Christopher Booker, The Sunday Telegraph
When, amid all the millions of words uttered about Grenfell, are we finally going to focus on the real cause of that fire? A comment on my column last week said that “only Booker could get a link between Grenfell, the EU and global warming into a single article”. But that is precisely the point. Without those two factors, the fire could never have happened.
As I had written, all this talk about “cladding” has been looking in wholly the wrong direction. The cause of the conflagration was less to do with the “rainscreen” cladding: it was the combination of 6in of combustible Celotex insulation foam behind it with a void creating a “chimney” effect, sending the flames roaring up the building.
In 1989, after a fire in an 11-storey block in Knowsley, the Building Research Establishment was asked to devise a means that could have prevented it.
It found that this should be a new “whole system test” covering all the materials used on the outside of buildings to see how they interacted when installed together.
But in 1994 the European Commission called for a new EU-wide fire test which was exactly what the BRE had found so inadequate with existing practice: a “single burn” test applied only to each material separately.
But after 2000, when a Commons committee investigated a high-rise fire in Scotland, MPs recommended that the BRE’s “whole system test” should be adopted as the British standard, BS8414.
By 2002, however, the EU had adopted its inadequate test, incorporating it in a European standard using EN 13501. Under EU law, this became mandatory, leaving the UK’s BS 8414 as only a voluntary option.
The EU had also become obsessed with the need for better insulation of buildings to combat global warming, which became its only priority. All that mattered was the “thermal efficiency” of materials used for insulation, for which none was to prove better than the polyisocyanurate used in Celotex, the plastic chosen in 2014 for Grenfell.
Fire experts across Europe have pointed out that the lack of a proper whole system test was ignoring the risk of insulation fires, not least in Germany, where there have been more than 100.
Strangely, the maker of Celotex has stated on its website that the material used in Grenfell has been tested by the BRE as meeting fire safety requirements. But the BRE has tartly responded that this test referred to a different installation; and that “Celotex should not be claiming that their insulation product can be used generically in any other cladding system”.
Had the Grenfell installation been properly tested under BS 8414 it would not have met the standard, and thus the fire could not have happened. The ultimate irony is that China and Dubai are now adopting mandatory systems based on BS 8414. They can do this because they are not in the EU. But, because Britain is still in the EU, it cannot legally enforce the very standard which would have prevented that disaster.
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The purpose of the 50mm gap between the insulation and the concrete wall is?
I can easily see that a sealed air gap is good, but this air gap is open to the elements, chimney effect etc.
Any views?
Yes, the air gap would require sealing to prevent convective cooling from the walls. It did provide the air needed for combustion at the inner face of the panel.
So why an air gap? Reduced thermal efficiency and exposure of the insulation face makes no sense if planning an installation.
Drainage of rain penetration, in this case via seams and abutments. That is what traditional cavities (particularly in brickwork) are for. Not for stuffing full of insulation that soaks up moisture giving massive heat loss later due to evaporation. Mind the gap!
Is the goal of “Climate Change” to reduce the human population? If so, the cladding and the regulations did their job.
We know the real reason: they saved 2 Pounds per mxm on non-flammable insulation. End of story.
Matt
They ‘saved’ some £350,000 per building, of which the council has many, in selecting cladding which appears to have been legal and appropriate according to current building regulations.
Whether it WAS both of these things and whether the installation was correct we will have to wait until the enquiry has finished
tonyb
I made the point even prior to Booker’s article that the only way to be certain when testing multiple materials was to test them in every conceivable combination. I was, admittedly, thinking more in terms of chemical reactions or the potential for one inflammable material to reach a temperature where it could cause a reaction — physical or chemical — with another which in 90% of situations would be considered inert.
What beggars belief is that the UK government apparently made no effort to influence the EU decision on materials testing even though it had carried out its own tests and considered the EU ones to be inadequate. And since it appears that Germany’s building regulations are stricter than EN13501 there seems no reason for the UK not to interpret the Regulation to suit UK circumstances.
The worst the EU could have done would have been to bring a case against the UK which would almoat certainly ended up in the ECJ and, whatever Brexit supporters may think of that body, there is a reasonable chance that, given all the relevant data, it would in this case have sided with the UK, especially if the German standards are indeed stricter than EN13501!
Where I disagree with Forrest Gardener is in his collection of “but fors”. The initial fire was extinguished as rapidly as possible and the firemen were confident that it had been contained. “But for” the material used in the cladding it would have been, and we will need to await the outcome of the Inquiry to discover whether the spread was such that no sprinkler system and no fire door would have been adequate to prevent that spread which is possible but does not absolve the building’s owner from some culpability in not ensuring that such safety features were in place.
But the guilty party was the cladding and the material involved was used precisely because the “absolute priority” was insulation as an energy saving measure to reduce CO2 emissions and combat global warming. Any other consideration was secondary.
the EU won’t. any country is free to use higher and better standards, that’s what the author of the article (conveniently?) omitted.
any country is allowed to do better then the european standards, they just may not go below them.
The tougher German standard (and indeed the tougher British standard) cannot be made compulsory without breaching EU law (at least until Brexit!). Making them compulsory would effectively exclude certain products from sale which the EU had effectively permitted. That goes against the Single Market rules.
In fact, the British regulations are written in a massive tangle of legalese. I think that the civil servants did it that way so they could honour the EU rules, while leaving the politicians with the impression that the rules were somewhat tougher than they really are.
You are correct about the prime motivation. From the planning application:
Social housing: The quick fix
Responsibility for meeting the government’s CO2-emissions targets was invested in the Community Energy Savings Programme (CESP). CESP, which lasted from 2009 until 2012, was run by the big energy providers, British Gas, E.On, Scottish Power and others. Its success was limited but, tellingly, its final report states that ‘almost all CESP measures were delivered through partnerships with social-housing providers’.
In May 2012, the government’s committee on climate change (CCC) published its ‘advice on how local authorities can reduce emissions and control climate risk’ under the 2010 Climate Change Act. The CCC identified social housing as one of the key areas where CO2 emissions could be reduced by improved energy efficiency from greater insulation. The problem, as the CCC put it, was that ‘the very slow turnover of stock’ makes ‘[housing] relatively energy inefficient’. The CCC’s solution was to reduce emissions in existing housing stock through insulation and new boilers. As the CCC explained, ‘local authorities and housing associations have been the key partners, driven largely by their role as social landlords’.
Professor Julia King, a member of the CCC, said in May of 2012 that ‘local authorities have the potential to impact significantly on the UK’s scale and speed of emissions reduction’. At the top of King’s list for action were ‘energy-efficiency measures for existing buildings’ – insulation, such as cladding, and new boilers. While local authorities struggled to get funding for other things, austerity did not apply to the CO2-reduction scheme. Indeed, a 2010 National Audit Office report identifies 20 estate refurbishments with funding of £1.5 billion from the Department of Communities and Local Government under ‘private finance initiative’ schemes.
http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/grenfell-clad-in-climate-change-politics/20003#.WWSaKIgrL4Z
Left wing pro AGW media did its best to report that the cladding was only fitted to improve the looks of the buildings…
According to planning documents for the tower block, which were seen in the wake of the devastating blaze, the cladding was partly designed to improve the building’s appearance for wealthier neighbours.
Read more: http://metro.co.uk/2017/06/14/cladding-added-to-grenfell-tower-to-improve-view-for-nearby-luxury-flats-6709369/#ixzz4mVviQhVC
http://metro.co.uk/2017/06/14/cladding-added-to-grenfell-tower-to-improve-view-for-nearby-luxury-flats-6709369/
So it’s really the fault of those who had to look at the building.
A paint job would have done just as well. no need for fancy cladding.
True, but paint wouldn’t leave as much room for baksheesh.
Originally done by Richard North at EUReferendum on the 04th July 2017: http://www.eureferendum.com/blogview.aspx?blogno=86528
The drawing shows the 50mm cavity is between the outer panel and the insulation, whilst the insulation is/should be fixed to the outer face of the original concrete structure with no voids. From both an insulation and weatherproofing perspective, that is correct, so as to prevent water penetration from impairing the insulation. If an open cavity were between the original structure and the insulation, it wouldn’t be fulfilling its purpose as an insulating layer.
The supporting framework holding the windows within the new outer structure is to reduce cold bridging and air ingress that would have occurred around the original casements. However, the fire appears to have badly impaired the framework, causing windows to fall out and contributing to the rapid spread of the fire into the other flats.
The presence of the outer cavity almost certainly accelerated the spread of the fire, as did the failure of the framework supporting the windows. But this would not have occurred in the first place if the insulation was fire retardant.
As far as I am aware, apartments in the Grenfell Tower did not have air conditioning. I assume that on the rather warm night in question many occupants would have kept their windows open, which may have allowed the entry of flames from the exterior into some apartments (I’m guessing – I don’t know if this happened). If it happened the obvious thing for the occupants to do would be to vacate the apartment as soon as possible – most likely without closing the windows. As the fire progressed it would be natural for occupants remaining on the upper floors of the building to open their windows in order to call for help.
Until this event occurred I had no idea that flammable insulation separated by a ventilation gap from a thin outer cladding could be used on the exterior of residential tower blocks the upper floors of which are out of the reach of fire hoses on the ground.
I now know that this was not the first such external cladding/insulation fire on a tower block, although earlier examples had fewer or no casualties.
The new windows have been largely overlooked by most commenters. Very relevant point about window failures contributing to the spread of the fire. I suspect the same sort of insulation was present in the window frames. But nothing wold have occurred “in the first place” if they had not reinsulated an insulated building to lower CO2 emissions, OR if they had just changed out the window frames.
I assume the building was insured. Why don’t insurance companies do fire safety assessments on such big investments/risks?
… Why don’t insurance companies do fire safety assessments on such big investments/risks?…
Does the building comply with all fires safety standards? Check.
Has the building got a current fire safety certificate? Check.
Is the local authority responsible for providing all fire prevention and safety services? Check.
Has the building got a history of dangerous fires? No.
OK – We’ll insure it….
As it was government owned it was likely “self insured” as far a loss is concerned. This is typical for large governments, like US states, and large corporations. No one like Chubb or Factory Mutual is likely to have been involved.
But the point about other factors is well taken. When you read properly conducted reports into disasters such as this, one factor in itself is rarely the cause, it takes a lot of other contributory elements to turn a problem into a tragedy. The summary of the Cullen Report into Piper Alpha is a perfect example.
“Climate alarmism is rife in the bureaucracies, but the assertion that it was climate alarmism which caused the standard to be inadequate remains a stretch.”
Though undoubtedly climate alarmism is not the only factor attributable to this tragedy, it appears to be a wholly important one. “Green Blob” corruption seems to be endemic in government bureaucracy – not only because it provides ample opportunity to ‘disappear’ public money into the pockets of the favoured inside a labyrinthine system of environmental regulations (all justifiable under the banner of this noble cause) – but also because this behaviour sets the standard across the board in local governance. I am confident that if there were such thing as an investigative journalist in the UK any more – and they dug deep – they would find a level of ‘green’ corruption in the public sector which would make Venezuela blush.
A far less tragic, but one of many examples which I am sure are quietly occurring in the UK with increasing frequency: https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/news/exclusive-demolished-eco-schools-design-fell-below-expected-level-of-competence/10018891.article
Above article is paywalled – more here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-29012084
There are a variety of other factors at play here. There is nothing wrong with trying to insulate buildings which, in the era of cheap fuel when built, were often inadequately insulated and consequently in the modern age and with attendant damp/condensation problems and high heating costs need to be upgraded. This building had 10 million pounds spent on it just the year before so it was not as if the building had been neglected.
There are a lot of ‘if only’s’ here, of which the first is whether or not the building met current fire standards, but equally whether the people inside had the means or knowledge to fight a fire.
It appears there may have been some persons living there without the councils knowledge and in addition many of those living there legally had arrived recently and who might not have spoken the language. Bearing in mind this mix, should each individual home have been equipped with a fire extinguisher, fire blanket, individual fire alarm and, equally importantly, inhabitants instructed how to go about fighting a small fire and what actions they needed to take if they couldn’t put it out?
For example, ringing 999 and asking for the fire services, explaining the nature of the fire, its precise location, its cause if known (oil from a chip pan, electrical fault etc). Then they needed to set off the fire alarm which SHOULD have been on each landing. If you are in a strange country or don’t speak the language then the procedures to follow might not be apparent.
So whether the insulation itself was the key fact, or lack of individual fire fighting equipment and knowledge of how to fight the fire were the exacerbating factors we will have to wait and see until the enquiry reports.
In the meantime, as an interim measure, surely in similar high rise buildings supplying individual fire fighting equipment to each apartment and providing clear instructions of the procedure to follow in case of a fire, will bring some peace of mind to inhabitants and the rest of us shocked by this fire.
tonyb
The original Building Design was for Fire Containment at the Point Of Origin, So the residents were told to stay put until the fire was extinguished, as had happened in lots of fires prior to Blocks of Flats being Clad on the outside.
It was a 1970s design with only one central exit, no sprinkler system and no fire escapes, even so in the past the system had worked very well.
It was changing the original design that led to such disastrous consequences.
Concrete buildings do not burn, and therefore it is difficult for fire to spread unless combustible materials are introduced.
You are right that:.
And the original design was only changed because of cAGW alarmism and green sustainable regulations made in response to that alarmism.
…Bearing in mind this mix, should each individual home have been equipped with a fire extinguisher, fire blanket, individual fire alarm and, equally importantly, inhabitants instructed how to go about fighting a small fire and what actions they needed to take if they couldn’t put it out?…
1 – Different languages and cultures. Some people might consider that a fire is ‘God’s will’ – others, that a fire extinguisher is white man’s magic designed to render them impotent…
2 – Illegal immigrants will NOT figure on any list of inhabitants, or attend any authority briefings…
Here’s a link to the harmonized standards for construction products. https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/harmonised-standards/construction-products_en I don’t see EN 13501 in the list. Harmonized standards are those that can be used to show a presumption of conformity to the applicable directive.
From the rumours and unconfirmed news reports going around, a guess at the findings of the Inquiry might be:
1 – the fire started in a fridge which uses the inflammable refrigerant mandated by ‘save the ozone’ activists.
2 – there was no immediate fire extinguishing or warning infrastructure built into the block
3 – the warning about the fire was poor. The owner of the flat where the fire was did not immediately summon the fire brigade.
4 – there was no practiced drill for evacuating the building and no concept of floor wardens. Multiple languages and customs would have made such practices difficult to maintain.
5 – standing directions from the fire brigade were to remain in the flats in the event of a fire.
6 – the hot summer meant that all doors and windows were open, and there was no one trained or responsible for closing them
7 – illegal immigrants and sub-letting increased the number of victims
8 – the external cladding caught fire, enabling the flames to bypass any internal fire blocks.
9 – this cladding had passed fire standards because of two main drivers:
a) the cladding provided low-cost insulation which builders are under pressure to fit
b) fire standards are now an EU competence, which means that any modification to them to address new building methods is cumbersome and slow.
This is simply a guess, based on no evidence. However, assuming it is accurate, blame might be apportioned as below:
Numbers 2, 4 and 5 were failings by the authority responsible for fire safety.
Numbers 3, 6 and 7 were failings by the block inhabitants.
Numbers 1, 8 and 9 were regulatory failings, in which the current mania for ‘Green’ compliance played a major part.
I would add that the fridge itself probably had a thick layer of flammable insulation, so once the blowtorch of flammable gas in the refrigeration circuit got going it had a ready supply of combustible material to ignite. Again, EU green regulation has driven the use of extra insulation in fridges. Internal volumes are now under half the total volume in order to meet the green standards now imposed – and that drives the choice of insulation. Use anything more fireproof, but less insulating, and the interior space shrinks still further.
The inquiry should also find that the exterior insulation project made no kind of economic sense – I calculated they were trying to say £10,000 worth of annual energy losses through the walls by spending £2.6 million on the insulation project – a straight payback of 260 years before allowing for any other costs of maintenance or financing.
Trying to get extra greenie points for “beating the building standard by 50%” is clear from the planning application: these counted above anything else.
I wonder why some of my recent posts have been disappearing? Mods – any idea what’s happening?
Here’s the thing: energy costs in Europe have skyrocketed, due in large part to Big Green and EU mandates, all based on pseudoscience. Thus, even though based on bogus science, saving energy can make economic sense. And saving energy means less “carbon” is emitted, which is what the Greenie ecofascists ostensibly want, so it’s win-win. But focusing on saving energy can and very often does mean that other considerations (like safety) are left by the wayside. And remember, the apparent cause of the initial fire was a crap refrigerator built, you guessed it, with “energy efficiency” in mind.
It is assumed that residents do not have the means to fight fires themselves. In public information literature it is stated that attempting to tackle a blaze yourself is not recommended because it is assumed normal people often do not have the means, the ability or knowledge to do so. i don’t have the means in my home to fight a fridge fire, although I will do something about that, I already carry an extinguisher in my car.
You can argue that this is wrong, fair enough. But the building itself should be designed to withstand the spread of fire for a set period of time to allow residents to make their escape, regulations are there for precisely that purpose. And it didn’t, despite this scenario being entirely predictable and avoidable.
The fire alarm system should have functioned throughout the building, having individual fire and smoke detectors is not enough to warn all residents of a fire in one flat. I haven’t heard much mention regarding the building’s fire alarm system, so won’t comment. Stopgap measures are now necessary to temporarily mitigate the risk associated with the modified buildings, as you have admirably pointed out, until all the buildings in question are changed.
I just wish this article hadn’t been angled as anti EU/CAGW, despite the factual points and criticism made about the choice of insulation materials being valid.
I agree with your point about the unfortunate angle of this article. As for taking action ourselves against fire. There is some basic equipment that those in blocks of flats-which are always more vulnerable than a one storey house where safety is often within easy reach-should have. I listed some above.
A chip pan fire can often be readily smothered. Over warm electrical equipment unplugged . A chimney fire can be averted by brushing the chimney or removing the source of the fuel-in our case a burning log. So there is often much that can be done to prevent a small fire becoming a big one.
I think the biggest question I have about Grenfell is why the people had been instructed prior to the conflagration and during it, to stay in their flats. Was that because of the fire doors? Which assumes they hadn’t been propped open or other safety measures compromised.
You have a big responsibility to yourself and neighbours when living in a high rise flat and perhaps residents and the council need to be reminded of them.
tonyb
This is conjecture on my behalf and may well be proved wrong by the public inquiry.
Unfortunately the standard advice given to remain in the flats until the Fire Brigade arrives probably wasn’t the correct instruction, because the source of the fire was the outside of the building, once it had spread beyond the initial fire allegedly caused by the faulty fridge.
Normally a fire within an individual flat should initially be contained by the entrance fire door of each flat, plasterboard ceilings and the concrete floors, giving time for the emergency services to get to site and attack the fire.
Because the fire spread to the outside cladding, presumably from the kitchen, where the fridge may have been located adjacent to a window, the fire bridged the internal finishing of the external cladding system and set the insulation alight. From this point the danger rapidly spread to other flats, breaking windows and filling adjacent flats with smoke and eventually setting fire to most.
In hindsight, the correct approach would be to immediately evacuate the building, whilst the stairwells were still accessible, but those in the flats at the time would not necessarily been able to fully appreciate the extent of the danger that they faced, because who would have anticipated the fire spreading from the outside in?
@tonyb
I can answer that question, as I have done fire alarm design for high rises. As others have pointed out, modern concrete construction naturally tends to isolate fires to the floor of origin. Taking advantage of this, fire control strategies employ a “floor above, floor below, floor of incidence” response to evacuation. So, if the 14th floor reports a fire, residents on floors 13, 14, and 15 will receive a message to evacuate. In addition, floors 12 and 16 may receive a notice that an emergency has been reported in the building, and to stand by for further instructions. Fire responders then limit their efforts to the fire floors, until such time as the fire may break through to another floor, say 15. Then the residents of 16 will be instructed to leave, and 17 will receive the alert warning, and so on. This helps responders keep the civilians under control and out from under foot and somewhat limiting the chaos on the scene.
It was the cladding system addition that put paid to this scheme, with multiple floors becoming involved simultaneously.
For those on both sides of the pond, you need to know that in the US, building codes are far more prescriptive than in the UK, Australia, NZ and the EU, which tend to favor performance based designs. The cladding was limited by its flame spread rating as determined by UL to use in buildings of 3 stories or less in the US by the building code and requires no judgement on the part of the architect or engineer. Here, the fire sub code official would, if it managed to get by the reviewing architect or engineer, simply deny the permit application until a suitable material was presented. Appealing such a decision is costly in terms of money, and more importantly, time. Contractors find it far easier and cheaper to simply comply.
PumpSump, the Building as ORIGINALLY DESIGNED did provide containment of the fires as history shows.
It was adding the cladding, ie a design change, that caused this fire to spread so quickly,
Pretty sure that’s what I’ve been saying….
The point is simple.
The building was never designed to have insulation, or some secondary wall/outter cladding and the only reason that this building was fitted with a secondary wall/outter cladding is because of cAGW and resultant environmental regulations with regard to sustainability.
The fitting of the cladding is not for energy efficiency in the sense of lessening energy bills. The cost of cladding was between £20,000 to £30,000 per flat. It would take 100 years for a 1 or 2 bedroom flat to save that sort of sum against their energy bills. if we want lower energy bills then that is simple; get rid of all renewables and rely upon coal and gas for energy production.
This article is quite right to point out the role which cAGW and the effect of resultant environmental/sustainability rules and regulations have had. The fire is an unintended consequence, but nonetheless but for cAGW, it would not have happened as it did.
It appears that there is now a risk of fire because of the fitting of solar panels to roofs. There have been a number of such flats in the UK and Germany. Again, another unintended consequence, but once again, these roof fires would not have happened but for cAGW and policy put in place to deal with the perceived threat of cAGW. See:
http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/826553/Solar-panel-fire-fears-BRE-flats-east-London-Bethnal-Green
I’m with you on photovoltaic panels, in 25 years time most will be expensive roof adornments.
You could point the finger at policy makers being steered by wanting to be seen to be ‘eco-friendly’, ‘CO2 reducing’ etc etc, but the drastic extent of the fire and its consequences will almost certainly be due to the incorrect insulation type.
Much as I would love to see the Green Cabal slung in chokey for their crimes against the civilized world, we can’t pin this one on them, sorry.
The building was completed in 1974 – and as originally designed, it would not have seen the fire spread. The fire would have been contained in the concrete box that was the flat it started in. It was the installation of the exterior cladding that gave a route for the fire to spread with alarming rapidity. That really is the key point.
One of the problems with installing fire alarms and sprinklers in building such as these is that there are likely small minded hooligans among their inhabitants who would set them off if they can – causing problems for residents. That restricts what you can reasonably do – fire alarms just covering one flat, and sprinklers perhaps confined only to the main stairwell. In any event, the fire spread up the sides of the building, away from any putative sprinklers, which would have done little to prevent it.
WELL SAID. That is the fundamental issue. At its lowest denominator that is the root of the tragedy.
The building was not so much renovated, but rather it under went an adaption which adaption compromised the original design.
I hope that the inquiry gets to the root cause, although I am not optimistic that it will. This tragedy, and the costs associated with the investigation and removal of all such similar cladding and installing new cladding on other buildings lies firmly at the doors of the green movement, and the weak politicians that have succumbed to the pressure of NGOs supporting the green agenda and/or New World Order. Blame and accountability should rightly attach to where it properly lies.
There was never a good reason for the adaption. It is clear that the costs of the adaption (£20,000 to £30,000 per flat) was vastly more than the energy savings that would result from better thermal efficiency lowering energy bills. It is therefore clear that the primary purpose of the adaption was not to save energy monetary costs but rather to lower the CO2 footprint of the building so as to comply with sustainability rules and regulations which sustainability rules and regulations were brought about due to cAGW alarmism and the perceived need to save the planet.
Bruce, the relevant point here being it is perfectly possible to achieve greater energy efficiency and be designed to be safe, they are not mutually exclusive.
The point you make is correct.
However, the more fundamental point and the primary point, is that there was never any need to achieve greater energy efficiency, and this was only done because of the green agenda following cAGW alarmism..
The average energy bill for a 1 to 2 bedroom flat is about £600 to £800 pa. If you could make the flat say 30% more energy efficient then one saves about £180 to £240 per year on energy bills. Who spends somewhere between £20,000 to £30,000 per flat to save between £180 to £240 per year?
There is no efficiency in such expenditure, and it would take about 100 years to break even when you take into account the cost of financing.
The greens (and wet politicians that have gone along with this madness) should be held fully accountable for the unintended consequence arising out of the implication of their agenda.
There is more than just energy saving here, there is also the extension of serviceable life of the building to be taken into consideration, compared to the cost of constructing new building(s) at some point in the future. Whilst such buildings are rarely aesthetically pleasing, nor that pleasant to live in, the Council has assets that it has to maintain and if they are going to reclad to extend service life, they might as well insulate it at the same time.
Since nearly all high rise blocks in the UK are now electric only (after Ronan Point) and heating a draughty, poorly insulated flat costs residents a lot of money, often on pay meter (a huge ripoff BTW), the underlying reasoning is not flawed, though the implementation was.
If I were able to build my own property to my own design, I would build it to be as efficient as is practicable at the time. That doesn’t make me a pseudo-Lefty eco-nut pro-EU Birkenstock wearing CAGW alarmist.
Despite Ronan Point gas was freshly installed at Grenfell Tower as part of the refurbishment. It seems it was also a contributor to the fire.
The work done on the building was cosmetic, not structural. It had nothing to do with extending the life of the building. If one had desired to smarten it up, one could easily have just painted the rendering/concrete and nothing more than that.
The average energy bill for a 1 or 2 bed flat (and the average flat will be in an apartment) is around £600 to £800 per annum according to energy comparison sites. It would have been cheaper for the Council to give the residents free electricity than to clad the building and install double glazing!!
The cost of energy is a non issue since it is likely that the council was paying the energy bills since most of the tenants were on benefit and benefit would have extended to cover energy bills especially for those in fuel poverty. Energy costs are likely to be an issue to only those residents who were illegally living in the flats, ie., illegal immigrants and/or those who acquired the apartment under an illegal sub letting arrangement..
I agree with the point about pay per meter and I consider that the government should end that rip off, but old buildings are designed to be drafty and problems occur when they are not. I had a 1930s house fitted with crittall metal windows. My neighbours changed theirs for double glazing and got slightly lower energy bills but also damp problems. Mine were ill fitting and drafty but my house had no damp problems. In any case, we would invariably have a window open to get some fresh air in and then there is no point to double glazing.
My wife is Norwegian. In Norway they often have triple glazing. When in Norway, we would always sleep with the window open and in the evening the french doors would be opened for several hours during the course of the evening to get fresh air in, even in winter hen it was -15 to – 20degC outside.
The energy saving capabilities of double glazing is over hyped since it is often compromised by life style choices.
I will not address the asset point since it is a contentious issue whether a Council owns assets especially if those are not a net positive revenue earning assets filling the Council’s coffers.
Your political bent has nothing to do with the issues. The But For Test is that but for cAGW and resultant rules and regulations on sustainability, that fire would not have happened in the manner that it did. That said, whilst the renovation undertaken was unnecessary, I accept that it was possible to renovate the building in such manner that the fire would not have happened/spread as it did.
I remain of the view that when the inquiry reports on the facts, one of the findings should be that the fire was the result of cAGW alarmism which has brought about rules and regulations on sustainability and lowering carbon footprints.
Semantics. I can accept that the building may have been modified for eco/energy/CO2 reduction reasons, but the devastation caused by the fire was a direct result of inappropriate insulation materials, most likely exacerbated by key construction details such as the outer cavity. On that note, we we should agree to disagree.
Looking at old pictures prior to modification, Grenfell’s visible exterior was of precast panels & part glazed curtain wall type construction. Problems of such construction include deterioration of the curtain wall panels themselves, the failure of sealants between panels, concrete panels spalling, none of which would have benefited from painting/rendering.
really seriously? I think the columnist didn’t check the facts about EU regulations:
The EU regulations are a minimum requirement which every country has to meet. the british BS 8414 standard was superior, thus could be used all the way, the EU wouldn’t disagree.
to give simple examples in Belgium, fire safety codes and building codes are also superior to the EU regulations, and our country never got called to lower these standards
if a company decides to use the less adequate EN 13501 instead of the superior BS 8414 (because it’s cheaper) then it says more about the company then about the EU. if a company chooses to meet the less safe EU regulations because the BS 8414 standard was only voluntary, that’s not the EU that’s the choice that has been made.
in short: the UK was, and always has been free to make it’s superior BS 8414 standard mandatory nation wide, just because it’s superior to the european standard. so they could have easily voted the law for an upgrade of their standards, but they didn’t.
in short: the european standards are just a minimum which every EU country has to meet, but if they make superior standards mandatory they are free to do this and have even a thumbs up from the EU.
it’s easy to point the finger towards an organ that can make mistakes but it’s an act of cowardice to say their superior standard could not have been used because of that. To not use it, that was the choice of the UK itself to make it voluntarily they easily could have made it mandatory for their nation.
i’m not an EU fan but at least before writing an article like this, do some basic research of what the regulations and EU standards are for: to meet a basic uniform minimal requirement. Any country is free to have superior standards, but are not allowed to go below them.
It’s the british governement that chose to just meet the inferior EU standards and not to make their BS 8414 standard mandatory. so i really laugh with this article because the writer has no idea of what he is writing about.
However even that i disagree with his opinion, i do agree that the EN 13501 has some serious flaws. Some other EU regulations are also flawed, that’s why in belgium the government did vote higher standards and made them mandatory.
According to Richard North, the EU’s “occupied field doctrine” prevents the adoption, subsequent to an EU regulation, from being more stringent than it. See my comment upthread at https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/07/10/the-grenfell-tower-fire-would-not-have-happened-without-eu-and-climate-regulations/comment-page-1/#comment-2548577
Well, this post certainly fetched out the trolls. Not only the usual boring Greenie trolls, but the pathetic EU Remoaner trolls.
So we have suggestions that, because there are trivial differences between English & Scottish codes, the latter somehow must be adequate (drivel!) and it must be obvious (NO) that this tragedy is nothing to do with those paragons of scientific excellence, the Eurocrats.
Bunkum.
One even has the chutzpah to quote Carbon Brief to “prove” the innocence of the EU.
It is quite clear that, as Booker suggests, if the British Standard had been introduced as mandatory (rather than voluntary), just as it has been in Dubai and China (not in the EU!), there is at least a good chance this disaster would have been much less severe. Of course, sprinklers, a second means of egress would have also helped. But there was / is NO legal requirement for either to be retro-fitted.
Another obvious point to consider is why these dreadful tower blocks were constructed (as ‘social housing’) in the first place. I can vouch, from experience 50 years ago in Sheffield, that almost no-body wanted to be rehoused into these architectural monstrosities.
In the mean time, whilst there are some useful and well informed comments above, there is much blatant nonsense (and not just from the usual suspects).
Rather than the GWPF / Telegraph piece (good as it is), I suggest that this much more detailed analysis is excellent:-
http://www.eureferendum.com/blogview.aspx?blogno
“So we have suggestions that, because there are trivial differences between English & Scottish codes, the latter somehow must be adequate (drivel!)..”
Apparently Martin thinks saying the word drivel – with an exclamation point! somehow proves that the differences between Scottish and English codes are trivial.
“Combustible cladding has been found on seven high-rise blocks of flats in four local authority areas in England, Downing Street has said…..However, no local authority blocks in Scotland are understood to have the type of cladding used in Grenfell Tower, consistent with current building standards regulations in Scotland.”
And “For any building with a height above 18m, or less than 1m from a boundary, the regulations in England state that external walls must be clad in products with limited combustibility. In Scotland the regulations require that the cladding material is non-combustible.”
So apparently to Martin, the difference between the words “limited combustibility” and “non-combustible” is trivial.
When you are considering the suitability of the the whole refurbishment system of add-on insulation plus air gap plus weather proof cladding plus all supporting members, moisture-vapour membranes and all the rest, yes.
Trivial.
Only a full system test (as per the British Standard) will give any indication of whether this is the case. The European code decisively will NOT.
Non-combustible means it will not burn. Or, if you can understand more technical terms, whether the material in question is capable at high temperatures of combining with oxygen in an exothermic reaction. Non-combustible would include steel (best make that stainless steel so it doesn’t need a coating), brickwork, some special grades of glass or ceramic). This “non-combustible” cladding needs to be supported to take suitable self weight, wind snow and other loads. And that would need to be “non-combustible” as well. If our Scottish chums have succeeded in all this (which I doubt) then they are on the right path.
But only so far down the path. You haven’t yet considered the insulation, any more than have the great majority of media and political commenters.
If the insulation has “limited combustibility” or is “flame retardant” (to whatever standard), or is treated with flame suppressants or whatever, it need to be able to withstand a chimney fire in a 67m high chimney unless thre are really effective cavity closures at every storey height. Obviously not the case at Grenfell and likely not the case anywhere else. Interesting that some of the TV footage shown after the disaster with teams of men up & down the Country) removing cladding panels (and ONLY the cladding panels) for testing, showed timber had been used as part of the support structure. I don’t care what it has been treated with, timber and any oil based insulation material CANNOT withstand a 67m high chimney fire.
Who knows what the investigation in Scotland will reveal. They may be in a better place than England & Wales. And had just scraped their revised regulations through before the European Code was imposed.
Interesting as well, that the Germans (with their supposedly more rigorous code) have evacuated a tower block at Wuppertal, one of many, apparently, with a similar system to that at Grenfell.
But these nicities will doubtless escape anyone who imagines that the enormously subsidised (by HMG and the EU) apologists for Ruinable Energy and “Sustainability” in Carbon Brief will have anything truthful and sensible to say about Grenfell. Covering their arses, more like.
That should be:-
http://www.eureferendum.com/blogview.aspx?blogno=86532
Celotex polyisocyanurate foam forms a protective surface char when exposed to flame. Reynobond PE polyethylene burns like a candle when exposed to flame. Reynobond indeed offers a flame-retardant version, which was not used, much to the dismay of the victims. The PE version is indeed a better insulator than the flame-retardant version. We can all do the math here, now it is up to the lawyers, and woe unto whoever decided to save 5,000 pounds…
It is highly doubtful whether the FR grade of Reynobond would have made much difference to the outcome. It is in any case not recommended by the manufacturer for buildings over 30 metres tall, for which they specify the non-insulating Reynodual, which is just two sheets of aluminium bonded together. Even then, the design with 150mm of Celotex and a 50mm air gap to the cladding might still have proven very combustible.
Recent energy code changes in the US that require the elimination require the elimination thermal bridging have created significant challenges in architecture and engineering. Attached is a link outlining some of the fire-rating issues and how they are addressed. The International Building Code (IBC) is produced by the International Code Council (ICC).
http://bsj.iccsafe.org/august/features/code_and_fire.html
Clearly with the adoption of the inadequate standard, the EU just wants people to die.
It is a moot point indeed whether the building cladding would have reduced the heat loss and contribute to energy saving at Grenfell Tower. It would depend on external wall temperature of the composite wall before the cladding is added. An internal room temperature of 60 F (15 C) would be the room dry lining temperature also; the drop across the lining depending on thermal conductivity would be at least 30 F; further drops across thermal blocks and the concrete wall would give a drop leaving the external wall close to external ambient giving a very low C&R coefficient. Aluminium clad panels would indeed have a low emissivity but would have negligible energy saving effect because the external wall temperature would be close to ambient anyway. The cladding must have been purely decorative
Thank you Robert S for your more technical explanation, that was the point I was trying to make further up the page — besides the planning application document for the renovation apparently makes several references to the ‘improved appearance’ of the proposed cladding.