While we worry about future threats like global warming, and present threats like Iran’s escalating nuclear program, the sun’s propensity for belching out monstrous solar flares (like the Carrington event of 1859) could almost instantly create a world without modern conveniences, or even electricity. The sun could literally “bomb us back to the stone age”.
Imagine a world without iPhones, and you’d understand why Homeland security rates New York and Seattle the highest for likelihood of major social unrest. Humans don’t do well in the dark. DHS has taken notice.
Above: A modern solar flare recorded Dec. 5, 2006, by the X-ray Imager onboard NOAA’s GOES-13 satellite. The flare was so intense, it actually damaged the instrument that took the picture. Researchers believe Carrington’s flare was much more energetic than this one.
First some history, from NASA:
At 11:18 AM on the cloudless morning of Thursday, September 1, 1859, 33-year-old Richard Carrington—widely acknowledged to be one of England’s foremost solar astronomers—was in his well-appointed private observatory. Just as usual on every sunny day, his telescope was projecting an 11-inch-wide image of the sun on a screen, and Carrington skillfully drew the sunspots he saw.
On that morning, he was capturing the likeness of an enormous group of sunspots. Suddenly, before his eyes, two brilliant beads of blinding white light appeared over the sunspots, intensified rapidly, and became kidney-shaped. Realizing that he was witnessing something unprecedented and “being somewhat flurried by the surprise,” Carrington later wrote, “I hastily ran to call someone to witness the exhibition with me. On returning within 60 seconds, I was mortified to find that it was already much changed and enfeebled.” He and his witness watched the white spots contract to mere pinpoints and disappear.
It was 11:23 AM. Only five minutes had passed.
Just before dawn the next day, skies all over planet Earth erupted in red, green, and purple auroras so brilliant that newspapers could be read as easily as in daylight. Indeed, stunning auroras pulsated even at near tropical latitudes over Cuba, the Bahamas, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Hawaii.
Even more disconcerting, telegraph systems worldwide went haywire. Spark discharges shocked telegraph operators and set the telegraph paper on fire. Even when telegraphers disconnected the batteries powering the lines, aurora-induced electric currents in the wires still allowed messages to be transmitted.
“What Carrington saw was a white-light solar flare—a magnetic explosion on the sun,” explains David Hathaway, solar physics team lead at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama.
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We’ve discussed before at WUWT what might happen if a Carrington Class solar flare induced Geomagnetic storm happened today. From my view, it is not a matter of if, but when.
The likely outcome is a broad scale collapse of power grids, frying of satellites, and collapse of our delicate silicon based microelectronics networks. Fortunately, we may have enough warning to shutdown everything ahead of time to minimize damage, but will we do anything about it?
The Department of Homeland Security has created this report on the issue, I’ve posted excerpts below.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the last six years, natural hazards have caused catastrophic consequences across the globe. Tsunamis, hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions have led to hundreds of thousands of fatalities and billions of dollars in economic costs. Geomagnetic storms—a type of space weather—are much less frequent, but have the potential to cause damage across the globe with a single event. In the past, geomagnetic storms have disrupted space-based assets as well as terrestrial assets such as electric power transmission networks.
Extra-high-voltage (EHV) transformers and transmission lines—built to increase the reliability of electric power systems in cases of terrestrial hazards—are particularly vulnerable to geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) caused by the disturbance of Earth‘s geomagnetic field. The simultaneous loss of these assets could cause a voltage collapse and lead to cascading power outages. As a natural event whose effects are exacerbated by economic and technological developments, geomagnetic storms pose a systemic risk that requires both domestic and international policy-driven actions.
As part of the OECD Future Global Shocks project, this case study on geomagnetic storms was undertaken to identify the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in current international risk management practices. The literature on geomagnetic storm risk assessments indicates that the state of the art for assessing the security risk from this type of event is still inchoate. There are examples of analyses that describe threat, vulnerability, and consequence, but they are not integrated, primarily because of the weakness in the threat analysis. The lack of valid risk assessments has limited risk mitigation efforts in many critical infrastructure sectors, as it is difficult to demonstrate the utility of investing in either hardening or operational mitigation efforts, especially if these investments reduce time and money spent in preparing for more common risks.
To explore the risk to the international community, this report presents a platform to discuss the risk of geomagnetic storms by describing a worst reasonable scenario and its risk factors. Our analysis identifies areas with EHV assets that are in vulnerable locations due to latitude and ground conductivity, and examines the first- and second-order consequences of an extreme storm, highlighting those consequences with an international impact such as scarcity of surplus EHV transformers and satellite communication signal degradation. In addition to exploring the expected economic consequences of a geomagnetic storm event, the report also assessed psychological consequence in the form of social unrest, behavioral changes and social vulnerability.
The potential for international consequences if an extreme event occurs are high, although the severity of those consequences can be mitigated if the international community takes certain actions in advance, such as investing in additional geomagnetic storm warning systems.
Geomagnetic storms can be categorized as a global shock for several reasons: the effects of an extreme storm will be felt on multiple continents; the resulting damage to electric power transmission will require international cooperation to address; and the economic costs of a lengthy power outage will affect economies around the world. As a global shock event, a severe geomagnetic storm, although unlikely, could lead to major consequences for OECD governments.
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I found this graphic in the report interesting, it suggests that New York, New England, and Seattle are the worst places to be in a Carrington type event. “Get outta Dodge” takes on a whole new meaning due to the social unrest that is likely:
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The consequences of an extreme geomagnetic storm certainly would be severe at the local and national levels. The failure of transnational electric power systems would set off a series of cascading effects, including the disruption of government operations. The potential for international consequences if an extreme event occurs are high, although the severity of those consequences can be mitigated if the international community takes certain actions in advance. In particular, recommendations 1 through 3 provide low-cost mitigation mechanisms the international community can pursue to manage the international risks posed by an extreme geomagnetic storm.
1. The international community should mitigate against the risk of a single point of failure in the current space weather warning and alert system.
The investments that some nations have made in warning systems provide a valuable tool in helping all nations lower the risk of such catastrophic consequences. Today, the ACE satellite represents a critical possible point of failure in the global geomagnetic storm alert and monitoring network. The international community is relying on the United States of America to replace ACE. Although funds have been proposed in the FY11 U.S. Department of Commerce budget to fund an ACE replacement, DISCVR, the international community should carefully consider investing in additional satellite resources to complement the ACE replacement‘s planned CME directional detection capabilities.
2. The international community should improve the current geomagnetic storm warning and alert system.
The efforts to date fostered under ISES, and those of the SWPC in particular, are laudable. But, significant room for improvement remains in the international geomagnetic storm warning and alert infrastructure. First, understanding the consequences of geomagnetic storms requires a greater understanding of the ground induced currents resulting from those storms. Greater investment in magnetometers worldwide and integration of the resulting data would improve the SWPCs ability to assess storm severity.
The international geomagnetic storm alerting and warning community currently uses a 5- level scale to communicate the severity of an impending geomagnetic storm. This scale lacks sufficient granularity at the high end to provide useful tactical guidance to geomagnetic storm alerting and warning information customers. As consumers of space weather forecasting services, the electric power industry would benefit from greater granularity differentiating between severe and extreme geomagnetic storms for tailored operational mitigation measures.
3. Electricity-generating companies should be encouraged to harden high-voltage transformers connecting major power generating assets to electric grids.
Even with warning and alert procedures in place, operational mitigations may be overwhelmed by a sufficiently large storm. Hardening all critical infrastructures against geomagnetic storms is neither economically cost-effective nor technically possible. Hardening high-voltage transmission lines with transmission line series capacitors and the transformers connected to these lines through the installation of neutral-blocking capacitors is possible. But, doing so for all utilities supporting 345 MV and above would prove economically prohibitive (Molinski, 2000). For instance, since the 1989 Quebec electricity outage, Hydro-Quebec has spent more than $1.2 billion on transmission line series capacitors (Government of Canada, 2002). Although hardening all high-voltage transmission lines and transformers is not likely an economically viable strategy, OECD member governments should consider encouraging electricity generation companies and publicly owned utilities to harden transformers connecting critical electricity generation facilities to their respective electrical grids. Ensuring the survival of these high-voltage transformers in the event of an extreme geomagnetic storm will facilitate faster restoration of national electrical grids and remove part of the likely demand for replacement high-voltage transformers in an extreme geomagnetic storm scenario.
4. OECD members should define an allocation process for replacement high-voltage transformers in the event of increased international demand following an extreme geomagnetic storm.
As discussed above, the major international aspects from such an event are likely to be competition for limited resources necessary for recovery of electric power transmission capabilities. Joint planning, therefore, is a clear necessity. The international community would be wise to establish a framework or at least a forum for discussing various mechanisms for prioritization of needs in a competitive environment. Willingness to cooperate post-crisis, however, will depend in many ways on the individual nations‘ policies and planning prior to the crisis, and likely anticipated demands from consumers, both individual and corporate. If one nation invests nothing in warning, emergency procedures, and exercises, for example, it will have difficulty arguing that it should be first in line to receive replacement transformers after a disaster strikes.
Similarly, the international community should have a common understanding of how and when to communicate the possibility of catastrophic effects from an extreme geomagnetic storm prior as an immediate alert. Public panic and unrest can be caused or exacerbated by conflicting or inaccurate information. Clear communications are facilitated by plans and international understanding of roles and responsibilities that have been established prior to an emergency.
To ensure that each participating nation participates to a degree to support such an international partnership, it may be helpful to conduct a more thorough risk assessment. The assessment included in this report is based largely on existing data that have severe limitations and assumptions where there are no data. There are many aspects of the scenario presented here that could be improved through simulation, exercises, and additional analysis of operational procedures. The physical aspects of geomagnetic storms are relatively well known. The reaction of infrastructure operators, the public, and government leaders are more uncertain. These require more thorough understanding so that appropriate incentives can be developed for optimum policy development and implementation.
5. National governments should conduct mission disruption assessments.
The critical infrastructure interdependence analysis included in this report indicates a wide range of critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors would suffer second-order consequences stemming from the first-order consequences of an extreme geomagnetic storm. This analysis identifies eight critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors likely to experience first-order disruptions as a result of an extreme geomagnetic storm:
1. Communications (Satellite)
2. Communications (Wireline)
3. Energy (Electric Power)
4. Information Technology
5. Transportation (Aviation)
6. Transportation (Mass Transit)
7. Transportation (Pipeline)
8. Transportation (Rail)
As described starting on page 27, disruptions to three of these critical infrastructures would drive second-order disruptions to other critical infrastructures. For example, an extreme geomagnetic storm would result in widespread outages in the electric grids of the U.S.A. and Canada, in turn driving second-order disruptions to 20 other critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors (using U.S. DHS definitions for critical infrastructure sectors and sub-sectors). The extreme geomagnetic storm described in the scenario also would drive similar widespread electricity outages in Western Europe and Scandinavia, with second-order consequences similar to those suffered in the U.S. and Canada likely. The scale of these second-order consequences will vary from country to country, depending on a range of factors such as domestic legislation dictating back-up power requirements for hospitals.
The potential for cascading effects on critical infrastructure stemming from an extreme geomagnetic storm means OECD member governments should carefully consider conducting formal risk assessments in at least two areas. First, at a minimum, OECD members should conduct critical infrastructure dependence exercises determining the cascading effects of the loss of electric power. In addition to providing insight into the consequences stemming from an extreme geomagnetic storm, this form of risk analysis will also be applicable to other hazards that could interrupt electricity supplies. Second, OECD member governments should conduct assessments evaluating their dependence on space-based assets for continuity of government. An extreme geomagnetic storm could result in both short- and longer-term disruptions to space-based assets leveraged by OECD member governments for communications, navigation, and information technology.
6. The international community needs a commonly applied methodology to evaluate social vulnerability.
The international community lacks a commonly accepted methodology to assess social vulnerability across national lines. With increasing interest in the implications of social unrest as a global shock, the OECD should take a leading role in facilitating the development of methodology that could be applied internationally. The analysis in this report uses the University of South Carolina Social Vulnerability Index, which is designed for analysis within the United States. This has provided useful insight into the contributors to social vulnerability and comparative analysis for prioritization efforts. To compare similar phenomena across national boundaries, the international community would need to overcome challenges of inconsistent population area definitions, internationally comparable socio-economic factors, and political considerations that allow for application to a variety of types of government, emergency management, and hazard mitigation. The benefits would be a more robust approach to comparing a wide variety of hazard risks to nations and populations across the globe.
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Read the full report here
h/t to Dr. Leif Svalgaard
Looks like a political event! 🙂
From what I read a while back about a modern day Carrington Event is that if most of the transformers worldwide (not necessarily the big ones at sub-station but those you see in your neighborhood) get damaged it could take up to 2 years to restore power to civilization. There are simply not enough available for total replacement.
Pretty much everybody would need to move closer to the equator in order to survive a single winter without power or heat. There would not be fuel in the pumps since it take electricity to run the pumps. No fuel, no transport… no food. Even those with food and generators could not survive that long.
It would be a dream situation for eugenicists but it would be a reverse situation where those countries that rely the most on technology and electricity would be the first to fall. Most third world countries could do ok since they often live under such conditions.
As Anthony says… it is not what if but when. The whole power system needs to be protected, from the satellites up to your power meter outside your house.
We are all over-insured but in this case it is our survival that is at play.
I am having difficulty understanding actual mechanism for the damage. I realize that a significant low frequency current imposed on a transformer winding can do significant damage, but I do not understand the current path. I would assume that a large loop would be needed to induce a significant current, but are the induced voltages from power lines to ground or from line to line? If they are from line to ground, what sort of DC voltages will the transformers have to withstand. Will DC power lines withstand these events better? I tried calculating the voltages that could be developed in a large power grid loop, but I do not understand how the conductivity of the earth plays into the equation.
I do not understand how a rate of change of a few microgauss per minute could damage any small (such as automobile sized or smaller) item. I have worked with many electromagnets which generated in excess of a Tesla. I think of one in particular which was a dipole about a yard long with rates of change in excess of 100 Tesla per second which I could feel in my steel toed boots from several feet away, but I never noticed any electronics acting strange around it even when within a few inches. An EMP pulse may be totally different, but I have never seen any data that gives real numbers for their characteristics.
I would greatly appreciate any links which could inform me to the extent that I could do my own calculations and see if I consider the assertions reasonable.
The one thing that seems reasonable to me is replace copper communication lines with fiber optical lines as soon as feasible.
Isn’t the good news the warning time will be 24 hours or more.
Park the car in your garage, turn everything off, disconnect from power lines and wait. Ammo, water and food for the aftermath. Pull your house off the grid with the breakers.
Best be prepared, if you hope to run and get supplies, you won’t. I would use hurricane procedures and supplies. We had a local two week electrical outage, it was getting tough.
By 1859 the sun was revving up again after the Dalton Minimum – stretching its muscles after a long sleep. The sun is now going into a quiet phase, and is perhaps less inclined to put on a spectacular like the Carrington Event.
@ur momisugly DesertYote says:
February 14, 2012 at 12:45 pm
I can neither confirm nor deny that I have some knowledge about this, but I doubt there would be a serious problem with modern munitions nor military aircraft. Though I have heard the Obama has been shutting down test facilities. Maybe he wants us to be vulnerable.
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So far this thread has focused on the potential technology disruption. But I think you touched on the real issue. That is what DHS and others are planning to put in place “just in case”. The ‘reason’ given (potential Carrington Event ) could result in many restrictions and costs. Especially as concerns the comments in the report regarding ‘civil unrest’. This is a very broad brush.
If people are interested Stuart Clark, in his book, The Sun Kings, Chapter 1, has sixteen pages of description of the events surrounding the Carrington flare.
The following article from the IEEE Transactions on Plasma Science (link below) might have some bearing on the question of how often over time and to what extent a really serious series of solar flares might occur. Now if the GPS birds go down as a result……..Now here’s a world crisis we can believe in.
If that does happen, ham radio operators, as they have many times over the past 100 years, will be ready and able to provide emergency communication outside the grid and without the need of any satellite comms assistance.
Jim
W3BH
“Characteristics for the Occurrence of a High-Current, Z-Pinch Aurora as Recorded in Antiquity”
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14145750/Anthony-Peratt-Characteristics-for-the-Occurrence-of-a-HighCurrent-ZPinch-Aurora-as-Recorded-in-Antiquity
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PLASMA SCIENCE, VOL. 31, NO. 6, DECEMBER 2003
Abstract—
The discovery that objects from the Neolithic or Early Bronze Age carry patterns associated with high-current Z-pinches provides a possible insight into the origin and meaning of these ancient symbols produced by man. This paper directly compares the graphical and radiation data from high-current Z-pinches to these patterns. The paper focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on petroglyphs. It is found that a great many archaic petroglyphs can be classified according to plasma stability and instability data. As the same morphological types are found worldwide, the comparisons suggest the occurrence of an intense aurora, as might be produced if the solar wind had increased between one and two orders of magnitude, millennia ago.
Current geomagnetic storm is relatively strong and still gaining in intensity , at the moment at 1% of the earths Z field and 4-5% of the horizontal, should be good for aurora viewing
http://flux.phys.uit.no/cgi-bin/plotgeodata.cgi?Last24&site=tro2a&
vboring says:
“I’m having a hard time imagining exactly how a flare could damage the electric transmission grid.”
There are three areas where the electric transmission grid is susceptible to damage from geo-magnetically induced currents (GICs) that occur during geo-magnetic disturbances (GMDs) – (1) harmonics, (2) heating, and (3) increased volt amperes resistance (VAr) consumption – http://www.ornl.gov/info/reports/2010/3445605747724.pdf .
Harmonics are distortions in the voltage or current wave, which manifest as cycle saturation of transformer cores – especially on extra high energy or EHV transmission systems ( those greater than 230 kilovolts or kV). These harmonics can cause the associated protective relays to operate prematurely, overload associated capacitor banks, and heat non-associated generator rotors.
Heating is caused by magnetic flux during cycle saturation, which extends beyond the transformer core. The fringing fields of the magnetic flux may produce eddy current heating, resulting in localized hot spots within the transformer’s casing. As a result, heating may cause damage to the transformer’s components (e.g., insulation, core windings, and casing walls). In addition, heating may also cause gassing (i.e., chemical decomposition due to thermal or electrical stress) of the transformer’s insulating oil (mineral oil dielectric fluid or MODF).
Increased VAr consumption occurs because cycle saturation reduces the magnetizing reactance (opposition to current flow because of inductance) in the transformer core, which increases (dramatically) the frequency (60 hertz or Hz in the U.S.) of the exciting current. This results in the transformer “appearing” as an inductive load on the electric transmission grid. The grid attempts to adjust to the false inductive load via reactive loading, which can lead to a voltage decrease – resulting in line load shedding and isolation or, when severe, system voltage collapse.
The good news is that any damage would be more annoying than civilization ending. As was done in the “olden days,” impacted lines and substations would be staffed manually to coordinate the restart (and monitor the operation of the electric transmission grid. It’d take time to replace damaged components, but that shouldn’t be overly disruptive to either the restart or continuity of operation thereafter.
Be that as it may, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) are concerned about the issue because it represents one of several High-Impact, Low Frequency (HILF) disruption events. And HILFs tend to directly impact a modern society’s ability to function at an “expected” technological level because of its dependence on a sustained electric transmission grid – http://www.nerc.com/files/HILF.pdf .
For reference, NERC is the electric reliability organization for North America and reports to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and equivalent in Canada, although it is not a governmental agency.
As examples of that dependence, recent weather events along the heavily populated east coast (Tropical Strom Irene in August 2011 and the Nor’easter in October 2011) revealed dramatically the changed expectations of customers in modern society (i.e., the Information Age) – http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/connecticut_attorney_general_d.html . An “act of god” is now a possible criminal offense because Billy couldn’t charge his iPad and watch his MTV…? Apparently, it very well may be.
Regardless of that drama, NERC has issued an Industry Advisory on the issue, which is essentially regarded as regulation by utilities – http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2011-05-10-01_GMD_FINAL.pdf . The Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) had already responded by developing and implementing GMD response action plans like the one issued by the Independent System Operator (ISO) in New England – http://www.iso-ne.com/rules_proceds/operating/sysop/rt_mkts/sop_rtmkts_0120_0050.pdf .
The short story: GMDs are of concern to electric utilities because of the GICs they produce. As a result, space weather is now monitored alongside terrestrial weather by the electric utilities. Response action plans address those areas requiring increased mitigation strategies to GICs, while emergency response plans address the restoration effort needed to restart the grid – regardless of the cause. The end result of these plans is to minimize the length of service interruption with the understanding that customer expectations need to be managed in advance and during GIC-precipitated interruptions by both the electric utilities and governmental authorities (state and federal emergency response agencies).
polistra says:
February 14, 2012 at 11:28 am
“The job of Heimatssicherheitsdienst is to maximize public panic, in order to maximize Heimatssicherheitsdienst budget and power. I don’t believe anything they say.”
Nice translation. But I would prefer “Heimatssicherheitsabteilung”; as “department” is “Abteilung”, while “Dienst” is “Service”. Or maybe “Abteilung für Heimatsicherung”.
Maybe not a War On The Sun; maybe a full cavity search will do!
Curiousgeorge says:
February 14, 2012 at 12:40 pm
A big fan the number .410 and 4 load.
Alan says:
February 14, 2012 at 11:36 am
“The only big scare that actually does scare me is: the threat of social unrest. Boy, do I ever distrust a crowd of humans. I’d rather be in the wild with a pack of horses and dogs, my best friends, when something bad happens.”
But the other humans distrust you as well; so you can use that to your advantage. Imagine you had a warning because you read WUWT. Now, the normal humans rely on MSM. In other words, just use the warning time to stock up on food that you can then sell for inflated prices to the starving neighbours. Sell them hand-cranked radios for a fortune.
Great opportunities in the EMP-struck city! In case a full scale evacuation is ordered: Prepare for hiding with some stocks of food. Start looting when all the neighbours are gone.
EMP And The City.
Fear mongering(?) – we and our systems will survive for reasons I have stated before as well.
See: PJM Manual 13, Emergency Operations page 51, titled “3.7 Geo-Magnetic Disturbances” as to how power transmission ops (operations) would handle this.
The short answer: The various ‘areas’ that are normally tied to together to form the actual grid (your local distribution is more a ‘hub and spoke’ system) will be what is termed “islanded” (separated) and all will be well; the long transmission paths that GIC (Geomagnetic Induced Currents) normally raise the all the havoc on at that point won’t exist …
Slow news day, crew?
.
Ya know, these ‘events’ haven’t exactly passed unnoticed by various organizations whose charter is to understand and recommend procedures to ‘cope’ with said events (and from a technical standpoint as well):
Prepared by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Power Systems Technology Program –
http://www.ornl.gov/~webworks/cpr/v823/rpt/51089.pdf
Electric Utility Experience Industry
with Geomagnetic Disturbances
Those engineers and scientists reading here may be interested in the above; reference to the actual physics with consideration of the magnitudes of the influencing magnetic field and the effects or consequences on electric power transmission hardware are discussed.
An earlier report here:
“Solar Storm Threat Analysis”:
http://www.breadandbutterscience.com/SSTA.pdf
From the conclusions-
“A Great solar storm has the potential of seriously damaging the North American electrical power grid. The resulting blackout will be focused on the northern tier of states and the East and West coast of the U.S. and throughout Canada. The damaged equipment in the power infrastructure would generally have a replacement lead time of over a year due to its uniqueness.
“Critical elements affected by the blackout will include water, sewage, commerce, industry,
banking, transportation, communications, and in the winter, heating. Because modern society relies so heavily on sophisticated technology, a long-term blackout will have a very profound effect on the fabric of society.
“A Great solar storm (comparable in size to solar storm of September 1859) will cause an increase in the number of cases of heart attacks, strokes, and cardiac arrest. The scope of this effect will be comparable to a doubling the overall daily death rate for the length of the solar storm (~ 4 days).”
However the author, James A. Marusek, has faith in the ability of the US to quickly repair the damage: “Should this threat materialize, I also expect the crisis would quickly elevate to the level of a national imperative. All available expertise, manpower, equipment and facilities would be brought to bear to fabricate and install key damaged infrastructure elements and move the electrical power grid back into operational status. Normally one might expect a year or two to replace this equipment but under a concerted effort and governmental mandate, I believe the damaged infrastructure could be resolved in the order of weeks rather than in years.”
As Corporal Jones would say, “don’t panic…”
And why is the DHS citing in the bibliography “Trenberth, Kevin (2005), ―Uncertainty in Hurricanes and Global Warming,‖ Science Magazine, June 2005”?
Actually timg56 has raised some issues that I have often wondered about:
Why 0.22 and not 0.25?
Why 0.38 and not 0.30 or 0.35? Or even 0.40?
Why 0.45 and not 0.40?
And why the heck is it 0.223?
Informed people want to know!
http://www.robertschoch.com/plasma.html
Bigger doom! 😉
I maybe thinking about this backwards but I won’t let that stop me. Massive magnetic fields or not there is only so much power that can be generated, which is a lot but not infinite. Could the power concentration be spread out to the point where it would not be a massive disaster?
There are a lot of conducting structures built, there is a lot of reinforcement metal in roads, a lot of big and small ships, a lot of metal in land fills and junkyards, a lot of metal poles, if we were to put aluminum wires on every wood pole in world would that be enough to spread out the power to a less disastrous level?
Las Vegas appears in pretty good shape! Maybe thats because you can eat the tourists!
345 MV ?
Just think … none of the above would mean anything at all to over 75% of the population of Central Africa.
Electricity? What’s that?
Can you imagine all the people unable to post on facebook what they are doing at the present moment? Oh the humanity!
For those asking, the CME front from the Carrington event, which made the journey in 18 hours, arrived well ahead of schedule according to on-line sources (Wikipedia). Radiation takes about nine minutes to arrive, but a CME usually requires several days. Ice core records suggest an average interval of about 500 years for geomagnetic events of that scale. As regards the DHS, even a stopped clock is right once or twice a day depending on its geographic location.
Ric Werme
February 14, 2012 at 11:19 am
I found this graphic in the report interesting, it suggests that New York, New England, and Seattle are the worst places to be in a Carrington type event.
New England? Vermont and New Hampshire are nearly all laid-back blue! And the red splotch in central Maine? no one lives there – it’s all trees, bear and moose. (Apologies to any WUWT readers who do live there – are there any?)
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Ric,
I grew up in Piscataquis County (the ‘Big Woods’.) No apology required; the population density is currently only 4 people/mi^2 which is about the same as it was when I left there 60 years ago.
I read the definition of SVI but I’m puzzled by Susan Cuttler’s rating of ‘Most Vulnerable’ for Piscataquis County; the same as New York City. I suspect that something is wrong with her methodology, data or math.
BTW, I live in York County now.