While we worry about future threats like global warming, and present threats like Iran’s escalating nuclear program, the sun’s propensity for belching out monstrous solar flares (like the Carrington event of 1859) could almost instantly create a world without modern conveniences, or even electricity. The sun could literally “bomb us back to the stone age”.
Imagine a world without iPhones, and you’d understand why Homeland security rates New York and Seattle the highest for likelihood of major social unrest. Humans don’t do well in the dark. DHS has taken notice.
Above: A modern solar flare recorded Dec. 5, 2006, by the X-ray Imager onboard NOAA’s GOES-13 satellite. The flare was so intense, it actually damaged the instrument that took the picture. Researchers believe Carrington’s flare was much more energetic than this one.
First some history, from NASA:
At 11:18 AM on the cloudless morning of Thursday, September 1, 1859, 33-year-old Richard Carrington—widely acknowledged to be one of England’s foremost solar astronomers—was in his well-appointed private observatory. Just as usual on every sunny day, his telescope was projecting an 11-inch-wide image of the sun on a screen, and Carrington skillfully drew the sunspots he saw.
On that morning, he was capturing the likeness of an enormous group of sunspots. Suddenly, before his eyes, two brilliant beads of blinding white light appeared over the sunspots, intensified rapidly, and became kidney-shaped. Realizing that he was witnessing something unprecedented and “being somewhat flurried by the surprise,” Carrington later wrote, “I hastily ran to call someone to witness the exhibition with me. On returning within 60 seconds, I was mortified to find that it was already much changed and enfeebled.” He and his witness watched the white spots contract to mere pinpoints and disappear.
It was 11:23 AM. Only five minutes had passed.
Just before dawn the next day, skies all over planet Earth erupted in red, green, and purple auroras so brilliant that newspapers could be read as easily as in daylight. Indeed, stunning auroras pulsated even at near tropical latitudes over Cuba, the Bahamas, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Hawaii.
Even more disconcerting, telegraph systems worldwide went haywire. Spark discharges shocked telegraph operators and set the telegraph paper on fire. Even when telegraphers disconnected the batteries powering the lines, aurora-induced electric currents in the wires still allowed messages to be transmitted.
“What Carrington saw was a white-light solar flare—a magnetic explosion on the sun,” explains David Hathaway, solar physics team lead at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama.
=============================================================
We’ve discussed before at WUWT what might happen if a Carrington Class solar flare induced Geomagnetic storm happened today. From my view, it is not a matter of if, but when.
The likely outcome is a broad scale collapse of power grids, frying of satellites, and collapse of our delicate silicon based microelectronics networks. Fortunately, we may have enough warning to shutdown everything ahead of time to minimize damage, but will we do anything about it?
The Department of Homeland Security has created this report on the issue, I’ve posted excerpts below.
=============================================================
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the last six years, natural hazards have caused catastrophic consequences across the globe. Tsunamis, hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions have led to hundreds of thousands of fatalities and billions of dollars in economic costs. Geomagnetic storms—a type of space weather—are much less frequent, but have the potential to cause damage across the globe with a single event. In the past, geomagnetic storms have disrupted space-based assets as well as terrestrial assets such as electric power transmission networks.
Extra-high-voltage (EHV) transformers and transmission lines—built to increase the reliability of electric power systems in cases of terrestrial hazards—are particularly vulnerable to geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) caused by the disturbance of Earth‘s geomagnetic field. The simultaneous loss of these assets could cause a voltage collapse and lead to cascading power outages. As a natural event whose effects are exacerbated by economic and technological developments, geomagnetic storms pose a systemic risk that requires both domestic and international policy-driven actions.
As part of the OECD Future Global Shocks project, this case study on geomagnetic storms was undertaken to identify the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in current international risk management practices. The literature on geomagnetic storm risk assessments indicates that the state of the art for assessing the security risk from this type of event is still inchoate. There are examples of analyses that describe threat, vulnerability, and consequence, but they are not integrated, primarily because of the weakness in the threat analysis. The lack of valid risk assessments has limited risk mitigation efforts in many critical infrastructure sectors, as it is difficult to demonstrate the utility of investing in either hardening or operational mitigation efforts, especially if these investments reduce time and money spent in preparing for more common risks.
To explore the risk to the international community, this report presents a platform to discuss the risk of geomagnetic storms by describing a worst reasonable scenario and its risk factors. Our analysis identifies areas with EHV assets that are in vulnerable locations due to latitude and ground conductivity, and examines the first- and second-order consequences of an extreme storm, highlighting those consequences with an international impact such as scarcity of surplus EHV transformers and satellite communication signal degradation. In addition to exploring the expected economic consequences of a geomagnetic storm event, the report also assessed psychological consequence in the form of social unrest, behavioral changes and social vulnerability.
The potential for international consequences if an extreme event occurs are high, although the severity of those consequences can be mitigated if the international community takes certain actions in advance, such as investing in additional geomagnetic storm warning systems.
Geomagnetic storms can be categorized as a global shock for several reasons: the effects of an extreme storm will be felt on multiple continents; the resulting damage to electric power transmission will require international cooperation to address; and the economic costs of a lengthy power outage will affect economies around the world. As a global shock event, a severe geomagnetic storm, although unlikely, could lead to major consequences for OECD governments.
================================================================
I found this graphic in the report interesting, it suggests that New York, New England, and Seattle are the worst places to be in a Carrington type event. “Get outta Dodge” takes on a whole new meaning due to the social unrest that is likely:
===============================================================
RECOMMENDATIONS
The consequences of an extreme geomagnetic storm certainly would be severe at the local and national levels. The failure of transnational electric power systems would set off a series of cascading effects, including the disruption of government operations. The potential for international consequences if an extreme event occurs are high, although the severity of those consequences can be mitigated if the international community takes certain actions in advance. In particular, recommendations 1 through 3 provide low-cost mitigation mechanisms the international community can pursue to manage the international risks posed by an extreme geomagnetic storm.
1. The international community should mitigate against the risk of a single point of failure in the current space weather warning and alert system.
The investments that some nations have made in warning systems provide a valuable tool in helping all nations lower the risk of such catastrophic consequences. Today, the ACE satellite represents a critical possible point of failure in the global geomagnetic storm alert and monitoring network. The international community is relying on the United States of America to replace ACE. Although funds have been proposed in the FY11 U.S. Department of Commerce budget to fund an ACE replacement, DISCVR, the international community should carefully consider investing in additional satellite resources to complement the ACE replacement‘s planned CME directional detection capabilities.
2. The international community should improve the current geomagnetic storm warning and alert system.
The efforts to date fostered under ISES, and those of the SWPC in particular, are laudable. But, significant room for improvement remains in the international geomagnetic storm warning and alert infrastructure. First, understanding the consequences of geomagnetic storms requires a greater understanding of the ground induced currents resulting from those storms. Greater investment in magnetometers worldwide and integration of the resulting data would improve the SWPCs ability to assess storm severity.
The international geomagnetic storm alerting and warning community currently uses a 5- level scale to communicate the severity of an impending geomagnetic storm. This scale lacks sufficient granularity at the high end to provide useful tactical guidance to geomagnetic storm alerting and warning information customers. As consumers of space weather forecasting services, the electric power industry would benefit from greater granularity differentiating between severe and extreme geomagnetic storms for tailored operational mitigation measures.
3. Electricity-generating companies should be encouraged to harden high-voltage transformers connecting major power generating assets to electric grids.
Even with warning and alert procedures in place, operational mitigations may be overwhelmed by a sufficiently large storm. Hardening all critical infrastructures against geomagnetic storms is neither economically cost-effective nor technically possible. Hardening high-voltage transmission lines with transmission line series capacitors and the transformers connected to these lines through the installation of neutral-blocking capacitors is possible. But, doing so for all utilities supporting 345 MV and above would prove economically prohibitive (Molinski, 2000). For instance, since the 1989 Quebec electricity outage, Hydro-Quebec has spent more than $1.2 billion on transmission line series capacitors (Government of Canada, 2002). Although hardening all high-voltage transmission lines and transformers is not likely an economically viable strategy, OECD member governments should consider encouraging electricity generation companies and publicly owned utilities to harden transformers connecting critical electricity generation facilities to their respective electrical grids. Ensuring the survival of these high-voltage transformers in the event of an extreme geomagnetic storm will facilitate faster restoration of national electrical grids and remove part of the likely demand for replacement high-voltage transformers in an extreme geomagnetic storm scenario.
4. OECD members should define an allocation process for replacement high-voltage transformers in the event of increased international demand following an extreme geomagnetic storm.
As discussed above, the major international aspects from such an event are likely to be competition for limited resources necessary for recovery of electric power transmission capabilities. Joint planning, therefore, is a clear necessity. The international community would be wise to establish a framework or at least a forum for discussing various mechanisms for prioritization of needs in a competitive environment. Willingness to cooperate post-crisis, however, will depend in many ways on the individual nations‘ policies and planning prior to the crisis, and likely anticipated demands from consumers, both individual and corporate. If one nation invests nothing in warning, emergency procedures, and exercises, for example, it will have difficulty arguing that it should be first in line to receive replacement transformers after a disaster strikes.
Similarly, the international community should have a common understanding of how and when to communicate the possibility of catastrophic effects from an extreme geomagnetic storm prior as an immediate alert. Public panic and unrest can be caused or exacerbated by conflicting or inaccurate information. Clear communications are facilitated by plans and international understanding of roles and responsibilities that have been established prior to an emergency.
To ensure that each participating nation participates to a degree to support such an international partnership, it may be helpful to conduct a more thorough risk assessment. The assessment included in this report is based largely on existing data that have severe limitations and assumptions where there are no data. There are many aspects of the scenario presented here that could be improved through simulation, exercises, and additional analysis of operational procedures. The physical aspects of geomagnetic storms are relatively well known. The reaction of infrastructure operators, the public, and government leaders are more uncertain. These require more thorough understanding so that appropriate incentives can be developed for optimum policy development and implementation.
5. National governments should conduct mission disruption assessments.
The critical infrastructure interdependence analysis included in this report indicates a wide range of critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors would suffer second-order consequences stemming from the first-order consequences of an extreme geomagnetic storm. This analysis identifies eight critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors likely to experience first-order disruptions as a result of an extreme geomagnetic storm:
1. Communications (Satellite)
2. Communications (Wireline)
3. Energy (Electric Power)
4. Information Technology
5. Transportation (Aviation)
6. Transportation (Mass Transit)
7. Transportation (Pipeline)
8. Transportation (Rail)
As described starting on page 27, disruptions to three of these critical infrastructures would drive second-order disruptions to other critical infrastructures. For example, an extreme geomagnetic storm would result in widespread outages in the electric grids of the U.S.A. and Canada, in turn driving second-order disruptions to 20 other critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors (using U.S. DHS definitions for critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors). The extreme geomagnetic storm described in the scenario also would drive similar widespread electricity outages in Western Europe and Scandinavia, with second-order consequences similar to those suffered in the U.S. and Canada likely. The scale of these second-order consequences will vary from country to country, depending on a range of factors such as domestic legislation dictating back-up power requirements for hospitals.
The potential for cascading effects on critical infrastructure stemming from an extreme geomagnetic storm means OECD member governments should carefully consider conducting formal risk assessments in at least two areas. First, at a minimum, OECD members should conduct critical infrastructure dependence exercises determining the cascading effects of the loss of electric power. In addition to providing insight into the consequences stemming from an extreme geomagnetic storm, this form of risk analysis will also be applicable to other hazards that could interrupt electricity supplies. Second, OECD member governments should conduct assessments evaluating their dependence on space-based assets for continuity of government. An extreme geomagnetic storm could result in both short- and longer-term disruptions to space-based assets leveraged by OECD member governments for communications, navigation, and information technology.
6. The international community needs a commonly applied methodology to evaluate social vulnerability.
The international community lacks a commonly accepted methodology to assess social vulnerability across national lines. With increasing interest in the implications of social unrest as a global shock, the OECD should take a leading role in facilitating the development of methodology that could be applied internationally. The analysis in this report uses the University of South Carolina Social Vulnerability Index, which is designed for analysis within the United States. This has provided useful insight into the contributors to social vulnerability and comparative analysis for prioritization efforts. To compare similar phenomena across national boundaries, the international community would need to overcome challenges of inconsistent population area definitions, internationally comparable socio-economic factors, and political considerations that allow for application to a variety of types of government, emergency management, and hazard mitigation. The benefits would be a more robust approach to comparing a wide variety of hazard risks to nations and populations across the globe.
====================================================================
Read the full report here
h/t to Dr. Leif Svalgaard
Discover more from Watts Up With That?
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
OMG lots of voodoo science speculation here…
JKrob: Bravo what you say begin to add rationality!
OK I’m not a big specialist in the field of Rf & RFI but still know a little bit & played a lot w/t theses things & HV stuff. Also has served as an Engineer for the MIL for some times in fields related to very sophisticated & modern (for the time) electronics & optics systems giving a good opportunity to be familliar w/t the ways the MIL implements EM radiation shielding in their equipments.
First, there is 3 different things (but related) we need to understand: there can exist a magnetic only component, an electric only one (E-field) and a combined one for the third (TEM) made by E & M field. The TEM is what we call “normal” radio transmission because this is the only one that have the capability to propagate to long distance; in the far field.
The two (uncoupled) field, namely E & M, cannot propagate past the near field (past around one wavelength). Forgive me if description given is not completely accurate because this is a long time since doing my class into Maxwell Equation, but believe me when I say this is a good approximation. The wavelength is the length it take in space (distance traveled) for only one “oscillation” or period. The thing to remember about the two uncoupled E & M fields is precisely the fact that they cannot go beyon one or maybe two wavelength to induce some effect. Take an electro-magnet, if you energize it w/t a current of increasing frequency, inductance permitting, as the frequency increase (thus reducing wavelength) you will reduce the detection possibility zone around of the induced field. This is the basis of secure near-field communication.
Any of these fields need to “couple” w/t an orthogonal field of the “other kind” to be able to propagate to great distance (Don’t believe me, go ahead & solve the lovely Maxwell equations by yourself, this is trivial stuff). For an uncoupled field to act at long distance, it need to be of a wavelength of similar size or larger. In other words, the frequency need to be very low or equal to zero (infinite wavelenght = non varying field). But then static or very low frequency magnetic field are not very good at inducing current in conductor, static field won’t induce nothing into non moving conductors!
The practical result is that geomagnetic field are weak & normally slow varying (I’m no solar expert but competent PhD in the field are welcomed to send some punishment if I’m completly wrong). Then the induced electric current in conductor will be of a similar frequency (in fact exactly) of the inducing magnetic field, and will only become of significance if the receiving conductor is of a length being significative vs the wavelength of the magnetic variation. As the length of the conductor receiving induction is reduced, the current in it also to a point where it is insignificant.
The problem w/t big power transformer is the related economics. These units are very matured technological gizmo, they are so optimized that they operate at the very edge of the cliff. The presence of a minimal intensity of current at lower frequency than 60Hz, especially sub-Hz component we can call practically DC will put these transformer into more saturation on one side, then hysteresis make all the cycle further in this direction, then… then BOOM. This is truly a positive feedback mechanism.
What is the physical caracteristics of electric transmission line: One main fact is that they are very long & are also dependant on ground conductivity (to varying degree). So very long line will get induced very low frequency component of the geomagnetic field. This is why we wanna put big serie capacitor (expensive) in the line to effectively filter out (high-pass) the lower than 60Hz component. The higher than 60Hz are not very good but this is another story & power dist. (I’ve done the class too long ago) is not my field. Conclusion: geomagnetic storm are not a problem (magnetic component I speak) for the small induction loop related to home & common electronics, spectral component is simply too low (field rate of change), but major problem for transmission lines & very long potentially conductive object like pipeline, etc…
Now EMP, like those created by nuclear explosion in high atmosphere. This is a very different matter!!! The specifics are probably classified & I never had access to this exact knowledge but from what I know the MIL take the matter very seriously! From what I know (very little) the effect arise from fast & strong ionization at time of detonation interacting w/t geomagnetic field or ionosphere or TBD (ask a PhD for the details) but from what I know this give rise to very fast rising EM pulse, remember the math around an impulse: they countain all frequency, in this case they countain also the very highest possible… The problem is a powerfull pulse, EM radiation (can propagate) & very high frequency content (enormous rate of change). This kind of pulse is capable of inducing non negligeable current in small loop of conductor, non closed loop conductor will see an also non negligeable potential induced. This is what will kill most if not all the electronics, even if powered off!!! However for the fearmonger, please take note that a lightning strike near you will also produce a very strong fast rising EMP, killing some electronic stuff around but not everything!
The good new, if the high frequency component is the worst, it is also the easiest to filter out. This fall in the domain of EMI protection, no black magic involved (please note that rf by definition is considered a black magic). The trick, like the MIL is simply to use as much shielding as possible, & filter & double-filter every power & signal input & output. This is not very difficult but costly. My experience w/t civiliant electronics, is as time pass, price drop, quality drop… and most importantly EMI protection & true metallic shielding tend to disapear. Instead mfg install ferrite bead on cabling as needed to pass thru EMI qual. test.
For the power bar surge protection, good ground, etc… these won’t protect for EMP type pulse, be informed that just 1 inch of your “grounding wire marvell” has quite low conductivity at 1GHz comparable frequency. And very decent DC isolation will form a very efficient capacitive conductive path at the same frequency.
And for those who prefer the “usual” aluminum paper helmet, please note that it is true that aluminum paper is able to shield moderate to high frequency field (try to phone a cell enveloped in aluminum paper (completly), if there is an open cavity for air or neck passage, Rf can penetrate and worst you risk getting instead a resonnant cavity!
Sorry for the very long post, but the subject is complex & need a couples of lines just to give an overview.
For those not familiar with bringing a grid (electrical power supply) back online, consider the following. If the power / grid were down for only a couple of days, every home would require a substantial amount of electricity when power is restored. Yes, your, as well as everyone else’s refridgerator, freezer, heating or cooling source, water heater, etc. would exert a much greater demand on the grid at the same time. Remember normally everyone’s furnace and fridge does not operate simultainiously. Add cooking dinner when you have been eating leftovers for a couple of days. Don’t forget everyone will have toilets to flush at the same time which will load the electrical demand on the water company. All of this will create a surge, which is a much larger demand on the source of electrical power. Certain the wind will be blowing? You better hope so.
Peter says:
February 14, 2012 at 10:02 pm
============
We should move those to some storage place underground under a mountain where they will be safe. Any ideas?
Would it be any worse than a lightning strike?
Sorry I meant to add that I doubt your car or snowblower will be affected.
Last night geomagnetic storm was one of the stronger ones since Japans earthquake.
http://flux.phys.uit.no/cgi-bin/plotgeodata.cgi?Last24&site=tro2a&
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Maps/10/235_45.php
Magnitude 6 earthquake off Oregon
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/usb00080ib.php
How odd, I was reading “Geomagnetic Storms, EMP and Nuclear Armageddon” by Matthew Stein (Nexus Mag) just 2 hours ago, in which he summarized the problems very well, but tended to the gloomy side on our preparedness.
My main question is, who would ‘pull the plug’ before the theoretical arrival of the event?. lf it was not done in time the consequences could be disastrous, as with our Withenhoe Dam and lack of pre-deluge release of water, Brisbane Floods. Clear chain of command and ultimate responsibility must be established.
An EMP attack would present a great threat to Nuclear Plants if their electronics are not fully hardened, especially the backup power plants, as in Fukishima.
http://www.whentechfails.com http://www.matstein.com
M.A.Vukcevic says:
February 15, 2012 at 12:45 am
Last night geomagnetic storm was one of the stronger ones since Japans earthquake.
http://flux.phys.uit.no/cgi-bin/plotgeodata.cgi?Last24&site=tro2a&
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Maps/10/235_45.php
Magnitude 6 earthquake off Oregon
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/usb00080ib.php
===================
I had wondered previously,
what??/ was happening prior to the huge quake and tsunamis a few years back solar wise?
I am a bit amazed folks tending to treat this as a minor issue or non event. would be worth remembering the reason people could be calm and well behaved in the hurricane aftermath was they Knew, that food water and help WAS available from extrenal areas. if massive areas go down that help won’t exist. and from what i see all too many people are far too reliant on “someone else” bailing them out.
as for DHS FEMA being of use?
with their prior showing they’re more likely to be shooting citizens than helping much.
your wind up radio isnt going to be any use if the broadcasters equipments is fried, ditto water and sewage lack of/ and back up respectively.
I have developed the habit of not only are appliances like PC turned off, I remove wall plugs, being turned off isnt any protection if theyre still grid connected, ie in lighning surges.
electronic ignitions etc all at risk ,
everyone should have at the least a gas camp stove and supplies for at least two weeks if not more., stored water drinking only.at least a one month supply of crucial meds at all times..
the present earth facing solar event does have M class possibilities I read, the recent large M class wasnt far off X and some issues, we were lucky it wasnt facing us.
one the other hand I would LIKE a lot of the spy in the sky crap to get fried!
sick of invasive snooping by govts and others. and be real nice to know usa spyplanes go down.
reckon the people copping drone attacks would be cheering too!
I contacted my local council to alert them to this, bit like talking to a brick.
Undeveloped countries and/or regions that don’t rely on foreign aid won’t even notice a Carrington Event unless they are are in latitudes high enough to see the extraordinary auroras. Neither will a Carrington Event wipe out the accumulated knowledge in science & engineering. So while there might be a large reduction in human population centered around industrialized nations the infrastructure will largely remain intact (a Carrington Event won’t damage cars or buildings or dams or sewer lines etc.) and a very rapid recovery will ensue.
It would be a dream come true for the anti-human environmentalist whackos except for the fact these nutcases all inhabit industrialized nations where people have the long-term security and leisure time to worry about those things. So the environmentalist movement would be one of the first casualties. How ironic.
@dwright
Imagine the electricity getting shut off across an entire continent and not coming back on for months. The first thing you’ll notice is that the electric pumps which move gasoline from underground tanks into your car won’t be working. Water won’t come out of the faucet in your home and even if you have water you won’t be able to flush your toilet because the sewers will back up without electrical pumps. Hospitals will shut down after a couple of days when emergency generators run out of fuel. You won’t have any refrigeration and the grocery store won’t have any food left.
It’ll be a pretty bad scene. The biggest vulnerability is transformers. Those big transformers everyone has seen at power stations and atop telephone poles and such get fried across continent size regions in a Carrington Event. These transformers normally perform for decades without service or replacement so we don’t have any replacement inventory to speak of. They are typically ordered a year or so in advance for pre-planned expansions of the electrical grid. If they get toasted by the tens of thousands all at once across a huge region it will be many months before they can be replaced and a large number of people in industrialized nations can’t survive more than about a week without electricity because transportation, food, water, sanitation, refrigeration, and many other things are dependent on a functioning electrical grid. Lack of communications is probably the least of the problems.
The only good, practical way to guard against this is being able to predict at least an hour or so ahead of time when a massive CME will arrive and trip circuit breakers on the electrical grid so all the transformers, or as least the biggest ones and largest transmission lines, are protected. Individual wires and smaller transformers and personal electronics will still get fried but at least enough will survive so that a combination of marshall law and emergency services will limit the death toll.
This is a lot more imminent and real than global warming by a very wide margin. We don’t know how often Carrington-severity events happen but we do know one happened just 150 years ago and if it happened today it would be the worst thing since the bubonic plague whereas 150 years ago when electricity was not essential to providing food, water, and shelter it was more of an oddity that burned up telegraph lines and set some fires in telegraph offices and caused northern lights to be seen as far south as Florida and nothing more. Farther in the past nothing would be noted except some brief beautiful lights in the night sky farther south than they are normally seen.
FYI this link provide info on nuclear induced EMP waveform & ref. to related IEC std.
[http://www.todaysengineer.org/2007/Sep/HEMP.asp]
If I’m not mistaken, fast component seem to produce about 50 MV/m/us !
There is comparative info w/t lightning strike.
There’s a lot of hype here, but also a very serious issue which it’s important to take appropriate mitigating action against.
A Carrington event will generally _not_ affect electronic devices like phones, ipads, or car engine management systems. If we have some warning, we’ll all have more than enough time to wrap our gadgets in tin foil to make doubly sure, but in general the conductors in such devices are too short to get much of a voltage difference along their length. Unplug everything, and don’t bother with earthing – the earth wire is more likely to act as an antenna. Oh, and watch out for water-pipe earths – the mains water pipes themselves can act as very long conductors/antennae.
The serious risk is that the power grid is very vulnerable. It’s not much use having lots of working electronic devices if there’s no power to run them, and a Carrington event would likely wipe out all the long-distance/high-voltage transformers in an affected area. We’ll have a lot of trouble pumping water and sewage, and that kind of knock-on effect.
Given the extremely low probability of another Carrington event in the next 100 years or so, I have to wonder if this report by DHS was only a academic exercise, or if it will be used to enlarge their already bloated budget and to justify further encroachments on businesses and citizens. I suspect the later.
Buried in the report, for example, is a recommendation to accelerate implementation and roll out of the “Smart Grid”, which on the surface may sound like a good thing, but there are serious technological concerns about it adding another level of complexity to an already complex system.
@dwright says:
“Imagine the electricity getting shut off across an entire continent and not coming back on for months…”
I was surprised at the number of… distortions in your post. I’ll take them point by point and offer a far more likely outcome or response.
“The first thing you’ll notice is that the electric pumps which move gasoline from underground tanks into your car won’t be working. Water won’t come out of the faucet in your home and even if you have water you won’t be able to flush your toilet because the sewers will back up without electrical pumps. Hospitals will shut down after a couple of days when emergency generators run out of fuel. You won’t have any refrigeration and the grocery store won’t have any food left.”
Utilities (including water and sewer) are designated critical infrastructure by the US DHS and FEMA – not to mention their obligations to provide quality service by the various, state regulators (e.g., public utility commissions and state emergency management agencies). As such, they are mandated by law and regulation to develop and maintain business continuity, emergency response, load shed, and response action plans. These plans, which are aligning more with the government agency-required National Incident Management System (NIMS) and its Incident Command System (ICS), detailed a scalable approach to a variety of incidents. Moreover, the plans are drilled frequently and implemented whenever Nature decides to hold a real-world drill. As a result, utilities would continue to operate (albeit on an emergency level for the first few days) – even after a Carrington Event.
The same is true for life-sustaining care facilities like hospitals. They are mandated by law and regulation to provide standby generation systems to ensure a continuity of care during the loss of primary power. I suspect such facilities would cancel elective surgeries (e.g., face lifts and tummy tucks) during the emergency time period; however, the hospitals would assuredly remain open.
As to the inability to pump fuel from underground storage tanks, this would be an inconvenience – at worst. Portable generation can solve this problem during and immediately following any service interruption (i.e., the initial 24-48 hours). In the short-term (i.e., upwards of a week), cargo trucks and tankers can be used to refuel due to their gravity feed and integrated pump systems. Ironically, the utilities usually position these units (as well as manual crank and electric pump drop tanks) at their centralized staging sites to assist fleet refueling during a major storm restoration. The grid would be largely operational between 3-7 days post-event impact.
“Those big transformers everyone has seen at power stations and atop telephone poles and such get fried across continent size regions in a Carrington Event. These transformers normally perform for decades without service or replacement so we don’t have any replacement inventory to speak of. They are typically ordered a year or so in advance for pre-planned expansions of the electrical grid. If they get toasted by the tens of thousands all at once across a huge region it will be many months before they can be replaced…”
While certain transmission transformers are more vulnerable than others, the distribution transformers (i.e., the pole- and pad-mounted units omnipresent alongside streets and roadways) are largely unaffected by a Carrington Event. And the assertion that utilities don’t have “any replacement inventory to speak of” is just wrong. How do you think a region recovers so quickly from a major storm impact? Distribution transformers, poles, cross arms, fuses, etc… are available in local stores at the utilities to replace those which have been damaged or destroyed. Spare transmission transformers, especially at identified critical points in the grid, are also maintained – usually within the perimeter of the substation to minimize the change-out time with the damaged unit. And utilities maintain mobile substations, as well as mutual assistance agreements, which both aid in the prompt restoration of service.
“The only good, practical way to guard against this is being able to predict at least an hour or so ahead of time when a massive CME will arrive and trip circuit breakers on the electrical grid so all the transformers, or as least the biggest ones and largest transmission lines, are protected.”
The utilities would need as much lead time as possible (far more than an hour) to properly take down the grid. The good news is that a 12-18 hour lead time is possible between discovery and impact times. The transformers would need to be isolated from the grid at their disconnects and the line sectioned via terminal circuit breakers, line reclosers, and visible air breaks. Admittedly, the bottleneck would be the resource commitment of qualified workers needed to “switch off” and physically disconnect critical points within a compressed time period – a fair amount of this activity would be manual. The likelihood of completing the take down successfully would decrease as the geographic footprint of the impacted area was increased.
“Individual wires and smaller transformers and personal electronics will still get fried but at least enough will survive so that a combination of marshall law and emergency services will limit the death toll.”
“Smaller” or distribution transformers are largely unaffected by a Carrington Event. Even personal electronics will largely be unaffected – it’s those systems that act like a long “wire,” which can then be influenced by a GIC that are most vulnerable.
Of course, it’s common sense for an individual to be prepared for (at least) a three-day interruption of electric service. Most major terrestrial weather events can easily make such preparations well worthwhile. In fact, these preparations are often promoted by the US DHS, FEMA, and the electric utilities. Unfortunately, the attention span of the average ratepayer and/or citizen is limited to the hour that forms “American Idol” or “Dancing with the Stars.” And an increasing dependence by the same on the government to provide immediate assistance in the wake of (recent) major storm events runs counter to the need for individual responsibility.
“Be informed. Make a plan. Build a kit. Get involved,” – http://www.ready.gov/ .
Yeah, the incompetent morons at Homeland Security are really going to be able to deal with this non-issue, which is pretty typical of the entire incompetent moronic federal government.
Tom Murphy>
“And the assertion that utilities don’t have “any replacement inventory to speak of” is just wrong. How do you think a region recovers so quickly from a major storm impact? Distribution transformers, poles, cross arms, fuses, etc… are available in local stores at the utilities to replace those which have been damaged or destroyed. Spare transmission transformers, especially at identified critical points in the grid, are also maintained – usually within the perimeter of the substation to minimize the change-out time with the damaged unit. And utilities maintain mobile substations, as well as mutual assistance agreements, which both aid in the prompt restoration of service.”
You’re not wrong, but that’s not the whole story. An unmitigated Carrington event would knock out _every_ high-voltage, long-distance transformer in the affected areas. Although there is some spare capacity, it’s nowhere near enough. More of a problem is that there is no stock of such transformers – they’re built to order – and they will take a minimum of a few months (assuming emergency priority) to build even if there is manufacturing capacity and power available to run it. On top of that, there is definitely nowhere near enough manufacturing capacity globally to replace more than a few percent of HVLD transformers in the US alone in under a year.
As I said in my post above, there’s a lot of hype, but also a serious risk. As far as I can see the only reasonably practical and cost-effective protection is to install remote-controlled air-gap switches to isolate all HVLD transformers at short notice. I was under the impression that most transformers were already fitted with them, but perhaps that’s just here in the UK where we have fewer.
Tom Murphy:
My comment was the Top Gear vid, no worries. I was tired of the Hollywood myths and general hysteria flying around the thread.
As for no power to fuel depots/stations has nobody ever had to hand crank diesel from a slip tank? Or for that matter know that 12v fuel transfer pumps are as close as the local NAPA store?
Between construction rental (industrial trailer mounted gen sets) welders(truck mounted) freaking home depot, there’s more than enough local generation to cover essential services for a while.
CuriousGeorge,
I thought about .22, however the only items I currently have to utilize that are a Ruger Bearcat and a Colt SAA.
But you are correct. .22 is certainly a number one wants to incorporate.
eyesonu,
Good point. While I currently like the freedom not owning a dog brings (sort of), I do benefit from having our son’s lab staying with us.
Peter,
Where do you get your information about nuclear power plants and spent fuel pools?
One of the engineers at one of the plants I worked at once, decided to work out what the evaporation loss would be if the recirculating pumps shut down. He found out that if the reactor operator pee’d into the pool once every 4 hours or so, the loss due to evaporation would be made up.
Next time, try picking a subject you actually know something about.
eyesonu,
A utility handles cold loading – as you described – by not bringing the entire distribution circuit back on line at once.
Dave says:
“An unmitigated Carrington event would knock out _every_ high-voltage, long-distance transformer in the affected areas.”
This is under the presumption that the utilities would ignore the scaled response in their own response action plans and continue to operate the transformers during the event. Even then, it’s uncertain that “every” applicable transformer will be damaged, but it’s fair to presume that a majority will be incapacitated. Regardless, it’s incorrect to initiate a restoration effort under the assumption all units have been lost; the utilities will retain some capacity to operate the grid because their plans mandate they do – http://www.iso-ne.com/rules_proceds/operating/isone/op19/index.html . Most of these documents are confidential because of the obvious terror concerns – why instruct such people on how to take down the grid in an uncontrolled manner?
“Although there is some spare capacity, it’s nowhere near enough. More of a problem is that there is no stock of such transformers – they’re built to order – and they will take a minimum of a few months (assuming emergency priority) to build…”
Transmission substations, which have been identified as critical to the reliable operation of the regional grid, do have spare transformers present. Do utilities maintain 100% redundancy for these units? No. Do you need 100% redundancy? No, because not all units will be damaged. A Carrington Event will make modern life inconvenient for a short time period. During that interval, loads can be shed and/or transferred based upon prioritizations. However, the grid will remain operational.
You are correct that replacement transformers will take some time to build; however, a complete rebuild of the grid is highly unlikely. The above measures should be sufficient to bridge the gap until permanent units have been manufactured and installed.
“I was under the impression that most transformers were already fitted with them, but perhaps that’s just here in the UK where we have fewer.”
Having worked for National Grid in the US, I can testify that National Grid in the UK is a bit of different animal. The Climate Change Act 2008 and its renewable commitments have it upgrading and expanding the transmission infrastructure significantly in the UK. Although the RTO-overseen grids in America are remotely monitored, not all are automated to a sufficient level, though, progress is being made yearly. A fair amount of physical disconnection would be required to isolate applicable transformers, if a Carrington Event were forecasted to impact Earth.
@Tom in indy says:
February 14, 2012 at 11:30 am
What would happen to passenger jets that were in the air during such an event?
_______________________________________________________________
I was on a BA 747 flying from London to San Francisco in the early 90s when a big solar flare blew. The plane was crippled and had to make a premature (but otherwise normal) landing in Boston – the flight crew never said what bits of electronics been broken. No harm done to the passengers, although we had to overnight at Logan and I’ll never forget the shag pile walls of the room I got at the Hilton.
Well, it’s not too hard. First off, a car parked in the garage is unlikely to be damaged, IMHO. (a war related EMP might fry some of those ‘on the road’, but the Carrington Event level looks to be mostly an effect in long distance transmission wires as inductors picking up / making currents).
Yes, that’s a bit ‘speculative’, but reasonable. Old cars with generators (like the old VW bug) ought to have no problem at all. Newer cars with Alternators might have the diodes blown, but I would not expect it. (They can handle 100 amps… and any attempt to reverse volt them has to deal with that big lead acid battery path…) So you might lose the GPS and radio, but I’d expect it to start / run ok. (Modulo those ‘engine computers’ on some being not-so-good).
Me? I have a mid-80s Mercedes Diesel for which an electric system is a ‘nice suggestion’ but not an essential… 😉
OK, so other than buying an old car, what can you do?
First off, you could put a spare engine control module and alternator in a metal box (‘Faraday cage’) in the garage. That gives you replacements if they get fried. (Given the costs, it might be cheaper to buy an old VW bug ‘beater’…)
Second, I have a small ‘portable power and light kit’ that usually lives in a metal enclosure. Even if the car won’t start, it can give power and light for many days just off the battery (at low drain):
http://chiefio.wordpress.com/2011/02/17/minimalist-emergency-power/
I also have a set of ‘preparedness packs’. One “car sized” in each car. One house sized…
http://chiefio.wordpress.com/2009/05/27/crisis-kits-and-preparedness-packs
(WHY do I have this stuff? Well, living just a few miles from The San Andreas Fault and having had a 7.2 already in my life… it is nice stuff to have when living in the yard without power for a few days…)
OK, sensitive electronics:
Most of these will be fried by voltages on the power lines. Help prevent this by leaving them unplugged with not in use. (An easy way to get 1/2 a loaf on it is to just put them on power strips with surge protection and a power switch. Switch them when not in use…)
Basically, if you are protected against lightning, you are likely protected against these, too.
For “emergency gear” electronics: Store them in metal cans or in things like jars or boxes lined with metal. (As a field expedient solution, you can wrap things in aluminum foil – no, no hat needed 😉 Any Faraday cage will do. So I have an emergency SW/AM/FM radio that lives in a metal wrapper.
Have various non-electric ways of getting things done: Lighting, have some candles or kerosene lamps. Heat, have a fireplace or wood stove if possible. (Kerosene emergency heater IFF you know how to use one and not get Carbon Monoxide poisoning…) Liquid fuel camp stove / BBQ on the patio (with matches to use if the electronic igniter gets fried…)
Generator: It’s a ‘good idea’ to have an emergency generator. I went out of my way to have a Generac generator that had nothing electronic in it. That, and some gasoline in the car with a siphon hose gives you electricity for days / weeks. (I have since sold that one to a friend and replaced it with a much smaller and superior Honda that has an internal alternator and inverter, so risk NOT having a generator that works in an EMP / Carrington Event emergency… but I have 3 inverter kits and I’m pretty sure the metal body on the cars is a good enough Faraday Cage anyway) Besides, the friend lives alone and would likely bring the old generator back in exchange for food 😉
So, IMHO, that’s basically what to do. You can add a lot of ‘frills’ with things like food and fuel storage and a “Ham Radio” or “CB Radio” in a metal box, but I don’t think it’s really needed. Most of the “issue” is parasitic currents in long power and communications wires, not the ‘little stuff’ in an unplugged laptop. So, IMHO, most of what will be lost is “Grid and Grid Connected”. So “switch off” a lot of your stuff and have some that is unplugged / wireless and I’m pretty sure things will be OK. (Then again, we have no idea what will happen to wireless front end stages in such an event as radio with semiconductors was not around then…)
Oh, and Vacuum Tubes are immune. So if you find an old Tube radio at a yard sale… ( FWIW, I have a “tube radio kit” in storage. Bought from Australia, so they call them ‘valves’… In a real EOWorld scenario, I’d spend a couple of days building a radio with it… likely to discover nobody transmitting… Then again, I can make a spark gap transmitter in a few hours too… Tubes are widely available and used in music Power Amps for their sound quality, so ‘get to know a musician’ and you can turn those amps into communications gear parts… I have an antique tube SW/AM/FM radio too. Needs the capacitors replaced though as it humms something fierce right now, but ‘someday’ I’ll fix it. – The capacitors in them often become leaky and let them humm / not work right. Easy to replace the electrolytic caps… brown things about the size of 1/2 a little finger between tube socket and ground or tube socket an next stage.)
At any rate, all the mil-spec gear ought to have no problems at all, as most of the police gear too, so I’m not seeing ‘end of civilization’ more like ‘darned annoying’ for a few months and “need to cope” for a week or two. Then “folks like me” will have things well on the way to repair. (One of my first ‘checks’ to be the local gas station to see if they need ‘the old generator’ for a few hours each day to pump gasoline into jugs for folks with generators…)
Summary: Prep for a {quake / hurricane / tornado / blizzard} but wrap any electronics in foil or pack in metal cans. Get a non-electronic generator and some gas. Old cars are your friends, do not junk them.
EM Smith>
Funny, I don’t disagree with you about preparedness, but in an EOW scenario I have different priorities. The first thing I’ll be doing is heading to the nearest defensible library and stockpiling supplies and weapons there. In a world without the internet, the man with all the information will be king. I’ll be able to trade for anything else I need, just as long as I can defend the books.
I suppose you might call that the lazy man’s survivalism.