Guest Post by Willis Eschenbach
In oil, as in other extractive industries, you have what is called the “R/P ratio”. In the R/P ratio, “R” is reserves of whatever it is you are extracting, and “P” is the production rate, the rate at which you are extracting and using up your reserves.
Figure 1. World annual oil production in billions of barrels (blue line), and years left at that production rate (R/P ratio, red line). Right scale shows the proven oil reserves for each year, in billions of barrels (dotted green line). DATA SOURCE: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011, a most fascinating Excel spreadsheet. PHOTO Spindletop Hill Gusher, 1901
When you divide the amount you have in reserves by the rate at which you are extracting the resource, you get the number of years the reserves will last at that rate of extraction. Accordingly, I include the R/P ratio in Figure 1 as “Years Left”
A couple of things to point out. First, the “Years Left”, the R/P ratio, is currently more than forty years … and has been for about a quarter century. Thirty years ago, we only had 30 years of proven oil reserves left. Estimates then said we would be running out of oil about now.
Twenty-five years ago, we had about forty years left. Ten years ago we had over forty years left. Now we have over forty-five years left. I’m sure you see the pattern here.
Second, this is only what are termed “proven reserves” (Wiki). It does not include “unproven reserves”, much of which is in the form of unconventional oils such as shale oil and oil sands. Even discounting the unproven reserves, while the rate of production has increased, the proven reserves have also increased at about the same rate. So the R/P ratio, the years left at the current rate of production, has stayed over forty years for almost a quarter century..
Now, at some point this party has to slow down, nothing goes on forever … but the data shows we certainly don’t need to hurry to replace oil with solar energy or rainbow energy or wind energy in the next few decades. We have plenty of time for the market to indicate the replacement.
Don’t get me wrong. I’d love to find a better energy source than oil. In fact, the huge new sources of shale gas will substitute in many areas for things like heating oil, and will burn cleaner in the bargain. And I do think we’ll find new sources of energy, humans are endlessly inventive.
I’m just registering my protest against the meme of “OMG we’re running out of oil we must change energy sources right now tomorrow!!”. It is simply not true. We have plenty of time. We have decades. We don’t have to blow billions of dollars of our money subsidizing solar and wind and biofuels. The world has enough oil to last for a long while, plenty long enough for the market to determine whatever the next energy source might be.
w.
NOTE: Oil figures, particularly reserves, are estimates. Oil companies are notoriously close-mouthed about their finds and the extent of their holdings. The advantage of the BP figures is that they are a single coherent time series. Other data gives somewhat different results. As far as I know the increase in proven reserves despite increasing production is common to all estimates.
TimTheToolMan says:
December 15, 2011 at 9:18 pm (Edit)
Sure, Tim, that’s the ticket. Go on believing that. You mean smart people like King Hubbard, who did so well in mis-predicting peak oil, as have those that followed him.
w.
Tim the tool man, it’s time you stopped digging when you’re already in a big hole. Willis has stripped apart every single argument of yours threadbare and you’re like that emperor with no clothes.
jrwakefield says:
December 15, 2011 at 8:26 pm
Willis, re your graphs. Those graphs do not tell the story. How much of the latter production is from tertiary recovery? Saudi Arabia is a case in point. The granddaddy of all, Ghawar, is in tertiary recovery. They are pumping in more seawater around the deposit’s periphery than they get out in oil. Classic sign of old age, and imminent decline.
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Ghawar is just fine. The water injection is not a classic sign of anything, it is part of responsible management. There are oil fields producing 98% water that are still cranking out economic oil production.
My wife has worked on Ghawar, both for Aramco and Exxon Research. She has seen more core from the Arab-D reservoir than anyone I know. They had a problem with water by-pass through large pores from leached Cladocoropsis corals, and they are actually controlling that better today than in the past. We recently took a trip with some Saudi Aramco engineers, and they assured us the Saudis could increase production by 5 million barrels a day with current facilities.
jrwakefield, would you please, give Willis credit for a very good post for an oil industry outsider, and please, stop posting on subjects about which you have extremely limited knowledge. There is a world of difference between reading a few books and working hands on in the oil business.
Here’s a very technical and interesting article on Ghawar. The bottom line reads:
“…the whole of North Ghawar is either off plateau already, or getting close. That is something like 3.9mbpd of production based on last known figures. Whatever of this decline has not already occurred will mostly occur during the next decade. Southern Ghawar, by contrast, can maintain plateau for decades to come, but there is only 1.7mbpd of production there on last known figures.
While we cannot attribute an exact fraction at this time, it seems likely that not-altogether successful attempts to maintain the north Ghawar plateau to the bitter end explain a significant fraction of the sharp increase in oil rigs that began in 2004, as well as the production declines since that timeframe.”
Some parts of Ghawar have an aggressive water cut to maintain the flow rate. The Saudi’s are experts at wringing out every last drop of oil they can in a very systematic way. But the depletion rate is too great to for them to ramp up total production for all fields beyond about 9mbd. It appears the Saudi’s cannot be the swing producer they once were.
Although they still sit on a sea of oil, it always comes down to flow rate. And if flow rate cannot meet demand, we have peak.
Here’s the link to the full article:
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/2470
Edit note:
Pick one.
😉
RE: TimTheToolMan says: (December 15, 2011 at 7:51 pm)
“At the end of the day people far smarter than me have determined that diversifying our energy sources particularly with renewables and putting massive amounts of money and effort toward the R&D is the best thing to do and I’m inclined to agree with them.”
I believe that most traditional renewables are limited to average energy collection rates on the order of twenty megawatts per square kilometer. It seems to me that massive amounts of money and R&D effort would be better spent if directed toward more energy-dense, clean nuclear alternatives. This would seem to make more sense than trying to force-fit methods that are known to be inadequate.
In his video above, (Dec 15 at 1:17 am) former Vice President of Pfizer Inc and Science Applications International Corporation, Dr. Christopher H. Martenson talks about the difference between solvable problems and predicaments. I think the transition from carbon power to ‘renewable’ energy sources would qualify as a predicament.
In the light of the multi-peaked plots that Willis has presented, I think Dr. Martenson might qualify his non post-peak recovery statement to exclude those cases where advanced recovery of lower grade and previously unexploited deposits is also included.
Flat production since 2004, and massive price increases since the same point.[1] would suggest the oil industry has been struggling to raise total global production since 2004, either that or they choose not to produce more, even at 4x the 2004 price.
At the very least, questions should be asked of the oil industry as to why production is not being increased to lesson the impact of the global financial crisis. Maybe we can ask the bankers behind the oil industry about this in court if the fat lady ever sings about the banking crisis.
[1]http://www.mongabay.com/images/commodities/charts/crude_oil.html
Spector writes “It seems to me that massive amounts of money and R&D effort would be better spent if directed toward more energy-dense, clean nuclear alternatives.”
I tend to agree. I think nuclear energy would for a good interim baseload energy source. It would be much better than fossil fuel alternatives.
So Willis, you’re saying you do agree with peak oil but you dont agree with it? I’m confused. (yes this is your cue to misquote me to your advantage). But nevertheless…You appear to believe developing fossil fuel alternatives is the best option and yet you claim you’d like to see an alternative to them.
You imply that 40 years longevity is a viable estimate for current the production rate but accept that rates will probably drop. You believe that technology can continually improve production rates so that peaks aren’t an issue. You point to individual regions that dont reach peak although they might look like they have and by implication suggest this is the norm.
Normally I can understand the thrust or your aruments but on this one I’m lost. What exactly are you saying Willis? Are you really saying we dont have to worry about alternative energy sources because we can simply do what we’re doing for 40 more years? And then worry about it?
@willis
quote
“Sure, Tim, that’s the ticket. Go on believing that. You mean smart people like King Hubbard, who did so well in mis-predicting peak oil, as have those that followed him.
w.”
Hubbard nailed the peak for the US and it appears at the moment for the whole world he was only off by a few years, not bad for a “mis prediction”
crude oil plus condensate was all he was concerned with and given the data he had to work with and the nature of the hubbard linearization method missing the world peak by a few years is to be expected
There is no big conspiracy here or controversy nor is it any real big mystery as to how the ultimately recoverable reserves are calculated for a field based on the geology and geometry of an oil field. Nor is the production curve a mystery.
pete says:
December 15, 2011 at 8:54 pm
The peak oilers are as relentless as the warmists. Though when you see someone post that “fusion is dead” you know they are full of it.
———-
Read the section: 5.1. Remaining barriers to fusion energy
here: http://europe.theoildrum.com/node/5929
Willis: “world oil production is still rising.”
No it isn’t. The total of convensional liquids dropped since 2005. Hubbert was off by 5 years. Total production of all sources has been flat.
“WHAT’S THE POINT OF “PEAK OIL”?” Can indeed be predicted. Look at the flow rates, and state of oil fields, the rate of new discovery, the size of new discovery. There is only one conclusion, peak oil is imminent.
Doug says:
December 16, 2011 at 12:44 am
Ghawar is just fine. The water injection is not a classic sign of anything, it is part of responsible management. There are oil fields producing 98% water that are still cranking out economic oil production.
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Water injection is only done during tertiary production, that’s the last stage and indicates the life of a field is near the end. Cantarel is an example of that, so is the North Sea.
Now oil extraction pipes are only so big, can only allow for so much flow rate. When the water cut is 98% to oil, that means the flow rate of oil from that well is down to 2% from its peak flow rate. That means you have CONFIRMED peak oil.
Regarding Ghawar. And you believe the Saudis???? Read Twighlight in the Desert. They are liars.
jrwakefield says:
December 16, 2011 at 7:08 am
Water injection is only done during tertiary production, that’s the last stage and indicates the life of a field is near the end.
Regarding Ghawar. And you believe the Saudis???? Read Twighlight in the Desert. They are liars.
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Water injection is often done from day one of production. It is done for various reasons, such a ensuring proper sweep, and preventing down dip gas cap expansion.
I read “Twilight in the Desert” I could write a book on the errors. Simmons never worked in Saudi Arabia, but spent a few days there, (before claiming a nuclear bomb would be required to plug the BP well, and drowning in a hot tub). As far as believing the Saudis, I would not make a blanket statement that they are liars. Regardless of that, I didn’t say the engineers from Saudi we recently spoke with were from they Saudi government, you just assumed that.—they actually were Americans, with advanced degrees and decades of experience working with Aramco. And yes, I do believe them, as I believe my wife’s work
Flow rate tends to be determined by demand & consumption.
Increase flow rate significantly beyond demand & consumption and you cause the price to go down. Do you think that oil companies (especially the super-majors) and national oil companies want to cause the world price to go down?
Generally they don’t (althoough, occasionally Saudi Abrabia does for geo-political reasons or long term demand protection).
So, at least among the super-major oil companies and national oil companies (small independents just want to sell all the oil they are able to find and put on the market) there is some effort to balance production with demand or even tighten production in relation to demand to keep upward pressure on prices.
The answer to the flow rate is “a thousand straws”.
Here that means simply adding additional “straws” (oil wells to existing fields — yes that means they will deplete faster) so that production or “flow rate” maintains a rough equallibrium with demand & consumption.
Why the “peaker’s” fixation on flow rate? Easy, because the proven reservers, which Willis Eschenbach has done such a good job of presenting has falsified the earlier “peaker” gambit of asserting that geological reserves of the Earth’s crust are near exhaustion. Yes, I know that’s not what “peakers” argue when pushed. But the rapid declines they predict make their claims of peak production very close to simply claiming exhaustion.
Of course, now, “peakers” have changed even that claim by saying decline from peak will be gradual.
But that’s not what they claimed in the beginning. “Peaker’s” arguments evolve as each argument turns out to no match reality.
even if we keep on finding more oil, is it wise to keep on burning it up? we will eventually run out, whether it is in twenty years, forty years, or perhaps even a hundred years… why wait until we have burned up most of the oil before figuring out policies to use other energy sources? complex hydrocarbons can be made into all sorts of useful THINGS (how much plastic do we use? there are always more and more things made of plastic). this stuff is too valuable to just burn it up!
elbatrop says:
December 16, 2011 at 6:27 am
Hubbard nailed the peak for the US and it appears at the moment for the whole world he was only off by a few years, not bad for a “mis prediction”
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Hubbert was good a predicting time of inflections, nothing more. His numbers on flow rates and long term curve shapes bear no resemblance to reality.
Let’s look at his gas curve: He predicted clear back in 1956 that US gas production would peak in 1972 at 38 BCFD. It did hit a primary peak in 1973, but at 60 bcfd. His curve would have us now at 6 bcfd, but actually is is 63 bcfd (exceeding the “peak”) and climbing.
His oil curve is being warped beyond recognition too.
As in climate science, Hubbert’s models show prediction is difficult, especially if it is about the future
Doug says:
December 16, 2011 at 8:08 am
elbatrop says:
December 16, 2011 at 6:27 am
Hubbard nailed the peak for the US and it appears at the moment for the whole world he was only off by a few years, not bad for a “mis prediction”
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Hubbert was good a predicting time of inflections, nothing more. His numbers on flow rates and long term curve shapes bear no resemblance to reality.
Let’s look at his gas curve: He predicted clear back in 1956 that US gas production would peak in 1972 at 38 BCFD. It did hit a primary peak in 1973, but at 60 bcfd. His curve would have us now at 6 bcfd, but actually is is 63 bcfd (exceeding the “peak”) and climbing.
His oil curve is being warped beyond recognition too.
As in climate science, Hubbert’s models show prediction is difficult, especially if it is about the future
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You are arguing academics. Doesn’t matter if Hubbert got his numbers wrong, peak oil is real. It is a thermodynamic and physical fact. His error does not make peak oil a myth.
James F. Evans says:
December 16, 2011 at 7:55 am
Flow rate tends to be determined by demand & consumption.
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False. Flow rates have geological and technical constraints. For example the less pourus the host rock the slower the flow rate. The more viscus the oil, the slower the flow rate. Well pipes get clogged with minerals (especially off shore) and can throttle the flow rate to almost nothing, Tertiary recovery with water injection reduces the amount of oil from a well as the water cut increases. Even sand can be a major problem with some wells, killing them completely if the sand cut gets too high. Some wells in SA were shut down completely because the H2S content was too high and risk not only explosion but also deaths.
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The answer to the flow rate is “a thousand straws”.
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No. More “straws” kills fields. This is what happened in texas and destroyed their fields. Extract the oil too fast and the well pressure drops, when the well pressure drops, it goes below the bubble point for disolved gases, which then displace the oil. Take oil too fast, and water under the deposit starts to flow as it moves easier, and it kills the well completely.
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Here that means simply adding additional “straws” (oil wells to existing fields — yes that means they will deplete faster) so that production or “flow rate” maintains a rough equallibrium with demand & consumption.
False. As noted, the faster the flow rate, the LOWER the over all production from a well.
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Why the “peaker’s” fixation on flow rate? Easy, because the proven reservers, which Willis Eschenbach has done such a good job of presenting has falsified the earlier “peaker” gambit of asserting that geological reserves of the Earth’s crust are near exhaustion. Yes, I know that’s not what “peakers” argue when pushed. But the rapid declines they predict make their claims of peak production very close to simply claiming exhaustion.
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Peak oil is not about exhaustion, its about flow rate. Once the flow rate drops below demand you have price spikes. Someone then does without the oil they need.
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Of course, now, “peakers” have changed even that claim by saying decline from peak will be gradual.
But that’s not what they claimed in the beginning. “Peaker’s” arguments evolve as each argument turns out to no match reality.
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Peak oil has always been about gradual decline in output as per a bell curve. Just look at Hubbert’s original graphs.
actually given the way the hubbert linearization method works and how the other field parameters are derived or calculated being off substantially when it comes to natural gas is to be expected
Oil or liquids however have physical constraints which can’t be avoided like permeability, pressure, and viscosity with the last variable causing larger errors as it decreases with respect to how the linearization method is applied. You also have to have enough data and accurate enough data. If you have economic or political constraints that get in the way of production these too must be factored in.
Accuracy to within a few years or decade however is plenty, the changes needed to deal with it or mitigate it will take decades to happen even with the political will to do so. The sooner it is realized and acted on the better. The alternative sources of energy with their low density and economic leverage make for an ugly transition and even collapse if it is ignored for too long. Some will argue it is already too late. Exponential decline rates make for a pretty nasty reality.
Let’s assume that over the next two-hundred years, a majority of the world’s population is successfully rescued from poverty and from the ravages of overpopulation, and that this process occurs through the progressive industrialization of most 2nd-world and 3rd-world nations located in Asia and in Africa.
Let’s also assume that by the year 2300, three quarters of the world’s energy consumption occurs on the Asian and African continents as a direct result of the progressive industrialization of the nations and the populations which are located there.
If I was a betting man, and if I was predicting the future of the world’s energy resources over the next 100 to 200 years based on the above scenario, I would bet that both fusion and thorium will eventually be demonstrated to be technological and economic dead ends, and that what we call renewables — wind, solar, and geothermal — will at most comprise perhaps 15% of the world’s total energy resource.
I’ll speculate as well that in the year 2300, some combination of conventional-scale nuclear and modular-scale nuclear might hold another 15% market share of the world’s total energy resources.
My guess is that the majority fraction of the world’s energy resources for the next 100 to 200 years, possibly 70% or more, will still come from carbon fuels, simply for the fact that carbon fuels are very portable, are very energy dense, and have an easily managed and safely operated end-to-end supply chain infrastructure — just what is needed for 2nd and 3rd world nations whose populations are emerging from poverty and which need a fast and efficient means of implementing an energy consumption infrastructure on a fairly widespread basis.
In the year 2300, the world’s carbon fuel resources will comprise a broad mix of conventional coal reserves plus various liquid carbon fuels derived from a variety of sources — synthetic biofuels, natural gas, liquified natural gas, coal liquefaction, and whatever remains of the world’s conventional petroleum resources by that time.
If look at the liquid carbon fuels portion of the energy mix, and if we think of “oil” as being strictly the natural petroleum resources now being extracted from the ground, well of course there will be a “peak oil” event at some point in the future — twenty years from now, forty years from now, a hundred years from now — whenever it happens to happen.
But if we speculate that steady progress occurs in the technology and the economics of liquid carbon fuel production over the next two-hundred years, there is little reason to think that most of the world won’t still be largely relying on a carbon fuels infrastructure in the year 2300.
Doug says:
December 16, 2011 at 7:55 am
jrwakefield says:
December 16, 2011 at 7:08 am
Water injection is only done during tertiary production, that’s the last stage and indicates the life of a field is near the end.
Regarding Ghawar. And you believe the Saudis???? Read Twighlight in the Desert. They are liars.
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Water injection is often done from day one of production. It is done for various reasons, such a ensuring proper sweep, and preventing down dip gas cap expansion.
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Water cut reduces oil flow rate. The higher the cut, the less oil you extract.
Is Ghawar in tertiary recovery? Yes or no. If yes, then it’s very near the end of its life, output will fall. And yes, I know about the CO2 injection they plan on doing soon. Last ditched efforts to get every drop they can. That’s classic sign of a dying field.
Saudis lying? How come their reserves have not changed in 30 years of production? Not physically possible.
tertiary techniques usually end up extending the plateau period of production with a far steeper and shorter decline phase as exhibited by the north sea, cantarell, etc etc while only marginally changing the URR
Water drive or injection can be used conservatively but in general yes once the water cut is quite high there is not turning back and the field is well into its depletion phase with a permanent decline in production. This is pretty typical of the US with thousands of wells using water drive, they still produce but they still are in a permanent and gradual decline.
The Saudi’s have been gradually encircling ghawar with an ever tighter circle of recovery wells and injection wells, this can be seen by satellite. When it goes into decline if it isn’t already there it will quite likely be very quick and very steep. It’s an old old oil field that has been producing for a long time, even super giant fields deplete sooner or later.
TimTheToolMan says:
December 16, 2011 at 5:01 am
Tim, if you are going to accuse me of misquoting you, at least have the balls to indicate where I’m supposed to have done so. Otherwise it’s just as meaningful as a prediction of peak oil … but much more underhanded.
w.
Scott Brim says:
December 16, 2011 at 8:53 am
Let’s assume that over the next two-hundred years, a majority of the world’s population is successfully rescued from poverty and from the ravages of overpopulation, and that this process occurs through the progressive industrialization of most 2nd-world and 3rd-world nations located in Asia and in Africa.
—–
Though none of us will be around to bicker about 2300, I’ll add my 2c. By 2300 ocean travel will be 100% wind via wooden sail boats. Land travel will be a mix, short travel by horse and buggy, long distances by steam locomotives buring wood. We will still have electrical power, nukes, hydro and a bit of coal.
Liquid fuels, if any, will be allocated for food production.
But as wth all predictions of the future, they are all wrong.
Here’s what I don’t get about “peak oil”.
1) What is it good for?
I mean, suppose someone magically could once and for all prove that peak oil happened in 2004 … what would anyone do differently? Everyone knows that we’re somewhere near the peak, and that if it didn’t happen already it will happen in the next couple of decades or so. People are already beavering away at a rate of knots to find alternatives. So suppose we could establish the actual time of peak oil to the nearest minute …
So what?
I mean, what would you do differently if you knew peak oil had already passed? On the other hand, that difference would it make if you knew it would occur in 2014?
And that’s all assuming we could see it coming beforehand … but we’ve proven over and over that we can’t predict peak oil.
I see no benefit in the concept. We can’t see it coming, we may not be able to see it in the rear view window, and even if we could I greatly doubt that it would change anyone’s beliefs or actions.
So what good is it?
2) After decades of failures, why does anyone pay any attention to the incessant predictions (all with different dates) of peak oil?
Seriously, other than climate science, I can’t think of a field with as many totally failed predictions as peak oil. I listed only a tiny fraction of them above, there’s lots more. How come people still believe them?
As I mentioned above, I didn’t discuss “peak oil” in the head post because I find it meaningless. My point was quite different—the end of the era of oil will not happen suddenly, we’re not running out of oil, and we have decades to make the transition REGARDLESS OF WHEN PEAK OIL OCCURS.
w.
@Michael Irwin.
1. What is knowledge of Peak Oil good for? The economy floats on oil. As it declines so does the economic model of perpetual growth. We cannot continue sticking our head in the sand thinking nothing will change. It will. A change to a steady-state economy is essential. Urban form will drastically change; sprawl is out, density is in. Auto dependence is out, transit is in. Globalism is out local/regional manufacture is in. These will be fundamental changes. It’s best to be as prepared as we can. The longer we wait to change the worse it will get. Oil depletion will have long ranging political/military consequences as well, especially for the U.S.A. We gorge on oil, yet our own supply is fast falling. This will, I’m sure, force some sort of resource war in the future. What do you think the Iraq war was all about? The hope was to install a puppet government to ensure a steady supply of oil.
2. Can we see it coming? Yes we can, and those of who look (including Dick Cheney, who warned of it in 1998), see it coming. Do we know the exact date? No, but we know enough to say that ultimate peak production will about 92-95mbd; right now we’re at 88mbd or so.
3. Peak Oil not mentioned in the post? Come on! The entire post was all about Peak Oil. Why else talk about production and reserve.
4. The end of the oil era. Correct, the oil era won’t end overnight. We will still have oil long after we’ve gone through the political and economic upheavals depletion will cause. It’s just that it will be very costly, available in quantity only to rich nations or those still blessed with reserves. The rest will have to power down and make do.
5. We have decades to make the transition. No we don’t. Most oil experts predict permanent decline by 2020, or sooner. The oil infrastructure is enormous. It will take a generation of dedicated effort and trillions of dollars to transition away from primarily oil to primarily something else. In fact the latest IEA report (a conservative organization that is careful about what it says) concludes the world needs to spend $38 trillion dollars by 2035 to provide the energy we’ll need. That won’t happen.
We need to see the facts as they are, not as we wish them to be and make a concerted effort to change our way of life. Peak oil is a reality and has real consequences whether you believe it or not.
jrwakefield says:
December 16, 2011 at 8:28 am
jr, you seem to have missed Doug’s point. He didn’t say that “peak oil was a myth”. He didn’t hint that peak oil is a myth. He said nothing about it being a myth. That is nothing but your straw man.
Nor is he arguing “academics”. He is saying that Hubbard was unable to predict the peak gas, and that his “oil curve” bears no resemblance to reality. This is important because if we can only see the peak in the rear-view mirror and we can’t predict it in advance and the shape of the production curve doesn’t match reality … it’s kinda useless.
w.
actually you won’t have decades at all, the economic damage and change happens very quickly
going from a high leverage high density source to low density low leverage sources in a short time and the implications of real limits to total energy production mean an end to the way our current economic system and way of life functions
leverage is everything and there are limits to how low we can go and still run the systems and economies we have, most alternatives are borderline or fall short
The first signs are people and nations near the margins being priced right out of using much fossil energy at all, this has already happened and is ongoing and will get progressively worse.
The decline rate and scale makes a transition quite problematic. It is akin to retooling in the face of a semi permanent long term economic depression. Man doesn’t handle going backwards very well.