Dr. Leif Svalgaard writes advising me of this new paper published Jan. 17. After reading it, I’ll have to say that it isn’t a matter of “if” – it’s a matter of when we’ll get another CME like the Carrington Event in 1859 – which had it occurred today, would plunge our society into darkness and chaos as our sensitive electronics, networks, and power systems fail world-wide. The authors call such an event a “global Hurricane Katrina.” If activists and global warming worriers spent just a fraction of the time and money spent on on climate hysteria preparing for this inevitable event, we could ensure a continuance of our way of life. As it stands, they seem blind to this looming and certain threat and prefer squabbling over a few tenths of a degree change in temperature that may or may not be entirely man-made.
Excerpts of the paper follow.
Edward J. Oughton , Andrew Skelton, Richard B. Horne , Alan W. P. Thomson3, and Charles T. Gaunt
Abstract
Extreme space weather due to coronal mass ejections has the potential to cause considerable disruption to the global economy by damaging the transformers required to operate electricity transmission infrastructure. However, expert opinion is split between the potential outcome being one of a temporary regional blackout and of a more prolonged event. The temporary blackout scenario proposed by some is expected to last the length of the disturbance, with normal operations resuming after a couple of days. On the other hand, others have predicted widespread equipment damage with blackout scenarios lasting months. In this paper we explore the potential costs associated with failure in the electricity transmission infrastructure in the U.S. due to extreme space weather, focusing on daily economic loss. This provides insight into the direct and indirect economic consequences of how an extreme space weather event may affect domestic production, as well as other nations, via supply chain linkages. By exploring the sensitivity of the blackout zone, we show that on average the direct economic cost incurred from disruption to electricity represents only 49% of the total potential macroeconomic cost. Therefore, if indirect supply chain costs are not considered when undertaking cost-benefit analysis of space weather forecasting and mitigation investment, the total potential macroeconomic cost is not correctly represented. The paper contributes to our understanding of the economic impact of space weather, as well as making a number of key methodological contributions relevant for future work. Further economic impact assessment of this threat must consider multiday, multiregional events.
1. Introduction
Space weather disturbances of the upper atmosphere and near-Earth space can disrupt a wide range of tech- nological systems [Hapgood et al., 2012]. Over the past decade many reports have analyzed the potential effects of extreme space weather on electricity transmission infrastructure [Space Studies Board, 2008; OECD, 2011; JASON, 2011; North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2012; Cannon et al., 2013]. The economic costs associated with these extreme events have been heralded as being as high as $1–2 trillion in the first year, equivalent to a so-called “global Hurricane Katrina.” To date, however, there has been a lack of transparent research around how these direct and indirect economic costs actually stack up, which is surprising given the level of debate and uncertainty surrounding the vulnerability of electricity transmission infrastructure to extreme space weather.
Research in this paper has been produced by a similar team that originally developed the Helios Solar Storm Scenario [Oughton et al., 2016]—the first space weather stress test for the global insurance industry. Ultimately, these are different pieces of work. Helios purposefully explored the sensitivity of economic loss due to different temporal restoration periods, in order to provide a tool for stressing the portfolio exposure of global insurance companies. Helios is not a prediction but a hypothetical range of scenarios to enable miti- gation of space weather risks in the insurance industry. On the other hand, this paper focuses purely on the daily direct and indirect economic consequences of how an extreme space weather event may affect U.S. domestic production, as well as other nations via supply chain linkages, based on different blackout zones.
Two opposing views have emerged. On the one hand, some believe that the potential damage would not be that large and that we are relatively well prepared to deal with an extreme geomagnetic disturbance (GMD). The worst case scenario is seen to be an electrical collapse of the transmission grid, probably initiated by loss of voltage stability that will consequently protect the power system assets from damage. The grid connec- tions could then be reestablished, leading to a disruption only lasting hours or a few days. On the other hand, there are those who believe that damage might be initiated before a system loses stability or might occur outside the region of the electrical collapse and that we could end up with extensive damage to equipment and a doomsday-type catastrophe scenario where blackouts last weeks, even months, until exposed assets (with many supply issues) are replaced. There is still disagreement among these perspectives, and therefore, it is not surprising that the recent U.S. National Space Weather Action Plan [National Science and Technology Council, 2015] identifies the need for improved assessment, modeling, and prediction of the impact of this threat on critical infrastructure systems. Although there has been substantial development in the credibility of these perspectives in recent years, there is a valid need to explore how disruption to electricity transmis- sion infrastructure might affect our economy and society.
Modern economies increasingly rely on a variety of critical interdependent infrastructure systems powered by electricity. Although space weather can be caused by a variety of phenomena including solar particle events and bursts of electromagnetic radiation from solar flares, it is coronal mass ejections (CMEs) which are mostly associated with the long-term catastrophe scenarios that have been characterized in the literature. CMEs pose the main risk to Earth and its modern, technological society because large (1012 kg), relatively dense (100/cm3), and fast (>500 km s-1) CMEs hitting Earth with a southward interplanetary magnetic field direction (Bz) can give rise to extreme GMDs [Möstl et al., 2015; Temmer and Nitta, 2015; Balan et al., 2014].
Significant events may see quantities considerably larger than the numbers stated here. These have the potential to damage and disrupt the aviation, satellite, GPS, and electricity networks that our economy and society depend on. This is particularly problematic because failure in the power sector can cascade to other critical interdependent infrastructure systems, disrupting business activities and inducing a range of other economic and social consequences that can affect the global economy [Ouyang, 2014; Anderson et al., 2007; Haimes and Jiang, 2001; Rinaldi et al., 2001].
In particular, it is acknowledged that an extreme GMD has the potential to generate geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) that could initiate permanent damage to extra high voltage (EHV) transformers. Failure in these critical assets could cause system-wide instability issues leading to cascading failure. Further, such high-value assets are not necessarily easy to procure and replace in the short term. Understanding the economic impact of space weather risks can improve mitigation procedures and practices, as it can guide where limited resources should be allocated to improve economic resilience. Moreover, in industry it is not just utility com- panies who are concerned with catastrophe scenarios; the potential loss to insurance companies due to casualty and business interruption payouts could be enough to threaten the viability of certain companies in this sector (despite the use of limits and deductibles on insurance policies). Even during a relatively calm period of solar activity (2000–2010), Schrijver et al. [2014] have shown that there can be significant equipment loss and related business interruption claims for the insurance industry. Estimates of the potential economic loss associated with catastrophic events are able to be used to stress test asset exposure in the insurance industry and beyond. Indeed, in the UK General Insurance Stress Test 2015 undertaken by the Bank of England’s Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), insurers are required to undertake exposure stress tests for an extreme space weather event.
The scope of this paper has been guided by a recent workshop that focused on understanding the potential impacts of extreme space weather on the global economy. Held at the Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, UK, this event gathered together representatives from space physics, economics, catastrophe modeling, actuarial science, and law, with those from the property, casualty, and space insurance industry. Now that the motivation for the paper has been introduced, section 1 will present background material and examine past events. Section 2 will outline the methodology, and section 3 will report the results and discussion. Finally, conclusions will be presented in section 4.
…
4. Conclusions
This paper explored the direct and indirect daily economic costs associated with different scenarios of extreme space weather on mainland U.S., focusing on the upstream and downstream supply chain impact. The total daily economic loss to the U.S. economy associated with a storm within 55° ± 2.75° geomagnetic latitude (S1) was $6.2 bn (15% of daily U.S. GDP). This is predicated on approximately 8% of the population being left without power. This is supplemented by an indirect loss to the global economy via supply chain linkages with other nations of $0.8 bn per day. The total daily economic loss to the U.S. economy associated with a storm within 50° ± 2.75° geomagnetic latitude (S2), leaving 44% of the U.S. population without power, was $37.7 bn (91% of daily U.S. GDP). The indirect loss to the global economy via supply chain linkages with other nations is a further $4.8 bn per day. The S3 scenario with a blackout zone of 45° ± 2.75° geomagnetic latitude (S3) left 23% of the population without power. The total daily economic loss to the U.S. economy was
$16.5 bn (41% of daily U.S. GDP), and the indirect loss to other nations totaled $2.2 bn. Finally, the S4 scenario (50° ± 7.75° geomagnetic latitude) affected 66% of the U.S. population leading to an estimated potential eco- nomic loss of $41.5 billion per day to the U.S. economy (100% of daily U.S. GDP), combined with a daily loss to the global economy of $7 billion.
A key finding was that the direct economic cost incurred from disruption to electricity within the blackout zone was only a fraction of the total cost for those scenarios explored. On average in this study, only 49% of the total economic loss took place in the area affected by the storm, with a further 39% being lost indirectly in the U.S. outside of the blackout zone. A total of 12% of the impact took place internationally. Therefore, there is a great need when undertaking cost-benefit analysis of space weather forecasting and mitigation investment to consider the domestic and global indirect costs that could accrue via supply chains disruption; otherwise, the potential total cost is not being correctly represented.
However, this analysis focused only on the U.S., when in reality we could be susceptible to a multiday, multi- regional extreme space weather event. As a consequence, there is a need to undertake further economic impact assessment including Europe and East Asia, with multiple blackout zones, in order to understand the potential global cost associated with this threat.
Full paper –open access: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2016SW001491/full
It’s just a theory.
This whole thread is a colonal mass ejection of alarmism. What is going on, or, WUWT? It will end up because of CO2. The climateers are scrambling for more scary stuff as the funding ax descends.
Right. None of us know what we’re talking about.
Since there is disagreement. ..of course it follows that folks don’t know.
Sceptical tropes
Oh its just a “conspiracy”, sheesh it is a real risk, probably a world ending risk, with a certain percentage of nuke plants not shutting down properly and melting down. 10% of 440 nuke plants is 44 meltdowns.
Survivable? Ask the Pacific how its doing
March 1989: Hydro-Quebec’s power grid is completely shut down by a ~0.5 x Carrington event, resulting in ~6 million folks w/out power for ~9hrs (a few spots were out for a few days). The cost in repairs was ~C$10,000000 to H-Q’s equipment, & no casualties were blamed on either the CME or resulting blackout.
January 1998: Hydro-Quebec’s grid suffers multiple failures due to widespread damage & destruction of their grid due to ice storms. At the height of the outage ~3 to 4 million are without power, 90% of those affected see the power off for ~7 days, and the outage was not fully ended for more than a month. Some 35 people died from the storm & resulting loss of heat in the middle of winter, and almost a thousand were treated at area emergency rooms. H-Q’s equipment was not fully repaired until March of that year, at a cost of ~C$800,000,000.
When assessing risk, we must examine not only the possible damage, but also the likelihood of the event. In addition, it’s helpful to consider whether such events have happened before, and if so, how they were/would be dealt if they do occur again. My impression is that ice storms in the Canadian winter are far more likely than Carrington-scale solar events to do major damage to our power grids & communications networks, and while both are potentially acute, the ice storms are more likely to present long-term recovery problems.
As a SATCOM service provider, I have to admit: I’m really not all that concerned about the Sun smashing us back to the 1600s… although I am slightly more concerned about it (very slightly concerned)than I am the possibility of the Kessler Syndrome (not at ALL concerned). Others are welcome to their opinions though, I’m sure.
You don’t believe that the grid has improved in the 27 years since 1989?
@MarkW — What about what I wrote makes you think I believe that? I’m just comparing “apples to apples.”
Smokey, as an expert in energy systems and EMF protection, I wrapped a SATCOM in stainless steel, with wave guides and RF filters, and the entire backup power systems inside the shield.
When we did the final cutover, it literally required an approval of congress. You can imagine the expense.
“They” know the impact on critical infrastructure.
It seems the goverment is trying to do something about EMP but they are not doing nearly enough.
http://www.wnd.com/2017/01/gingrich-warns-of-very-dangerous-obama-directive/?cat_orig=us
Gingrich warns U.S. of ‘very dangerous’ Obama directive
“The day before President Trump was inaugurated, a Democrat-controlled commission set new standards to protect America’s life-sustaining electric grid that will leave the U.S. vulnerable to a devastating electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attack from a hostile nation such as North Korea or Iran.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s directive, issued Jan. 19, will protect the nation only from an EMP caused by solar activities. . .”
“Former Ambassador Henry Cooper – who was President Ronald Reagan’s chief representative in the “Star Wars” initiative negotiations with the Soviet Union and SDI director under President George H.W. Bush – agreed that should Trump repeal the directive immediately and appoint new FERC commissioners “who will represent him by putting America first — not the electric power industry.”
Cooper said in a commentary for Family Security Matters “the shortsighted FERC rule means that when the ‘powers that be’ ever get around to addressing the more threatening problem, they will have to start all over again in upgrading whatever they do in response to the less threatening threat.”
“The ‘manmade’ EMP threat includes a much higher amplitude low frequency component and contains high frequency components that are not part of the ‘natural’ EMP threat,” he said.
Cooper explained that protecting the grid from the manmade EMP threat also protects it from the natural EMP threat, but the converse is not true.”
end excerpts
Gingrich is FOS; a ‘paid’ lackey and spokesman on issues he has no scientific grasp off.
“Renowned Physicists Cast Doubt on Gingrich’s Far-Fetched Scenario about EMP weapons”
From: https://fabiusmaximus.com/2011/12/14/32077/
(3) How Congress gouged out its own eyes on science issues
In the mid-1990s, when Gingrich was Speaker of the House, Congress dismantled its Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a highly professional and objective organization that advised Congress on complex scientific and technical issues. Republican Roger Herdman, a medical doctor who was OTA’s last director, was quoted by journalist Chris Mooney in the September / October 2005 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists as saying, “There are those who said the Speaker [Gingrich] didn’t want an internal congressional voice that had views on science and technology that might differ from his.”
A major CME hitting the Earth in the near term in the 21st century would create a very valuable database for planning future protection and post-CME repair contingencies. Before that, the cost effectiveness of mitigating against the next one is hard to calculate given the next might be in the 21st century, or it might be in the 22nd century or etc, etc . . . .
Contingency repair plans to use after a major CME might be more cost effective that all encompassing measures preventing damage to electrical/electronic systems.
John
How do you rebuild when there is no electricity? Mitigation is definitely the smart thing to do.
There are no “spare” large transformers, they are made to order.
Actually, major transformers are usually backed up.
John
Appreciate a link reference to document the back up
John, worked for an electric utility for 20 yrs. There are only a few of the large transformer backups — not nearly enough to replace all or even half of them.
Could anything really be more scaring than Climate Change?
Maybe the climateers have spotted some signs on the wall, and now are testing out other theories to keep the scare alive. From time to time you will also hear something of meteors.
They have given up on peak oil, coal etc, because then you could not increase the CO2 content to catastrophic level.
Is that your real name?
Come on!
Some good sites for imagery, data, and observations.
https://sdo.gsfc.nasa.gov/gallery/main/
https://sohowww.nascom.nasa.gov
https://stereo.gsfc.nasa.gov Albeit they are still having issues with the Behind satellite.
Several things here.
1. The cost to rebuild a large blast furnace in 1997 dollars (which is the last time I did one) was 1.2 billion us bucks. Time to do this is 4 to 8 months. Not a trivial task because anytime the burden is dropped there is a lot of damage from thousands of tons of molten iron. Scada systems for power stations and the electric grid are accessible from the internet, but there are lots of hoops to jump through do do that. Again, not a trivial task.
2. Unless the Norks have much bigger bombs than anybody else the EMP effects would be fairly localized.
I mean you could take out Washington DC (Please!!!) and some of the surrounding area but not much else. I doubt the effects would go as far as say Richmond or Philthydelphia.
The best thing would be to consult Maxwell and see what his assessment is.
This is probably a bit overstated. A Carrington event would be really bad for primitive systems like we had in the 1950s, but today’s more flexible systems would probably fail relatively gracefully, with few key components damaged and most replaceable within days. There would be serious problems, but the power would be back on within days for 90% of the US population.
I’m sure CO2 makes a Carrington-like event much more likely…
/sarc
“which had it occurred today, would plunge our society into darkness and chaos as our sensitive electronics, networks, and power systems fail world-wide. ”
AS I’ve written before, this is unfounded and un-based BULLSHIT.
It is a waste of time anymore countering this kind of tripe … let those who enjoy an atmosphere of fear and trepidation, those few but vocal ‘Lemmings’ and Luddites who can’t find a reason to exist without a bogey man to ‘shadow box’ with, presumably hiding just out of sight beyond the back door …