The Strait of Hormuz Crisis Shows the World Still Runs on Fossil Fuels

From Tilak’s Substack

Tilak Doshi

The Strait of Hormuz is barely 21 miles wide at its narrowest point. Yet this narrow maritime corridor carries one of the greatest concentrations of economic risk on the planet. When tensions flare in the Persian Gulf, the reverberations travel far beyond the Middle East. They are felt in Mumbai, Tokyo, Seoul, Bangkok and Manila — and ultimately across the entire global economy.

The reason is simple. Roughly one fifth of the world’s oil consumption and a similar share of global LNG trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the most critical energy marine chokepoint on Earth.

The consequences of that vulnerability are now playing out in real time. As conflict and disruption threaten shipping through the Gulf, Asian Governments are scrambling to conserve fuel, release strategic reserves and secure alternative supplies.

The spectacle is a striking reminder of an inconvenient truth. Despite decades of political rhetoric about an imminent ‘energy transition’ to ‘Net Zero by 2050’, the modern global economy remains heavily dependent on oil and gas. Much of that supply still flows through a single narrow passage between Iran and Oman.

Roughly 20 million barrels of oil pass through the strait every day, representing around one fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. About one third of global seaborne oil trade also transits this passage, making it the single most important oil chokepoint on the planet. Liquefied natural gas flows through it as well, with Qatar being the world’s second largest LNG exporter (after the US). Around 20% of global LNG trade, primarily from Qatar, must pass through Hormuz before reaching energy-hungry markets in Asia.

The Shock of February 28th

Within hours of the United States and Israel launching coordinated strikes against Iranian targets on February 28th, the repercussions rippled across the energy system. Tanker traffic through the Strait collapsed dramatically, falling by more than 90% in the immediate aftermath. The closure was not initially triggered by the threat of Iranian mines or missile batteries. Instead, the immediate cause was more prosaic: the withdrawal of marine insurance coverage for tanker traffic through the strait by major insurers such as Lloyd’s. Without insurance, tankers simply could not sail.

Iranian threats followed soon after, declaring that vessels linked to American or Israeli interests could be attacked at will. The spectre of escalation transformed a tense geopolitical situation into a full-blown energy crisis. ⁠ An Iranian military spokesman, Ebrahim Zolfaqari, ‌declared that:

We won’t allow even one litre of oil to reach the ‌US, Zionists and their partners. Any vessel or ‌tanker bound to them ⁠will be a legitimate target. … Get ready for the oil barrel to ‌be at $200 because the oil price ⁠depends on ⁠the regional security which you have destabilised.

According to early assessments from the International Energy Agency, the disruption represents “one of the largest sudden interruptions of oil and gas flows in modern history”. The Economist sub-titled its main story in its March 14th edition: “Whatever happens in the Strait of Hormuz, energy markets have been changed for ever.” Oil markets reacted instantly. Brent crude surged above $100 per barrel within days of the attacks. Analysts began warning that if the strait remained closed even for a few weeks, prices could reach $150 per barrel or even higher — levels historically associated with global recessions.

Gordon Hughes, formerly Professor of Political Economy at the University of Edinburgh, regrets that the outbreak of oil price hysteria in the mainstream mass media as reporters with little historical perspective “hyperventilate” when the spot price of Brent crude oil has reached or exceeded $100 per barrel. In his masterful unpacking of historical Brent crude oil prices, Dr Hughes observes that in constant 2025 dollars, the monthly average price exceeded $100 at 2025 prices at least once in every year from 2005 to 2014 as well as in 2018 and 2022. Indeed, the average monthly price over the whole period from 2005 to 2025 was $101 at 2025 prices.

To understand the scale of the crisis, one must examine the geography of energy trade. The Persian Gulf contains some of the world’s largest and cheapest oil and gas reserves. Meanwhile, the fastest-growing consumers of energy lie “east of Suez”, extending from the Arabian Sea through the Indian Ocean into the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The result is a vast hydrocarbon artery linking the Gulf to Asia’s industrial heartlands.

The table below shows the extent of Asia’s heavy dependence on oil and gas imports delivered via the Strait of Hormuz.

The International Energy Agency estimates that roughly 90% of oil exported through the Strait of Hormuz is destined for Asian markets. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China and India all depend heavily on Gulf energy. Japan alone sources about 90% of its crude oil imports from the Middle East, leaving it acutely exposed to disruptions in the region. South Korea’s 70% dependence is nearly as striking. China and India, Asia’s largest energy consumers, while somewhat more diversified than other key Asian economies, also rely heavily on Gulf producers for its oil and gas imports. In short, the prosperity of Asia’s industrial economies remains tethered to energy flows through Hormuz.

The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has abruptly thrust two alternative crude oil pipelines into the global spotlight, one in Saudi Arabia and another in the United Arab Emirates. The first is Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline network with a design capacity of seven million barrels per day connecting Abqaiq on the kingdom’s eastern Gulf coast to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. The second smaller pipeline is the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah estimated to handle 1.5 million barrels per day. Taken together, energy analysts said the two pipelines could help to partially offset the nearly 20 million barrels per day that typically transit through the Strait of Hormuz. But the risk of infrastructure attacks by Iran amid the sprawling Middle East crisis remains an ongoing challenge.

Energy crises reveal priorities with brutal clarity. When prices spike or supplies tighten, governments do not turn to wind turbines or solar panels for emergency relief. They turn to stockpiled hydrocarbons. Across Asia, governments have already begun implementing conservation measures designed to reduce energy demand.

Thailand, for instance, recently instructed civil servants to work from home where possible, restrict travel and set air-conditioning temperatures no lower than 26–27°C in government buildings as part of an emergency energy-saving campaign.

Indonesia has sought to increase crude purchases from the United States to offset potential supply disruptions from the Middle East. Bangladesh, heavily reliant on LNG imports from Qatar, has scrambled to secure additional cargoes amid rising prices. Sri Lanka introduced fuel rationing on Sunday to extend the life of its supplies. The country also instituted a four-day working week and a work-from-home mandate to conserve dwindling oil and gas reserves amid supply disruptions caused by the US-Israeli war on Iran.

Such responses underscore a simple but politically inconvenient truth: hydrocarbons remain the backbone of modern energy systems. When crisis strikes, governments do not rely on intermittent renewable power. They rely on oil and gas.

The fertiliser and plastics supply crisis

The importance of the Strait of Hormuz extends beyond oil and gas. The Fertiliser Institute estimates that exporters exposed directly or indirectly to the conflict account for 49% of global urea exports, 30% of global ammonia exports and half of global sulphur trade. As one sharp analyst notes: “That combination makes Hormuz not merely an energy chokepoint, but one of the most concentrated nutrient chokepoints in the global food system.”

The Persian Gulf is a major exporter of nitrogen-based fertilisers and chemical feedstocks essential for global agriculture and pharmaceuticals. Urea, ammonia and sulphur products produced in the Gulf underpin food production across Asia and beyond. According to UNCTAD estimates, roughly one-third of global seaborne fertiliser trade passes through the Strait. The reason is simple. Fertiliser production depends heavily on natural gas, and the Gulf possesses abundant gas supplies.

The Middle East accounts for about 24% of global sulphur production, and sulphur is the feedstock for sulphuric acid used across the nickel, copper and fertiliser supply chains. Sulphuric acid is a key input in manufacturing phosphate fertilisers used worldwide. China, facing shortages in its own phosphate production announced export bans through August, has suspended phosphate fertiliser exports until at least August 2026 to prioritise domestic supply and ensure food security. This ban is expected to tighten global supply and increase fertiliser prices worldwide.

In response to the Hormuz blockade, Asia’s key world-class petrochemical plants announced force majeures in early March. These included Chandra Asri (Indonesia), Yeochun NCC (China) and PCS (Singapore). Due to disruptions in feedstock supply to Asia, CNOOC-Shell Huizhou is planning to shutdown its large 1.2-million-tonne facility. The impacts of these force majeure declarations and planned shutdowns will extend to the plastics industry and beyond. They cascade into pharmaceuticals because the feedstocks are identical.

Energy security, plastics, pharmaceuticals and agricultural resilience, in other words, are inseparable. A prolonged disruption of Gulf shipping will therefore ripple through energy markets, the global food system, food packaging and pharmaceuticals. Analyst Shanaka Anslem Perera lists the separate “domino” effects of the Hormuz blockade on the consumer: “Each domino hits the consumer from a different direction. Energy raises transport costs. Fertiliser raising farm costs. Packaging raises the cost of getting the food from the farm to the shelf.”

In response to the crisis, the International Energy Agency has coordinated a release of strategic petroleum reserves. IEA’s 32 member nations collectively agreed to release 400 million barrels of oil to stabilise markets. That’s one-third of the grouping’s total holding of 1.2 billion barrels of government reserves.

Previously, IEA member nations have released oil from emergency reserves five times: during the 1990-1991 Gulf War; after Hurricane Katrina in 2005; during the Libyan civil war in 2011; and twice after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Yet the practical impact of such releases may prove limited.

Strategic reserves cannot instantly replace a supply shock on the scale of Hormuz, estimated at 20 million barrels per day including roughly over four million barrels per day of refined products. The IEA has not yet provided a precise timeline for releasing the oil. Even under favourable conditions, the rate at which oil can be released into the market is constrained by logistical factors such as pipeline capacity and refinery processing. Coordinated IEA releases are usually spread over weeks or months, meaning only a portion of the 400 million planned barrels will be released in the short term.

Trump’s strategic dilemma

President Donald Trump said on Sunday his administration is talking to seven countries about helping to secure the Strait of Hormuz amid the war on Iran, calling on them to help protect ships in the vital waterway that Tehran has largely blocked to oil tanker traffic. Trump argued that nations relying heavily on oil from the Gulf have a responsibility to protect the strait. He said in a social media post that he hoped France, Japan, South Korea, Britain and others would participate. Curiously, President Trump included China in his call for help in policing the Strait of Hormuz. China has not responded to the ‘invitation’.

The crisis now places the United States in a strategic bind as these countries have rejected President Trump’s invitation to intervene in the Strait of Hormuz. The UK, Australia and Japan were cautious and made clear that they had no intention of sending warships to the region.

President Trump had once campaigned vigorously against what he called “forever wars” in the Middle East. Yet the decision to participate in strikes against Iran alongside Israel has arguably drawn Washington into precisely the kind of regional confrontation he once vowed to avoid. The domestic political risks are substantial. Within Trump’s own MAGA base, tensions are already emerging between factions prioritising an ‘America First’ isolationist foreign policy and those advocating an uncompromising determination to declaw the Iranian menace.

Meanwhile, global markets are delivering their own verdict. Rising oil prices threaten to push gasoline costs sharply higher in the United States — an outcome that could prove politically devastating ahead of mid-term elections. Washington therefore faces a delicate question: how to restore maritime security in the Gulf without becoming trapped in a long dispute over the strait.

Could Washington declare its objectives achieved and step back from further escalation? Would Iran moderate its threat to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for sanctions relief and security guarantees? The Strait of Hormuz offers a stark reminder of a principle that policymakers frequently ignore. Energy systems are governed not by political aspirations but by geography, physics and economics. For years, zealous advocates of the energy transition such as the IEA have predicted that oil demand will soon collapse as electric vehicles proliferate and renewable power expands.

Yet the strategic importance of Hormuz suggests otherwise. Oil continues to dominate aviation, shipping, petrochemicals and fertiliser production. Natural gas remains indispensable for electricity generation and industrial processes in the pharmaceuticals and petrochemicals sectors. Wind turbines and solar panels, which generate intermittent electricity, cannot easily replace hydrocarbons across the full spectrum of economic activity.

The world still runs on fossil fuels. Despite the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on renewable subsidies, Bjorn Lomborg reminds us that fossil fuels supply 81.1% of global energy today (as of 2023), only marginally down from 81.4% in 2000. Fossil fuels are not on track to end by 2050 but rather in between four and ten centuries if we extrapolate recent trends.

The result is a persistent reality: the modern global economy still depends on the stability of a narrow maritime corridor in the Persian Gulf.

The crisis unfolding in the Strait of Hormuz offers a sobering lesson for energy policymakers. Energy transitions unfold slowly. They require vast infrastructure investments and technological breakthroughs that cannot occur overnight. The global energy system has been built over more than a century. Replacing hydrocarbons entirely would require transformations on a scale rarely acknowledged in political debate.

The world will remain vulnerable to disruptions in oil and gas supply. And few places embody that vulnerability more clearly than the Strait of Hormuz. A sliver of water in the Persian Gulf still holds the power to shake the global economy. For all the confident rhetoric about a post-carbon future, the events now unfolding there remind us of a stubborn truth: the age of hydrocarbons is far from over.

This article was first published in the Daily Sceptic (https://dailysceptic.org/2026/03/20/the-strait-of-hormuz-crisis-shows-the-world-still-runs-on-fossil-fuels/)

Dr Tilak K. Doshi is the Daily Sceptic‘s Energy Editor. He is an economist, a member of the CO₂ Coalition and a former contributor to Forbes. Follow him on Substack and X.

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