abdication of that chief symbol of Britain’s Nazi-loving aristocracy, King Edward VIII, as part of the effort by anti-fascists to crush the Hitler project in Britain.
Monckton said that the global warming cabal will use the Copenhagen Climate Summit, scheduled for December 2009, to turn the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change into an enforcement body for world government. “They are not frankly particularly worried about whether they get a deal on who should cut
global emissions by how much,” Monckton said. “It is not, and never was, about that.” Monckton also restated his view that the global warming scare is the third
genocide being committed against the world’s population. He said people are already dying, all over the world, of starvation caused by the biofuels scam, which
came out the global warming scare. The other two genocides that Monckton speaks about are: (1) The banning of DDT which has so far caused the deaths of 40 million, and has left millions more, mostly children, still infected with malaria. (2) The failure to properly respond to the AIDS pandemic, by use of well-established public health measures, including universal testing, and isolation and treatment of the carriers. This intentional genocidal policy has led to 25 million deaths worldwide, and at least 40 million inflected. Monckton’s horrifying estimate of the number of persons infected with the HIV virus is only a published estimate by the World Health Organization. The extent of the HIV infection in the world population is not known since there is still to this day resistance to a policy of universal testing for the HIV virus in the general population.
In a presentation to the Third International Conference on Climate Change, hosted in Washington, D.C. by the Heartland Institute June 2, Monckton pointed out that the key to the victory over the cabal pushing world governance lies in the United States. Monckton said: “In the end, it will be here, in the United States, that the truth will first emerge. … Not in Europe, for we are no longer free. …
It is here, in this great nation founded upon liberty, that the battle for the world’s freedom will be won.”
End of article.
So what we are fighting against is nothing more but Green Fascism.
“One of Conor Clarke’s comments was that my analysis did not extend beyond the 21st century. He found this problematic because, as Conor put it, climate change would extend beyond 2100, and even if GDP is higher in 2100 with unfettered global warming than without, it’s not obvious that this GDP would continue to be higher “in the year 2200 or 2300 or 3758”.”
We are seriously into Mickey Mouse Land if THIS is what is called an ‘issue.’
We can’t even predict next month reliably. What is “problematic” is the total lack of any apprehension of reality.
Nogw: “If properly managed” has nothing to do with it. The existing world’s population can fit in Texas. How they live there comfortably is a little more complex, but from calculating the square footage per person it’s not hard to come up with a multilevel design for home, work, and transportation spaces.
But the point of the exercise is not a megalopolis design, it’s that we have resource distribution problems and not a population problem. Anyone can buy beans, wheat, or rice for worldwide delivery, if they can afford it and if they eat beans, wheat, or rice… and if the local authorities allow the delivery. And if the oceans rise, the delivery can be made to where the recipient moved to without needing the UN to figure out new delivery routes 200 years in advance.
OT. Pielke, Sr. has a guest post by Scafetta on mistakes in B&S09 that makes good reading.
http://climatesci.org/2009/08/03/nicola-scafetta-comments-on-solar-trends-and-global-warming-by-benestad-and-schmidt/
Another Congressman under fire from the public when he states Global Warming is real: http://thechillingeffect.org/2009/08/03/unhappy-voters-and-tim-bishops-global-warming-position/
M. Simon (10:26:57) wrote:
“I also note that your study did not extend to 9,000,000,000 AD when the sun is expected to be a burned out hulk.
There are some serious solar effects left out of your analysis.
I will bet serious money that I am the first one on this thread to even raise the question.”
How much do you want to bet? (Before you answer, see noaaprogrammer post at 9:30:53 – almost an hour previous to your post.)
Nogw(11:21:14), can you imagine the infrastructure problems and challenges, especially sewage? There would have to be quite a bit of vertical stacking in order to preserve some open space.
Assy (08:36:27) : “. . . there is evidence that during a climatically stable period of the Last Interglacial, sea level suddenly rose by 2-3 m withing a few centuries (Blanchon et al, Nature 2009). It shows that we must consider the possibility of a catastrophic ice sheet collapse to be plausible.”
1) I wouldn’t consider “a few centuries” that includes a 2-3 rise in sea level to be “climatically stable.” What does climatically stable mean, anyway?
2) When you say the last interglacial, do you mean the Eemian Interglacial (the previous one) or the Late Holocene Interglacial which, geologically speaking, is really the last?
3) 2-3 meter changes in sea level really are not “catastrophic” nor unusual when viewed in the greater history of climate.
4) The Eemian is somewhat irrelevant to the discussion. It had much higher sea levels and warmer temps that the present interglacial. Better to look closely at the present period and consider what has happened historically. The Fairbridge Curve appears to be the best reference for this (Fairbridge, R.W. Science 191 (4225) 353-359 1976). From roughly 2350 BC to 1900 BC the sea level apparently rose over 4.5 m. There you go—a “few centuries” in what many consider a relatively stable period with a greater pop than you mention. The most stable period of the present interglacial was between around 3500 BC to 2650 BC — nearly eight centuries with only around 0.65 meter in sea level flux (between 1.95 and 2.6 m higher than now). Interestingly, that “stable period” flux is about the same as the worst case scenario postulated by the IPCC which would still not get us to the average sea level during the period of human civilization!
5) Let’s go back “a few centuries” from the present, to depths of the Little Ice Age. The sea level has already risen about a meter since then. Hansen and cohorts believe it will rise another meter from here. SO WHAT! That’s all within the “normal” flux of climate as measured by sea level changes during an interglacial, including this one.
Perhaps we should understand the more recent phenomenon without looking all the way back to the Eemian. And, one could hope, we will all realize what normal or natural really means.
Retired Engineer – “…the Flying Spaghetti Monster will take a dump on D.C.”
LMAO!!!
If we fit the FSM with GPS can we guide it to Westminster to repeat the exercise?
IF THE SUN EXPLODES, New York City will be reduced to cinders, billions will die, the ice caps melt, and the oceans boil away! Since scientists all agree that the sun will explode, we must immediately enact a multi-trillion-dollar sunlight tax so the high priests of government can … er… make the sun… um, like, y’know…. NOT explode.
And so it came to pass, that the people of Twitland did revel in their virtuousness.