Climate Craziness of the Week – UN: Climate change to affect computers, communications, prepare now

“The real risk being the very real possibility of another Carrington event, which, when it occurs, will destroy much of the world’s electronic infrastructure in just a few seconds.”
To paraphrase Al Borland: “I don’t think so Tim.” It would seem the author of that line is not up to speed on present practice and training by the power/energy generation and transmission folk, and therefore is speaking beyond his competency.
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“I can’t help feeling though, that the UN is missing the real risk to global IT and communications infrastructure, by focusing attention on the climate non-issue. The real risk being the very real possibility of another Carrington event, which, when it occurs, will destroy much of the world’s electronic infrastructure in just a few seconds.”
Perhaps a lot of the proposed measures about resiliance a really aimed at that. But so as not to miss an oppertunity to spin AGW again they dress it up “climate disruption”.

re: James Strom says April 29, 2014 at 5:34 am
Addressing EMP (and ‘Carrington’ class events as well) Mario Rabinowitz of Electric Power Research Institute has this to say: http://arxiv.org/ftp/physics/papers/0307/0307127.pdf
A couple more places for further info:
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/02/18/largest-space-weather-storm-in-at-least-four-years/#comment-602214
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/02/18/largest-space-weather-storm-in-at-least-four-years/#comment-602234

re: Eric Worrall says April 29, 2014 at 5:40 am
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“My understanding is a Carrington event scale solar storm is similar to the effect of a high altitude nuclear explosion, but on a global scale.”
From: http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/02/18/largest-space-weather-storm-in-at-least-four-years/#comment-602324
This report from STANLEY J. JAKUBIAK, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE COMMAND CENTER’S DIVISION, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF regarding experience with COTS (Commercial, off the shelf) equipment (equipment not designed to be hardened to EMP) and its survivability to EMP, and by extension ‘Carrington’ class events, from testimony here: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has280010.000/has280010_0.HTM

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the committee on the electromagnetic pulse threat environment and to discuss the impact on commercial off-the-shelf or so-called COTS equipment used in military command and control systems.
As you know, the detonation of a nuclear weapon between 50 and several hundred kilometers above the Earth’s surface will produce an electromagnetic pulse that can, under certain conditions, damage electronic equipment. We don’t know exactly how much damage can be done to commercial equipment. The phenomenon is well-known, but the variances in electronic equipment design, commercial design, and the systems that they are incorporated in, do not provide us with sufficient information to allow us to accurately predict how widespread the damage or disruption will be.
Now, to counter the EMP attack, the military has in the past taken a simplistic approach. We have basically said and assumed that all commercial equipment would fail under an EMP pulse, and therefore we have designed protection into that equipment to withstand the EMP protection or the EMP environment.
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Now, the temporary upset reflected on this view graph [view graph not available] indicates that the upset was self-correcting. The equipment, in fact, had an upset, and the equipment self-corrected without any operator intervention. The upset column shows that the equipment, in fact, required an operator to do something to the equipment to bring it back into operation. And then the damage levels are shown on this chart also.
The Office of the National Communications System (NCS) has also done some extensive testing of the commercial public switch network [telephone network] and have found that the public switch network infrastructure is inherently resistant to the effects of EMP. Their studies have shown that the probability of connection of a telephone call under an EMP environment is greater than 90 percent with normal loading, and greater than 70 percent when there is panic loading on that system.
The NCS results have also been confirmed by AT&T Bell Laboratories, who reported that their testing of the public switch network also showed that some upset could be expected, but that damage to the system in an EMP environment was not a concern. …

re: Eric Worrall says April 29, 2014 at 5:40 am
… According to Wikipedia, a 300Kt high altitude Soviet nuclear test fused 570km of overhead telephone line, with a measured amperage of 2500 amps, started a fire that burned down the Karaganda power plant, and shut down 1,000-km of shallow-buried power cables between Aqmola and Almaty.
One telephone line that ‘fused’ at 2500A (at that rate it might should have simply vaporized) and the detonation also caused a power plant to burn down? Other factors may have been at play, I would venture to say (I would need to see a serious white paper on this to lend it much credence.)
I think we have a little better ‘handle’ of what happens with EMP when Starfish Prime was lit off and it was claimed that some infrastructure was affected in Hawaii … unfortunately, little was actually documented on what was actually affected, leaving me to think the accounts were anecdotal and no serious investigations launched at the time as little actual damage occurred. There was some investigation of a street light outage in Hawaii, as detailed below, however.
It should be noted that the effect was purported to be on a series-string street of lamps which used dated (’30s) techniques to minimize the lay-out of wire and fed the design therefore required the use of a specialized constant-current transformers and each light had an individual over-voltage (burned-out bulb bypass) ‘shorting’ discs that bypass an open filament (much like a series-string Christmas tree light set) so as to keep current flowing through the entire set.
Did High Altitude EMP Cause the Hawaiian Streetlight Incident?
http://www.ece.unm.edu/summa/notes/SDAN/0031.pdf
(The above link was slow to respond a few minutes ago; maybe check back a little later after IT has rectified any website issues …)
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