Wake Up Australia, we are becoming Green and Defenceless

American and Australian forces stopped the sea landings at “Milne Bay” American national guard toops (32div) and Australian “Desert Rats” threw them back across the Owen Stanley Mountains taking Buna
Also US Naval forces stopped earlier Japanese sea invasions in the battle of the Coral Sea. resulting in the loss of the USS Lexington and heavy damage to the USS Yorktown. Japan lost a light carrier and damage to two main line carriers. It was a long and bitter war.
michael

The Japanese withdrew because they needed the troops elsewhere. IMHO, they didn’t have sufficient troops or supplies to take Port Moresby anyway.
They say war is hell. The Kokoda Track Campaign must have been the inner circle of hell. At one point all the troops facing the Japanese were running a fever. In the mean time there were fat assed politicians as well as General MacArthur accusing the troops and their officers of being unwilling to fight. It makes my blood boil.

Lewis in the first months of the war the japanese shoot everthing out of the air; P-40s, P39s, Brewster Buffalos, and Hurricanes. (one squadron in Singapore) And yes the Merlin made the P51. But it was the P38s, Wildcats, Hellcats and Corsair changed the tide.

True, that the battles and US successes on Guadalcanal affected the eventual outcomes on the Kokoda Track.
But more needs to be said about the magnificent fighting retreat of the Australian forces across the Owen Stanley ranges, because these poor b’s were truly hard done by the self serving senior command of the time – first and foremost being TBM (That B**tard MacArthur). (It was actually more a series of set piece battles as the Australian troops fell back to the next defensive positions. Note the following account says nothing about the severe terrain or the fact no prisoners were taken). Sorry it is long, but needs to be stated.
Japanese troops landed on landed on the north east coast of Papua on 21 July 1942. The first defensive battle (an earlier ambush had killed 15 Japanese troops) was by a force of 77 men of the Papuan Infantry Battalion and the Australian 39th Div who were defending Kokoda village and airfield and they were attacked on 29th July 1942 by a force of 500 to 1000 Japanese infantry and marines. The first frontal attacks came at 3 in the afternoon, by 5.00 PM Japanese troops had scouted to the rear of the defenders through the jungle, and at 2.00 AM their positions were overun. Several men including two senior officers were lost on the track and killed at the site, and the remaining defenders slipped away though the jungle to retreat to Deniki. (This was the start of fighting in the mountains). The Lewis and Bren guns of the defenders had resulted in severe Japanese casualties, and later captured documents showed the Japanese troops had reported that they had overrun a position of an estimated 1,200 defenders. However, Major Allan Cameron (at HQ) stated that the retreat indicated a ‘lack of fighting spirit’ and later sent the company (B Company) primarily involved in the engagement back in to attempt to retake the position. (This was to set the pattern of underestimating what had actually been achieved, and of starting a merry go round of replacing good experienced officers with newer officers newly tasked with instructions to ‘get the job done’.)
On 9th August, 3 companies (ie, 430 men of A, B and C company of the 39th Battalion) were sent from different directions (paths and jungle tracks) to retake the position, at that stage held by 1000 Japanese troops. C company was ambushed on the track and pinned down for an entire day before withdrawing at nightfall. B company encountered a Japanese force (actually advancing to take Deniki) on their track and fought a two day fighting retreat. A company, approaching from a different direction managed to take and hold the lightly defended village of Kokoda, setting up a defensive position on a ridge near the airstrip, hoping to get reinforcement and supplies by air, but this never eventuated due to communication problems. Initially the Japanese had only sent one company to confront this force, underestimating its size. The first assaults started in the morning, and after nightfall Japanese soldiers started to infiltrate the Australian positions and there was close quarters fighting throughout the night. However after the retreat of the other two companies, the full force of the Japanese then focused on the village defenders (about 100 men). By 5 PM of the next day the defenders were out of food, and very low on ammunition, and so made a fighting retreat into the jungle to the west. They carried their wounded via several neighbouring tracks and villages, eventually rejoining Australian forces at Isuvara, 5 days after this attack had started. They lost 23 killed with 17 wounded.
This second Kokoda engagement had a strategic consequences out of proportion to the size of the forces engaged. The bold attack on Kokoda came as a surprise to Japanese commanders in Rabaul who reasoned that if the Australians were bold enough to retake Kokoda, even if only briefly, then they must have a large force in the area. This prompted the Japanese to consider postponing the attack on Port Moresby until more troops and supplies arrived, and until Milne Bay was taken. This was reinforced by news of the US landing at Guadalcanal, on 7 August. On 16 August a decision to postpone the attempt to take Port Moresby was made. Senior Japanese officers interviewed after the war thought that the factor most influencing the postponement was not Guadalcanal but rather ‘stronger than anticipated Australian resistance at Kokoda.’
The Australians fought a brief “resist then retreat” actions at Deniki losing 6 dead and 4 wounded.
On 26th of August General Horii moved 2,500 troops forward against the 39th Battalion and elements of the 49th and 53rd Battalions dug in at Isurava (1200 men in total) and with the aid of mortar and mountain gun support almost succeeded in breaking through. The Australians brought up another battalion (800 men) and re-established their original positions. (The method being short sharp counter attacks, quick dashes forward by men using automatic weapons, Brens and some Thompson guns, covered by heavier machine guns). Losses were high. General Horii realized the defenders had been reinforced so committed his own reserves, bringing his attacking force up to 6,500 men. By the 28th of August the Japanese were repeatedly attacking frontally and on both flanks. By 29 August they had moved men into positions in ridges either side of the defenders, pouring machine gun and mortar fire down in support of each attack.
As their perimeter shrank again on 29 August, and Japanese companies began to close in on the flanks, the defenders retreated. The heavily mauled Japanese did not immediately pursue them. Both sides were by now suffering severely from dysentery and malaria. Over the period from 25 August to 31 August the Australians lost 99 killed and 111 wounded.
The Australians left a group to defend then retreat from Eora and Templeton’s crossing, with an Australian loss of 21 killed and 54 wounded. Japanese losses there were about double the Australian losses.
The Australians dug in 1495 men for a determined defense at Efogi. (Better known in Australia as the battle of Mission Ridge-Brigade Hil) This was a good defensive position, and good visibility of open areas allowed US air support to cause casualties among the advancing Japanese forces. But the Australians were subject to accurate artillery fire, and unfortunately the Australian commander had positioned his men in three groups one behind the other with gaps between positions. The total Japanese force taking part in the entire assault on this position was only 1570 men, but Japanese flanking moves were somewhat lucky and moved a battalion onto a ridge in precisely between two of the Australian positions. Fierce Australian counter attacks failed to dislodge them, and half of all Australian casualties at Efogi occurred in those engagements.
The simple summary of “the Australians counter attacked but could not break through” does not do the men of either side justice here. It is worth reading the words of Kokichi Nishimura (Book, The Bone Man of Kokoda) on the Australian counter -attacks at Efogi. Nishimura’s platoon had climbed all night to establish positions on the ridge and dug shallow defensive scrapes just off the ridge line in the jungle. “The Australians counter attacked at 7.00 AM, at 10.30 AM, at 3.00 PM and at 4.30 PM. The bullets came like rain and we often could not see the men until they were 10 meters away”*. Fighting was at extremely close quarters, with Nishimura wounded through the upper chest in the final counter attack by two bullets from a submachine gun which had glanced off his helmet at point blank range. He killed the man who had shot him, but was almost completely incapacitated himself. By dawn, the Australians had slipped away into the jungle and he gathered together the survivors of his 25 man platoon. There were only two others besides him, both severely wounded. Both later died, while Nishimura recovered and went on to serve (and survive) in Burma (an even greater nightmare).
Australian casualties at Efogi were in total 87 dead and 77 wounded but as the Australians disengaged through the jungle some 500 troops were not to get back to their own lines for several weeks. The Japanese lost 60 dead and 165 wounded.
The Australians (with yet another commander at the helm as they were all replaced at each perceived failure) next dug in at Ioribaiwa, and the Japanese by now could only muster 1650 fighting men. (Horii had by now landed 10,000 men, and had initially sent 6500 forward over the mountains.) The Australians had a numerical advantage here, but were subject to intense bombardment by 8 artillery pieces, causing 50% of their casualties. Japanese flanking moves ran into extended Australian defences, and a fighting stalemate ensued. Unfortunately the new Australian commander blinked first, perhaps mainly because of the artillery fire and not knowing of his significant numerical advantage, and so pulled his force back to Imita Ridge.
All of these actions were initially seen and portrayed by high command, especially McArthur, as defeats. In fact they were all extremely well fought engagements and extremely sapping on Japanese strength and morale, and Ioribaiwa was to be as far as the Japanese were to advance. The losses in Guadalcanal, and the naval actions which cut off supplies and reinforcements came into play at this point and when the Australians later regrouped and moved to retake Ioribaiwa, they found the Japanese gone, now in retreat to Gona and Buna on the north coast.
The later battles of Buna and Gona in November/December of that year were terribly mismanaged by MacArthur and similarly absent Australian commanders, as they sent inadequate forces into action with no artillery or heavy weapons to retake what were supposed to be lightly manned makeshift defences. In fact it was primarily a swamp and the Japanese had built hundreds of earth covered log reinforced bunkers with overlapping fields of fire on any raised ground, all equipped with machine guns. Instead of the 1,500 defenders there were 6,500. The bunkers were overgrown by jungle and virtually invisible until they opened fire. Many of the brave men who had fought the fighting retreat over the horrific Kokoda trail were subsequently lost here. Many US troops (some who had clawed their way across mountain trails even worse than Kokoda (terrain wise, but no Japanese defenders) saw their first action under these terrible conditions, and died under the command of another merry go round of command replacements as the Japanese positions held out. Eventually Bren gun carriers then light tanks were landed to take the positions, but these too suffered terribly, restricted as they were to narrow log tracks in the swamps; tracks covered well by Japanese antitank guns.
There is much that could be said about the fighting at Buna/Gona but this quote perhaps sums it up:
“After we took the position I was amazed to see the bodies of our dead were covered in a fine green powder. I was looking in wonder and could not work out what it was, then I realized it was finely shredded leaves from the machine gun fire.” *
Books:
“The Bone Man of Kokoda”. Kokichi Nishimura
“A Bastard of a Place” Peter Brune
“The Ghost Mountain Boys” James Campbell
And: http://kokoda.commemoration.gov.au/into-the-mountains/
* (Quotes and times not exact: Have not got the books in front of me right now).